Narrative:

Prior to departing crestview, fl, bob sikes airport, I had received a briefing for my original destination, mccomb, la. After departing, I decided to divert to hammond, la, due to the WX progress that predicted better WX for my intended departure the following morning en route to my final destination, taft, ca. I had received flight following until I had the airport in sight. I called unicom to get advisories and was informed that runway 18 was in use. As I neared the airport I saw another aircraft doing touch-and-goes and I thought I had idented the runway they were using. As I established my downwind, I idented the numbers at the end of the runway, thought they looked 'not quite' right, and continued. I was, at this point looking hard for the traffic I had seen earlier and did not refocus on the runway numbers until I was on short final. I called a change to runway 13 and just as I was rounding out to touchdown and looked ahead I saw the yellow X on the runway. At about the same time, someone came on unicom and said runway 13 was closed. Since I was already committed to a sink rate, I looked ahead to see if I needed to take some immediate corrective action. I did not see the trench about 1500 ft down the runway. I elected to continue the landing. After I had used up about half of the available runway, the trench came into view. I did not think I could execute a safe go around and attempted to stop prior to the trench. As it turned out I needed about 10 ft more of runway to successfully complete the stop. The nosewheel went into the 15 inch deep trench at less than 2 mph. When the nosewheel dropped into the trench, the right propeller struck the ground damaging approximately 5 inches of each of 3 blades. Contributing factors: the haze and light conditions at that time of day prevented me from seeing the numbers clearly. That I had incorrectly idented the runway the aircraft was shooting touch-and-goes on lulled me into thinking I had the correct runway idented. My incorrect decision to continue the landing after I had seen the closed runway symbol 'X'. Perhaps someone could have told me the 13 was closed when I called for advisories. The lights marking the trench were sitting in the bottom of the trench and were weak and ineffective in those light conditions. Note: one of the contractors representatives said they had placed the lights in the bottom of the trench because the wind kept blowing them over. Additionally, the dirt that would normally have formed a bank, that might have helped me identify the trench, had been removed making the 3 ft wide trench almost impossible to identify from distances normal to lndgs. This was my first landing at that unfamiliar airport. Corrective actions: I should have called the nearest FSS when I diverted from my original destination to get a briefing on my new destination. I should have flown a 360 degree turn around the airport to familiarize myself prior to entering the traffic pattern. I should not have continued the landing after having idented the closed runway. The airport and the contractor should take steps to make the actual hazard more identifiable. Note: there are many airports in the united states that have X's on the runways that are closed for various reasons. No longer maintained, landing or taking off over residential areas, prisons, etc, where no real hazard is presented. Human factors: none, other than those already noted above.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SMT LANDED ON A CLOSED RWY.

