Narrative:

Lax landing to the west. Crossing smo VOR approach controller asked if we could do a 'short approach' to runway 24L. We replied 'sure.' approach controller said 'traffic you are following is a widebody transport on 2 mi final runway 24L report him in sight.' I replied 'in sight.' approach controller said 'traffic you will cross over is 6 mi east of the airport he is for runway 24R. It's an medium large transport, turn your base, contact the tower, you're cleared visual runway 24L.' we turned base and switched frequencys and heard nothing but blocked xmissions, one after another. I was looking over my shoulder looking for traffic in general when I saw the medium large transport headed towards us. He leveled off. The tower asked him if he could salvage the approach. He said yes and did. I do not feel he took evasive action. He did level off. It did not appear abrupt or evasive. On my 3RD transmission the tower cleared us to land on runway 24L. We were on 1 1/2 mi final. Ground control requested that I call tower. I did and talked to a supervisor. He asked why I had turned in front of medium large transport. This is what I told him. 1) I was not asked to identify the medium large transport or report him in sight. 2) when the controller turned our base without us having to make the traffic call I assumed he was providing traffic separation on a visual approach. (I admit to you this was wrong.) I knew he was out there I did not know where. 3) blocked transmission prevented clear and concise but most important timely information. He told me that TRACON told him I was informed about medium large transport. This is only partly accurate. I asked him what would be the next step, he said no action, he just wanted to know what I thought about the situation. I admit I could have been more vigilant. I feel that TRACON could have been more precise in pointing out the medium large transport. Also it was the 1ST time I have flown with this first officer. We also had some maintenance items that were MEL'ed that added to our workload. I have a list of some things I now implement in my cockpit on an every-day basis. Now I have 2 more. All of these come about because of bad experiences in the los angeles area. 1) no intersection takeoffs -- ever. Full length only. 2) when told to 'taxi into position and hold' position the aircraft so that final approach course can always be seen. 3) no 'VFR climbs' or dscnts. 4) no 'VFR on top.' new: 5) both pilots must see called traffic before it is reported 'in sight.' new: 6) no more short approachs. This is always an unstable maneuver at best.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG HAD CONFLICT WITH ACR X DURING VISUAL APCHS TO MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL RWYS AT LAX. SEE AND AVOID.

Narrative: LAX LNDG TO THE W. XING SMO VOR APCH CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD DO A 'SHORT APCH' TO RWY 24L. WE REPLIED 'SURE.' APCH CTLR SAID 'TFC YOU ARE FOLLOWING IS A WDB ON 2 MI FINAL RWY 24L RPT HIM IN SIGHT.' I REPLIED 'IN SIGHT.' APCH CTLR SAID 'TFC YOU WILL CROSS OVER IS 6 MI E OF THE ARPT HE IS FOR RWY 24R. IT'S AN MLG, TURN YOUR BASE, CONTACT THE TWR, YOU'RE CLRED VISUAL RWY 24L.' WE TURNED BASE AND SWITCHED FREQS AND HEARD NOTHING BUT BLOCKED XMISSIONS, ONE AFTER ANOTHER. I WAS LOOKING OVER MY SHOULDER LOOKING FOR TFC IN GENERAL WHEN I SAW THE MLG HEADED TOWARDS US. HE LEVELED OFF. THE TWR ASKED HIM IF HE COULD SALVAGE THE APCH. HE SAID YES AND DID. I DO NOT FEEL HE TOOK EVASIVE ACTION. HE DID LEVEL OFF. IT DID NOT APPEAR ABRUPT OR EVASIVE. ON MY 3RD XMISSION THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 24L. WE WERE ON 1 1/2 MI FINAL. GND CTL REQUESTED THAT I CALL TWR. I DID AND TALKED TO A SUPVR. HE ASKED WHY I HAD TURNED IN FRONT OF MLG. THIS IS WHAT I TOLD HIM. 1) I WAS NOT ASKED TO IDENT THE MLG OR RPT HIM IN SIGHT. 2) WHEN THE CTLR TURNED OUR BASE WITHOUT US HAVING TO MAKE THE TFC CALL I ASSUMED HE WAS PROVIDING TFC SEPARATION ON A VISUAL APCH. (I ADMIT TO YOU THIS WAS WRONG.) I KNEW HE WAS OUT THERE I DID NOT KNOW WHERE. 3) BLOCKED XMISSION PREVENTED CLR AND CONCISE BUT MOST IMPORTANT TIMELY INFO. HE TOLD ME THAT TRACON TOLD HIM I WAS INFORMED ABOUT MLG. THIS IS ONLY PARTLY ACCURATE. I ASKED HIM WHAT WOULD BE THE NEXT STEP, HE SAID NO ACTION, HE JUST WANTED TO KNOW WHAT I THOUGHT ABOUT THE SITUATION. I ADMIT I COULD HAVE BEEN MORE VIGILANT. I FEEL THAT TRACON COULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRECISE IN POINTING OUT THE MLG. ALSO IT WAS THE 1ST TIME I HAVE FLOWN WITH THIS FO. WE ALSO HAD SOME MAINT ITEMS THAT WERE MEL'ED THAT ADDED TO OUR WORKLOAD. I HAVE A LIST OF SOME THINGS I NOW IMPLEMENT IN MY COCKPIT ON AN EVERY-DAY BASIS. NOW I HAVE 2 MORE. ALL OF THESE COME ABOUT BECAUSE OF BAD EXPERIENCES IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA. 1) NO INTXN TKOFS -- EVER. FULL LENGTH ONLY. 2) WHEN TOLD TO 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD' POS THE ACFT SO THAT FINAL APCH COURSE CAN ALWAYS BE SEEN. 3) NO 'VFR CLBS' OR DSCNTS. 4) NO 'VFR ON TOP.' NEW: 5) BOTH PLTS MUST SEE CALLED TFC BEFORE IT IS RPTED 'IN SIGHT.' NEW: 6) NO MORE SHORT APCHS. THIS IS ALWAYS AN UNSTABLE MANEUVER AT BEST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.