Narrative:

After completing pwrback from gate we executed an extremely acute left turn to clear an aircraft parked at gate. We delayed our pwrback allowing air carrier B flight to pass behind us. Taxi clearance was requested for, and received along with notice of ATIS change. The flight engineer was obtaining new ATIS and first officer began preparing the new runway takeoff data chart. We were cleared to runway 35. Original chart was completed for runway 32. I examined my charts, and because of the deep unbroken darkness, I activated all taxi and landing lights and saw no guiding markings indicating correct route. I mentally pictured east and F taxiways (the way to 35), noted my 1-1 chart with a glance, and marking air carrier B taxi progress, made a slight left turn to what I thought to be east taxiway, then a right to F. I was still aware of air carrier B, and simultaneously, as I mistakenly entered runway 35, he turned towards me and copilot and I recognized the error. Air carrier B made the initial call as we reached for microphones to inform the tower. After some hesitation, the tower issued directions to clear the runway to the left on east. We complied. I feel several factors that led to this incursion were: 1) multiple construction lights between taxiway D and east without pattern or direction. 2) inadequate taxi lane markings and signs. 3) a conflict of diagrams of the location of east taxiway between charts oma 1-1 and 11-1 and the reality of the situation. 4) a change of planned runways from 32 to 35. 5) use of pwrback under limited visual reference and acute turn into a construction area. 6) inoperative equipment and aircraft components with resulting nonstandard operation and distraction. 7) lack of tower vigilance in monitoring movements on the airport. 8) rest facilities which are inadequately insulated from aural disturbances, especially considering the nature of operation times, and the resultant diminishment of reception and response to warning stimulus under possible fatigue conditions. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states what a way to start the day. Pushback was poor idea due to close proximity of other aircraft. ATIS changed as pushing back. Runway changed after completing computations for runway 32. No mention from tower of ATIS regarding construction area or taxi closures. Additionally it was extremely dark with no ambient light. It was extremely hard to read airport diagram even though reporter had taken it to hotel to study since this was first time into/out of airport. Company surveyed the area next day and FAA then rearranged barricades and lights to create a more visible taxi path. FAA investigation under way. Both flcs feel controller not too aware of situation. These 2 aircraft were the only moving traffic at the time. Controller acting as both ground and local.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CLRED TO RWY THROUGH POORLY MARKED CONSTRUCTION AREA. TAXIED ONTO RWY. SECOND ACFT CLRED TO TKOF. DID NOT AS HE SAW ACR ON RWY.

Narrative: AFTER COMPLETING PWRBACK FROM GATE WE EXECUTED AN EXTREMELY ACUTE L TURN TO CLR AN ACFT PARKED AT GATE. WE DELAYED OUR PWRBACK ALLOWING ACR B FLT TO PASS BEHIND US. TAXI CLRNC WAS REQUESTED FOR, AND RECEIVED ALONG WITH NOTICE OF ATIS CHANGE. THE FLT ENGINEER WAS OBTAINING NEW ATIS AND FO BEGAN PREPARING THE NEW RWY TKOF DATA CHART. WE WERE CLRED TO RWY 35. ORIGINAL CHART WAS COMPLETED FOR RWY 32. I EXAMINED MY CHARTS, AND BECAUSE OF THE DEEP UNBROKEN DARKNESS, I ACTIVATED ALL TAXI AND LNDG LIGHTS AND SAW NO GUIDING MARKINGS INDICATING CORRECT RTE. I MENTALLY PICTURED E AND F TAXIWAYS (THE WAY TO 35), NOTED MY 1-1 CHART WITH A GLANCE, AND MARKING ACR B TAXI PROGRESS, MADE A SLIGHT L TURN TO WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE E TAXIWAY, THEN A RIGHT TO F. I WAS STILL AWARE OF ACR B, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY, AS I MISTAKENLY ENTERED RWY 35, HE TURNED TOWARDS ME AND COPLT AND I RECOGNIZED THE ERROR. ACR B MADE THE INITIAL CALL AS WE REACHED FOR MICROPHONES TO INFORM THE TWR. AFTER SOME HESITATION, THE TWR ISSUED DIRECTIONS TO CLR THE RWY TO THE L ON E. WE COMPLIED. I FEEL SEVERAL FACTORS THAT LED TO THIS INCURSION WERE: 1) MULTIPLE CONSTRUCTION LIGHTS BTWN TAXIWAY D AND E WITHOUT PATTERN OR DIRECTION. 2) INADEQUATE TAXI LANE MARKINGS AND SIGNS. 3) A CONFLICT OF DIAGRAMS OF THE LOCATION OF E TAXIWAY BTWN CHARTS OMA 1-1 AND 11-1 AND THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION. 4) A CHANGE OF PLANNED RWYS FROM 32 TO 35. 5) USE OF PWRBACK UNDER LIMITED VISUAL REF AND ACUTE TURN INTO A CONSTRUCTION AREA. 6) INOP EQUIP AND ACFT COMPONENTS WITH RESULTING NONSTANDARD OP AND DISTR. 7) LACK OF TWR VIGILANCE IN MONITORING MOVEMENTS ON THE ARPT. 8) REST FACILITIES WHICH ARE INADEQUATELY INSULATED FROM AURAL DISTURBANCES, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF OP TIMES, AND THE RESULTANT DIMINISHMENT OF RECEPTION AND RESPONSE TO WARNING STIMULUS UNDER POSSIBLE FATIGUE CONDITIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES WHAT A WAY TO START THE DAY. PUSHBACK WAS POOR IDEA DUE TO CLOSE PROX OF OTHER ACFT. ATIS CHANGED AS PUSHING BACK. RWY CHANGED AFTER COMPLETING COMPUTATIONS FOR RWY 32. NO MENTION FROM TWR OF ATIS REGARDING CONSTRUCTION AREA OR TAXI CLOSURES. ADDITIONALLY IT WAS EXTREMELY DARK WITH NO AMBIENT LIGHT. IT WAS EXTREMELY HARD TO READ ARPT DIAGRAM EVEN THOUGH RPTR HAD TAKEN IT TO HOTEL TO STUDY SINCE THIS WAS FIRST TIME INTO/OUT OF ARPT. COMPANY SURVEYED THE AREA NEXT DAY AND FAA THEN REARRANGED BARRICADES AND LIGHTS TO CREATE A MORE VISIBLE TAXI PATH. FAA INVESTIGATION UNDER WAY. BOTH FLCS FEEL CTLR NOT TOO AWARE OF SITUATION. THESE 2 ACFT WERE THE ONLY MOVING TFC AT THE TIME. CTLR ACTING AS BOTH GND AND LCL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.