Narrative:

Flight phl to atl departed from gate. Pushback was commenced with marshaller hand signals with no interphone communication. Ground clearance for engine start was conveyed with hand signals to the pilot. After pushback was complete another hand signal was given to apply the brakes. The marshaller then disappeared under the nose of the aircraft, the tow bar was disconnected, and the tug returned to the gate. The crew contacted ground control and requested/obtained taxi clearance. An abnormally long time elapsed then the captain asked the first officer if the right side of the aircraft was clear. The first officer checked for obstructions and responded all clear. The captain then cleared the left side and forward of the aircraft. No personnel or equipment were visible near the aircraft and the tug was seen back at the gate. Assuming the marshaller departed the aircraft, the captain commenced taxi. Shortly thereafter, the marshaller reappeared in front of the aircraft and gave the hold hand signal. The marshaller (a mechanic) then directed the crew to taxi back to the gate, once again only with hand signals. Upon arrival at the gate, the crew was informed that the aircraft hit a baggage cart while ramp personnel were preparing to load late arriving baggage after pushback. Also, after gate arrival, the crew was informed by maintenance that ramp personnel had a difficult time opening the forward cargo door. Apparently the marshaller, who was a mechanic, left his duties to assist in opening the cargo door. However, the forward cargo door annunciator or master caution lights did not illuminate. The crew had no idea that late arriving baggage was going to be loaded, the forward cargo door would not open, and ground personnel were still in the vicinity of the aircraft. I feel this incident occurred due to poor communications and could have been prevented with 2-WAY voice communication. Pushback personnel must keep the crew informed of ground operations and should maintain 2-WAY voice communications to ensure safe operations. To prevent future incidents of this type, recommend pushback crews use interphone procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG HITS BAGGAGE CART IN UNAUTH TAXI PROC.

Narrative: FLT PHL TO ATL DEPARTED FROM GATE. PUSHBACK WAS COMMENCED WITH MARSHALLER HAND SIGNALS WITH NO INTERPHONE COM. GND CLRNC FOR ENG START WAS CONVEYED WITH HAND SIGNALS TO THE PLT. AFTER PUSHBACK WAS COMPLETE ANOTHER HAND SIGNAL WAS GIVEN TO APPLY THE BRAKES. THE MARSHALLER THEN DISAPPEARED UNDER THE NOSE OF THE ACFT, THE TOW BAR WAS DISCONNECTED, AND THE TUG RETURNED TO THE GATE. THE CREW CONTACTED GND CTL AND REQUESTED/OBTAINED TAXI CLRNC. AN ABNORMALLY LONG TIME ELAPSED THEN THE CAPT ASKED THE FO IF THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT WAS CLR. THE FO CHKED FOR OBSTRUCTIONS AND RESPONDED ALL CLR. THE CAPT THEN CLRED THE L SIDE AND FORWARD OF THE ACFT. NO PERSONNEL OR EQUIP WERE VISIBLE NEAR THE ACFT AND THE TUG WAS SEEN BACK AT THE GATE. ASSUMING THE MARSHALLER DEPARTED THE ACFT, THE CAPT COMMENCED TAXI. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE MARSHALLER REAPPEARED IN FRONT OF THE ACFT AND GAVE THE HOLD HAND SIGNAL. THE MARSHALLER (A MECH) THEN DIRECTED THE CREW TO TAXI BACK TO THE GATE, ONCE AGAIN ONLY WITH HAND SIGNALS. UPON ARR AT THE GATE, THE CREW WAS INFORMED THAT THE ACFT HIT A BAGGAGE CART WHILE RAMP PERSONNEL WERE PREPARING TO LOAD LATE ARRIVING BAGGAGE AFTER PUSHBACK. ALSO, AFTER GATE ARR, THE CREW WAS INFORMED BY MAINT THAT RAMP PERSONNEL HAD A DIFFICULT TIME OPENING THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR. APPARENTLY THE MARSHALLER, WHO WAS A MECH, LEFT HIS DUTIES TO ASSIST IN OPENING THE CARGO DOOR. HOWEVER, THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR ANNUNCIATOR OR MASTER CAUTION LIGHTS DID NOT ILLUMINATE. THE CREW HAD NO IDEA THAT LATE ARRIVING BAGGAGE WAS GOING TO BE LOADED, THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR WOULD NOT OPEN, AND GND PERSONNEL WERE STILL IN THE VICINITY OF THE ACFT. I FEEL THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED DUE TO POOR COMS AND COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED WITH 2-WAY VOICE COM. PUSHBACK PERSONNEL MUST KEEP THE CREW INFORMED OF GND OPS AND SHOULD MAINTAIN 2-WAY VOICE COMS TO ENSURE SAFE OPS. TO PREVENT FUTURE INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE, RECOMMEND PUSHBACK CREWS USE INTERPHONE PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.