Narrative:

On a 4 mi final approach to runway 27R at phl airport we got a TA from our TCASII. It was 900 ft above us and to our right. We looked for him and didn't see him. He was not really a factor for us. We continued our approach and at about 1/2 mi from the runway saw an small aircraft on final approach to runway 35. At about the same time we saw him, the tower controller sent him around. He at first asked if he could go over us and land long. The tower told him no. He went around, right over the top of us at 100-200 ft above. While talking to the tower chief later he said the other aircraft at first complained of a 'sputtering engine.' if we had been sent around we would have come very close to hitting the small aircraft. I don't know why the situation was allowed to proceed as far as it was before being corrected. Exactly 1 week earlier on the same flight from phx to phl with the same WX conditions (VFR) a similar incident took place. The winds at 1000 ft MSL were 330 degrees at 35 KTS. This obviously affects runway 35 operations more than aircraft landing on runway 27R. While on final approach to runway 27R we were notified of an aircraft landing on runway 35. The winds slowed the other plane so much that there was going to be a conflict. We were told to go around on short final. When we eventually got back on final approach, at 8 mi from the runway, we were not notified of traffic on runway 35, but saw him on our TCASII. We were told speed was at our discretion. When we told the tower of the possible conflict they agreed and told us to slow to final approach speed. We heard from another air crew later, that a widebody transport air carrier had been sent around on short final earlier that day for a similar tower controller inability to foresee a possible traffic conflict. They need to be made more aware of what winds are doing to aircraft if intersecting runway operations are going to be used most efficiently.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR HAS NMAC WITH SMA WHICH IS THEN ISSUED A GAR.

Narrative: ON A 4 MI FINAL APCH TO RWY 27R AT PHL ARPT WE GOT A TA FROM OUR TCASII. IT WAS 900 FT ABOVE US AND TO OUR R. WE LOOKED FOR HIM AND DIDN'T SEE HIM. HE WAS NOT REALLY A FACTOR FOR US. WE CONTINUED OUR APCH AND AT ABOUT 1/2 MI FROM THE RWY SAW AN SMA ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 35. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME WE SAW HIM, THE TWR CTLR SENT HIM AROUND. HE AT FIRST ASKED IF HE COULD GO OVER US AND LAND LONG. THE TWR TOLD HIM NO. HE WENT AROUND, RIGHT OVER THE TOP OF US AT 100-200 FT ABOVE. WHILE TALKING TO THE TWR CHIEF LATER HE SAID THE OTHER ACFT AT FIRST COMPLAINED OF A 'SPUTTERING ENG.' IF WE HAD BEEN SENT AROUND WE WOULD HAVE COME VERY CLOSE TO HITTING THE SMA. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE SIT WAS ALLOWED TO PROCEED AS FAR AS IT WAS BEFORE BEING CORRECTED. EXACTLY 1 WK EARLIER ON THE SAME FLT FROM PHX TO PHL WITH THE SAME WX CONDITIONS (VFR) A SIMILAR INCIDENT TOOK PLACE. THE WINDS AT 1000 FT MSL WERE 330 DEGS AT 35 KTS. THIS OBVIOUSLY AFFECTS RWY 35 OPS MORE THAN ACFT LNDG ON RWY 27R. WHILE ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 27R WE WERE NOTIFIED OF AN ACFT LNDG ON RWY 35. THE WINDS SLOWED THE OTHER PLANE SO MUCH THAT THERE WAS GOING TO BE A CONFLICT. WE WERE TOLD TO GAR ON SHORT FINAL. WHEN WE EVENTUALLY GOT BACK ON FINAL APCH, AT 8 MI FROM THE RWY, WE WERE NOT NOTIFIED OF TFC ON RWY 35, BUT SAW HIM ON OUR TCASII. WE WERE TOLD SPD WAS AT OUR DISCRETION. WHEN WE TOLD THE TWR OF THE POSSIBLE CONFLICT THEY AGREED AND TOLD US TO SLOW TO FINAL APCH SPD. WE HEARD FROM ANOTHER AIR CREW LATER, THAT A WDB ACR HAD BEEN SENT AROUND ON SHORT FINAL EARLIER THAT DAY FOR A SIMILAR TWR CTLR INABILITY TO FORESEE A POSSIBLE TFC CONFLICT. THEY NEED TO BE MADE MORE AWARE OF WHAT WINDS ARE DOING TO ACFT IF INTERSECTING RWY OPS ARE GOING TO BE USED MOST EFFICIENTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.