Narrative: PRIOR TO DEPARTING CRESTVIEW, FL, BOB SIKES ARPT, I HAD RECEIVED A BRIEFING FOR MY ORIGINAL DEST, MCCOMB, LA. AFTER DEPARTING, I DECIDED TO DIVERT TO HAMMOND, LA, DUE TO THE WX PROGRESS THAT PREDICTED BETTER WX FOR MY INTENDED DEP THE FOLLOWING MORNING ENRTE TO MY FINAL DEST, TAFT, CA. I HAD RECEIVED FLT FOLLOWING UNTIL I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I CALLED UNICOM TO GET ADVISORIES AND WAS INFORMED THAT RWY 18 WAS IN USE. AS I NEARED THE ARPT I SAW ANOTHER ACFT DOING TOUCH-AND-GOES AND I THOUGHT I HAD IDENTED THE RWY THEY WERE USING. AS I ESTABLISHED MY DOWNWIND, I IDENTED THE NUMBERS AT THE END OF THE RWY, THOUGHT THEY LOOKED 'NOT QUITE' RIGHT, AND CONTINUED. I WAS, AT THIS POINT LOOKING HARD FOR THE TFC I HAD SEEN EARLIER AND DID NOT REFOCUS ON THE RWY NUMBERS UNTIL I WAS ON SHORT FINAL. I CALLED A CHANGE TO RWY 13 AND JUST AS I WAS ROUNDING OUT TO TOUCHDOWN AND LOOKED AHEAD I SAW THE YELLOW X ON THE RWY. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, SOMEONE CAME ON UNICOM AND SAID RWY 13 WAS CLOSED. SINCE I WAS ALREADY COMMITTED TO A SINK RATE, I LOOKED AHEAD TO SEE IF I NEEDED TO TAKE SOME IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION. I DID NOT SEE THE TRENCH ABOUT 1500 FT DOWN THE RWY. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE LNDG. AFTER I HAD USED UP ABOUT HALF OF THE AVAILABLE RWY, THE TRENCH CAME INTO VIEW. I DID NOT THINK I COULD EXECUTE A SAFE GAR AND ATTEMPTED TO STOP PRIOR TO THE TRENCH. AS IT TURNED OUT I NEEDED ABOUT 10 FT MORE OF RWY TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE STOP. THE NOSEWHEEL WENT INTO THE 15 INCH DEEP TRENCH AT LESS THAN 2 MPH. WHEN THE NOSEWHEEL DROPPED INTO THE TRENCH, THE R PROP STRUCK THE GND DAMAGING APPROX 5 INCHES OF EACH OF 3 BLADES. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE HAZE AND LIGHT CONDITIONS AT THAT TIME OF DAY PREVENTED ME FROM SEEING THE NUMBERS CLRLY. THAT I HAD INCORRECTLY IDENTED THE RWY THE ACFT WAS SHOOTING TOUCH-AND-GOES ON LULLED ME INTO THINKING I HAD THE CORRECT RWY IDENTED. MY INCORRECT DECISION TO CONTINUE THE LNDG AFTER I HAD SEEN THE CLOSED RWY SYMBOL 'X'. PERHAPS SOMEONE COULD HAVE TOLD ME THE 13 WAS CLOSED WHEN I CALLED FOR ADVISORIES. THE LIGHTS MARKING THE TRENCH WERE SITTING IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH AND WERE WEAK AND INEFFECTIVE IN THOSE LIGHT CONDITIONS. NOTE: ONE OF THE CONTRACTORS REPRESENTATIVES SAID THEY HAD PLACED THE LIGHTS IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH BECAUSE THE WIND KEPT BLOWING THEM OVER. ADDITIONALLY, THE DIRT THAT WOULD NORMALLY HAVE FORMED A BANK, THAT MIGHT HAVE HELPED ME IDENT THE TRENCH, HAD BEEN REMOVED MAKING THE 3 FT WIDE TRENCH ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO IDENT FROM DISTANCES NORMAL TO LNDGS. THIS WAS MY FIRST LNDG AT THAT UNFAMILIAR ARPT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: I SHOULD HAVE CALLED THE NEAREST FSS WHEN I DIVERTED FROM MY ORIGINAL DEST TO GET A BRIEFING ON MY NEW DEST. I SHOULD HAVE FLOWN A 360 DEG TURN AROUND THE ARPT TO FAMILIARIZE MYSELF PRIOR TO ENTERING THE TFC PATTERN. I SHOULD NOT HAVE CONTINUED THE LNDG AFTER HAVING IDENTED THE CLOSED RWY. THE ARPT AND THE CONTRACTOR SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO MAKE THE ACTUAL HAZARD MORE IDENTIFIABLE. NOTE: THERE ARE MANY ARPTS IN THE UNITED STATES THAT HAVE X'S ON THE RWYS THAT ARE CLOSED FOR VARIOUS REASONS. NO LONGER MAINTAINED, LNDG OR TAKING OFF OVER RESIDENTIAL AREAS, PRISONS, ETC, WHERE NO REAL HAZARD IS PRESENTED. HUMAN FACTORS: NONE, OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY NOTED ABOVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.