Narrative:

We were being vectored for the ILS 11R at msp. Subsequently they changed our approach to 11L, which requires some distrs for the PNF to change the FMGC computer. We were sequenced behind a widebody transport ahead on the 11L approach. We were given lower speed changes to provide separation with the widebody transport. Inside the OM we began to experience some localizer fluctuations. I seemed to recall hearing tower clear an large transport B on to position and hold on 11L, then tower said the separation was not sufficient and asked the large transport B to immediately exit the runway. I later verified with tower that this did occur. We got increased fluctuations on the localizer due to this and the autoplt was searching back and forth to follow it. Although I did not feel the fluctuations were enough to require a go around I did decide to disconnect the autoplt and hand fly the approach. The captain did not realize I had done this. He thought the autoplt had automatic- disconnected so he reengaged it. I said 'that was me' meaning that was me and not the airplane that had disconnected the autoplt. He said 'oh' and proceeded to then disengage the autoplt. This caused some confusion and as I tried to reestablish myself on the localizer, we broke out. The captain called out the runway to the left. We were offset more than I had expected and having an FAA airworthiness inspector on the jumpseat, I considered a go around. I don't know our exact altitude but I believe it was around 400-500 ft AGL. I maneuvered left and realigned with the runway by about 200 ft AGL. The landing and rollout were normal. The captain later stated he estimated we touched down within the first 1500 ft of the runway. We queried ground control on our runway with ILS's in progress. They seemed very nonchalant. The FAA person asked us about the misalignment with the runway centerline after we parked at the gate, she seemed concerned. This was a new captain on day 3 of a 5-DAY trip after the other captain had gotten off sick. My first leg with him was with the FAA on so we hadn't had a chance to develop a smooth operating rapport. It was difficult for me to get feedback as to any uncomfortableness on the captain's part. Due to the autoplt confusion, our standard altitude callouts were missing. The captain never showed need for a go around, just the opposite when he pointed out the runway, this made me want to complete the approach to a landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ON APCH HAS FLUCTUATION OF ILS NEEDLES AS WDB LANDS AHEAD AND LGT CLRED ON THEN OFF RWY. HDG DEV.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE ILS 11R AT MSP. SUBSEQUENTLY THEY CHANGED OUR APCH TO 11L, WHICH REQUIRES SOME DISTRS FOR THE PNF TO CHANGE THE FMGC COMPUTER. WE WERE SEQUENCED BEHIND A WDB AHEAD ON THE 11L APCH. WE WERE GIVEN LOWER SPD CHANGES TO PROVIDE SEPARATION WITH THE WDB. INSIDE THE OM WE BEGAN TO EXPERIENCE SOME LOC FLUCTUATIONS. I SEEMED TO RECALL HEARING TWR CLR AN LGT B ON TO POS AND HOLD ON 11L, THEN TWR SAID THE SEPARATION WAS NOT SUFFICIENT AND ASKED THE LGT B TO IMMEDIATELY EXIT THE RWY. I LATER VERIFIED WITH TWR THAT THIS DID OCCUR. WE GOT INCREASED FLUCTUATIONS ON THE LOC DUE TO THIS AND THE AUTOPLT WAS SEARCHING BACK AND FORTH TO FOLLOW IT. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT FEEL THE FLUCTUATIONS WERE ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A GAR I DID DECIDE TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT AND HAND FLY THE APCH. THE CAPT DID NOT REALIZE I HAD DONE THIS. HE THOUGHT THE AUTOPLT HAD AUTO- DISCONNECTED SO HE REENGAGED IT. I SAID 'THAT WAS ME' MEANING THAT WAS ME AND NOT THE AIRPLANE THAT HAD DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. HE SAID 'OH' AND PROCEEDED TO THEN DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT. THIS CAUSED SOME CONFUSION AND AS I TRIED TO REESTABLISH MYSELF ON THE LOC, WE BROKE OUT. THE CAPT CALLED OUT THE RWY TO THE L. WE WERE OFFSET MORE THAN I HAD EXPECTED AND HAVING AN FAA AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTOR ON THE JUMPSEAT, I CONSIDERED A GAR. I DON'T KNOW OUR EXACT ALT BUT I BELIEVE IT WAS AROUND 400-500 FT AGL. I MANEUVERED L AND REALIGNED WITH THE RWY BY ABOUT 200 FT AGL. THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL. THE CAPT LATER STATED HE ESTIMATED WE TOUCHED DOWN WITHIN THE FIRST 1500 FT OF THE RWY. WE QUERIED GND CTL ON OUR RWY WITH ILS'S IN PROGRESS. THEY SEEMED VERY NONCHALANT. THE FAA PERSON ASKED US ABOUT THE MISALIGNMENT WITH THE RWY CTRLINE AFTER WE PARKED AT THE GATE, SHE SEEMED CONCERNED. THIS WAS A NEW CAPT ON DAY 3 OF A 5-DAY TRIP AFTER THE OTHER CAPT HAD GOTTEN OFF SICK. MY FIRST LEG WITH HIM WAS WITH THE FAA ON SO WE HADN'T HAD A CHANCE TO DEVELOP A SMOOTH OPERATING RAPPORT. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO GET FEEDBACK AS TO ANY UNCOMFORTABLENESS ON THE CAPT'S PART. DUE TO THE AUTOPLT CONFUSION, OUR STANDARD ALT CALLOUTS WERE MISSING. THE CAPT NEVER SHOWED NEED FOR A GAR, JUST THE OPPOSITE WHEN HE POINTED OUT THE RWY, THIS MADE ME WANT TO COMPLETE THE APCH TO A LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.