Large transport flight crew makes wrong direction turn, enters prohibited area.

Attributes
ACN	206118
Time
Date	199203
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : dca
State Reference	DC
Altitude	msl bound lower : 3000 msl bound upper : 3000
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : dca
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	climbout : initial climbout : takeoff climbout : intermediate altitude
Route In Use	departure other departure sid : sid
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 600
ASRS Report	206118
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time type : 100
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : clearance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other spatial deviation
Independent Detector	other controllera other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	flight crew : became reoriented flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Departure from runway 36 (dca) calls for a combined visual/instrument sequence. The captain (less than 100 hours in type and new to dca operation) was hesitant about the procedure for departure. We held short of runway 36 for 10 min to discuss the procedure. This my 5TH trip out of dca for the month. It was my opinion that he finally understood and was reasonably comfortable with the departure procedure sequence (note: light loaded large transport, maximum power takeoff setting -- hi power/thrust performance) on takeoff the acceleration of the aircraft and climb performance of the aircraft was more than the captain had anticipated. In his effort to focus on the massive climb performance and getting the acceleration and climb rate under control, he flew through the intercept radial, engaged LNAV (should have stayed in manual intercept and heading select) and the FMC commanded a right turn. (The FMC on this departure will not slow radial intercept). The turn should have been to left to intercept, as well as re-intercept due to overshoot, but followed the FMC which commanded the right turn. This caused a 65 degree off course away from the intercept heading to intercept. Now we are approaching level off (5000 ft) and penetration of prohibited/restr airspace. I was in process of responding to his (captain) other commands for engagement of other functions all first officer duties. I finally noticed the FMC commanded right and immediately called for a hard left turn to back on course. By this time, ATC also called for the turn. The captain was all consumed with the high acceleration and climb performance and was overwhelmed by the events and stunned/confused. Apparently, we didn't penetrate the P/right airspace, but the confusion on the captain's part of the departure sequence created the insufficient FMC/pilot interface -- resulting in our deviation. Solution: ensure that all factors are understood by both pilots, plan of action established and unquestionable perception of what the FMC is doing for us.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLC MAKES WRONG DIRECTION TURN, ENTERS PROHIBITED AREA.

Narrative: DEP FROM RWY 36 (DCA) CALLS FOR A COMBINED VISUAL/INST SEQUENCE. THE CAPT (LESS THAN 100 HRS IN TYPE AND NEW TO DCA OP) WAS HESITANT ABOUT THE PROC FOR DEP. WE HELD SHORT OF RWY 36 FOR 10 MIN TO DISCUSS THE PROC. THIS MY 5TH TRIP OUT OF DCA FOR THE MONTH. IT WAS MY OPINION THAT HE FINALLY UNDERSTOOD AND WAS REASONABLY COMFORTABLE WITH THE DEP PROC SEQUENCE (NOTE: LIGHT LOADED LGT, MAX PWR TKOF SETTING -- HI PWR/THRUST PERFORMANCE) ON TKOF THE ACCELERATION OF THE ACFT AND CLB PERFORMANCE OF THE ACFT WAS MORE THAN THE CAPT HAD ANTICIPATED. IN HIS EFFORT TO FOCUS ON THE MASSIVE CLB PERFORMANCE AND GETTING THE ACCELERATION AND CLB RATE UNDER CTL, HE FLEW THROUGH THE INTERCEPT RADIAL, ENGAGED LNAV (SHOULD HAVE STAYED IN MANUAL INTERCEPT AND HDG SELECT) AND THE FMC COMMANDED A R TURN. (THE FMC ON THIS DEP WILL NOT SLOW RADIAL INTERCEPT). THE TURN SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO L TO INTERCEPT, AS WELL AS RE-INTERCEPT DUE TO OVERSHOOT, BUT FOLLOWED THE FMC WHICH COMMANDED THE R TURN. THIS CAUSED A 65 DEG OFF COURSE AWAY FROM THE INTERCEPT HDG TO INTERCEPT. NOW WE ARE APCHING LEVEL OFF (5000 FT) AND PENETRATION OF PROHIBITED/RESTR AIRSPACE. I WAS IN PROCESS OF RESPONDING TO HIS (CAPT) OTHER COMMANDS FOR ENGAGEMENT OF OTHER FUNCTIONS ALL FO DUTIES. I FINALLY NOTICED THE FMC COMMANDED R AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR A HARD L TURN TO BACK ON COURSE. BY THIS TIME, ATC ALSO CALLED FOR THE TURN. THE CAPT WAS ALL CONSUMED WITH THE HIGH ACCELERATION AND CLB PERFORMANCE AND WAS OVERWHELMED BY THE EVENTS AND STUNNED/CONFUSED. APPARENTLY, WE DIDN'T PENETRATE THE P/R AIRSPACE, BUT THE CONFUSION ON THE CAPT'S PART OF THE DEP SEQUENCE CREATED THE INSUFFICIENT FMC/PLT INTERFACE -- RESULTING IN OUR DEV. SOLUTION: ENSURE THAT ALL FACTORS ARE UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH PLTS, PLAN OF ACTION ESTABLISHED AND UNQUESTIONABLE PERCEPTION OF WHAT THE FMC IS DOING FOR US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.