Narrative:

I was at the flight engineer panel for takeoff out of lgw, act in the capacity of international relief officer. The flight had been late out of fra, and because of passenger loading and missing our slot, we were going to be even more late out of lgw. Then all of a sudden, the doors were closed and we were going to be able to leave earlier than thought. There was a last min flurry of ATC calls and calls to the cockpit from the cabin. Because of the latter, I wasn't aware of commencing our pushback when it started. When I realized, my attention was directed to my panel. That's when I heard the first officer remark about the INS's not being in navigation. The aircraft was stopped. After a discussion, it was suggested that the INS's were ok and that with the INS's in navigation, no fault codes, no warning lights, green navigation lights on, and '1's' indicated that all systems were ok. The flight was continued. Sometime after takeoff a comparator light came on, while that was being investigated, the other ones also came on. The captain elected to return and a normal overweight landing was performed. Contributing factors were the extra time involved to load passengers because of security, the inflexibility of slot times and a high degree of anxiety with the flight attendants (lockerbie). Also, in this respect the flight attendants did not have the calming influence of the captain on the bus ride to the airport (split crew). This was translated into an unusual amount of interphone to the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB HAS TO RETURN LAND LGW WHEN IT IS DISCOVERED THAT THE INS'S WERE NOT PROPERLY ALIGNED.

Narrative: I WAS AT THE FLT ENGINEER PANEL FOR TKOF OUT OF LGW, ACT IN THE CAPACITY OF IRO. THE FLT HAD BEEN LATE OUT OF FRA, AND BECAUSE OF PAX LOADING AND MISSING OUR SLOT, WE WERE GOING TO BE EVEN MORE LATE OUT OF LGW. THEN ALL OF A SUDDEN, THE DOORS WERE CLOSED AND WE WERE GOING TO BE ABLE TO LEAVE EARLIER THAN THOUGHT. THERE WAS A LAST MIN FLURRY OF ATC CALLS AND CALLS TO THE COCKPIT FROM THE CABIN. BECAUSE OF THE LATTER, I WASN'T AWARE OF COMMENCING OUR PUSHBACK WHEN IT STARTED. WHEN I REALIZED, MY ATTN WAS DIRECTED TO MY PANEL. THAT'S WHEN I HEARD THE FO REMARK ABOUT THE INS'S NOT BEING IN NAV. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED. AFTER A DISCUSSION, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE INS'S WERE OK AND THAT WITH THE INS'S IN NAV, NO FAULT CODES, NO WARNING LIGHTS, GREEN NAV LIGHTS ON, AND '1'S' INDICATED THAT ALL SYSTEMS WERE OK. THE FLT WAS CONTINUED. SOMETIME AFTER TKOF A COMPARATOR LIGHT CAME ON, WHILE THAT WAS BEING INVESTIGATED, THE OTHER ONES ALSO CAME ON. THE CAPT ELECTED TO RETURN AND A NORMAL OVERWT LNDG WAS PERFORMED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE EXTRA TIME INVOLVED TO LOAD PAXS BECAUSE OF SECURITY, THE INFLEXIBILITY OF SLOT TIMES AND A HIGH DEG OF ANXIETY WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS (LOCKERBIE). ALSO, IN THIS RESPECT THE FLT ATTENDANTS DID NOT HAVE THE CALMING INFLUENCE OF THE CAPT ON THE BUS RIDE TO THE ARPT (SPLIT CREW). THIS WAS TRANSLATED INTO AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF INTERPHONE TO THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.