Narrative:

After departing the parking area in milan, ATC approved our takeoff on 17L versus the previously planned 35R. The taxi distance to 17L was much shorter, and in anticipation of 17L as our departure runway, the captain briefed the flight attendants of a possibly 'short taxi.' after gate departure, the captain advised the so to remind the flight attendants again that the taxi time would be reduced. The so complied, but had to interrupt the first flight attendant's briefing to do so. As we approached the holding point for 17L, the tower cleared us into position for takeoff. I stated to the captain that the flight attendants were still making their passenger announcements, but he replied that the flight attendants were aware of the short taxi and that they would be ready for takeoff in time. As we taxied onto 17L, the tower cleared us for an immediate takeoff, due to incoming traffic to 35R. Again, I stated that the flight attendants were still not ready and suggested we visually ensure that they were seated before commencing the takeoff. The so also confirmed that the flight attendants were still making their safety announcements but the captain assured us that the flight attendants were ready. The so made her announcements to the flight attendants to prepare for takeoff. Immediately after entering the active runway, 17L, the captain applied takeoff power, not giving the flight attendants adequate time to finish their demonstration and seat themselves. The captain continued the takeoff, in spite of having briefed that the takeoff was to be mine. As a result, the takeoff was made with the flight attendants standing in the aisles and galley. The forward galley doors were also not all properly stowed. Fortunately, no one was injured and the takeoff proceeded normally after that. Probably causes of this situation were the captain's mindset to continue the takeoff in spite of the concerns expressed by myself and the so, further influenced by a sense of urgency expressed by the tower controller. A visual inspection by the cockpit crew of the cabin crew could help to prevent future occurrences of this type from happening.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF ACR LGT ACFT TKOF WHEN THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE NOT ALL SEATED AND SAFETY BELTED IN ADDITION, SOME ACFT CABIN EQUIP WAS NOT SECURE.

Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING THE PARKING AREA IN MILAN, ATC APPROVED OUR TKOF ON 17L VERSUS THE PREVIOUSLY PLANNED 35R. THE TAXI DISTANCE TO 17L WAS MUCH SHORTER, AND IN ANTICIPATION OF 17L AS OUR DEP RWY, THE CAPT BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS OF A POSSIBLY 'SHORT TAXI.' AFTER GATE DEP, THE CAPT ADVISED THE SO TO REMIND THE FLT ATTENDANTS AGAIN THAT THE TAXI TIME WOULD BE REDUCED. THE SO COMPLIED, BUT HAD TO INTERRUPT THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT'S BRIEFING TO DO SO. AS WE APCHED THE HOLDING POINT FOR 17L, THE TWR CLRED US INTO POS FOR TKOF. I STATED TO THE CAPT THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE STILL MAKING THEIR PAX ANNOUNCEMENTS, BUT HE REPLIED THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE AWARE OF THE SHORT TAXI AND THAT THEY WOULD BE READY FOR TKOF IN TIME. AS WE TAXIED ONTO 17L, THE TWR CLRED US FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF, DUE TO INCOMING TFC TO 35R. AGAIN, I STATED THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE STILL NOT READY AND SUGGESTED WE VISUALLY ENSURE THAT THEY WERE SEATED BEFORE COMMENCING THE TKOF. THE SO ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE STILL MAKING THEIR SAFETY ANNOUNCEMENTS BUT THE CAPT ASSURED US THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE READY. THE SO MADE HER ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO PREPARE FOR TKOF. IMMEDIATELY AFTER ENTERING THE ACTIVE RWY, 17L, THE CAPT APPLIED TKOF PWR, NOT GIVING THE FLT ATTENDANTS ADEQUATE TIME TO FINISH THEIR DEMO AND SEAT THEMSELVES. THE CAPT CONTINUED THE TKOF, IN SPITE OF HAVING BRIEFED THAT THE TKOF WAS TO BE MINE. AS A RESULT, THE TKOF WAS MADE WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS STANDING IN THE AISLES AND GALLEY. THE FORWARD GALLEY DOORS WERE ALSO NOT ALL PROPERLY STOWED. FORTUNATELY, NO ONE WAS INJURED AND THE TKOF PROCEEDED NORMALLY AFTER THAT. PROBABLY CAUSES OF THIS SITUATION WERE THE CAPT'S MINDSET TO CONTINUE THE TKOF IN SPITE OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY MYSELF AND THE SO, FURTHER INFLUENCED BY A SENSE OF URGENCY EXPRESSED BY THE TWR CTLR. A VISUAL INSPECTION BY THE COCKPIT CREW OF THE CABIN CREW COULD HELP TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES OF THIS TYPE FROM HAPPENING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.