Narrative:

We were on published milton arrival to lga. We had leveled off at 11000 ft to meet the published crossing restriction for 11000. (We had been in level flight for about 1 or 2 mins at 11000.) TCASII issued a TA for a target that appeared at 10 O'clock and 200 ft below (also showing in level flight -- we did not yet have the traffic visually, only the TA and as observed on the TCASII traffic display). The TA quickly turned into an RA. I promptly started performing the RA which instructed us to climb at 1500 FPM. As I started the maneuver, the captain (PNF) advised ATC that we were starting a climb in response to the TCASII RA. When we reached 11300 ft, the RA changed to a 'do not descend' RA, and we caught a glimpse of a blue/white small aircraft pass directly underneath by an estimated 400-500 ft. TCASII worked just as it should have. After the traffic passed by, it issued the 'clear of traffic' message. Had it not been for TCASII, the separation at the closest point of approach may have been only 100 ft, assuming we couldn't pick up the traffic visually and start our own evasive maneuver. Maximum vertical deviation was 300 ft. The interesting thing (and somewhat disturbing thing) was the attitude of the controller in all this. It was one of 'you can't do anything unless I tell you it's ok, you need my permission first'! While in some situations a TCASII RA may make things 'interesting', in a compound traffic scenario, this was not one of them. It was fairly cut and dried. First the controller said he didn't show the traffic on his screen, and he sounded like he didn't believe us. Then he asked what we were going to do after we had started the climb. (This was in spite of the fact that if we had descended to 11000 ft at a slower rate a min or 2 earlier, we would have been at the altitude that we were climbing to as a result of the RA.) he didn't sound all 'rattled up', just very annoyed that we would take separation into our own hands. Somehow attitudes have to change. Whether it's a TCASII RA, or a maneuver undertaken to visually avoid a collision, pilots should not feel like they will be criticized or second-guessed by ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLC HAD TCASII RA AND CLBED 300 FT TO CLR THE RA. SMA TFC PASSED DIRECTLY BELOW AT APPROX 300 FT. N90 CTLR EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE AT FLC ACTION.

Narrative: WE WERE ON PUBLISHED MILTON ARR TO LGA. WE HAD LEVELED OFF AT 11000 FT TO MEET THE PUBLISHED XING RESTRICTION FOR 11000. (WE HAD BEEN IN LEVEL FLT FOR ABOUT 1 OR 2 MINS AT 11000.) TCASII ISSUED A TA FOR A TARGET THAT APPEARED AT 10 O'CLOCK AND 200 FT BELOW (ALSO SHOWING IN LEVEL FLT -- WE DID NOT YET HAVE THE TFC VISUALLY, ONLY THE TA AND AS OBSERVED ON THE TCASII TFC DISPLAY). THE TA QUICKLY TURNED INTO AN RA. I PROMPTLY STARTED PERFORMING THE RA WHICH INSTRUCTED US TO CLB AT 1500 FPM. AS I STARTED THE MANEUVER, THE CAPT (PNF) ADVISED ATC THAT WE WERE STARTING A CLB IN RESPONSE TO THE TCASII RA. WHEN WE REACHED 11300 FT, THE RA CHANGED TO A 'DO NOT DSND' RA, AND WE CAUGHT A GLIMPSE OF A BLUE/WHITE SMA PASS DIRECTLY UNDERNEATH BY AN ESTIMATED 400-500 FT. TCASII WORKED JUST AS IT SHOULD HAVE. AFTER THE TFC PASSED BY, IT ISSUED THE 'CLR OF TFC' MESSAGE. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR TCASII, THE SEPARATION AT THE CLOSEST POINT OF APCH MAY HAVE BEEN ONLY 100 FT, ASSUMING WE COULDN'T PICK UP THE TFC VISUALLY AND START OUR OWN EVASIVE MANEUVER. MAX VERT DEV WAS 300 FT. THE INTERESTING THING (AND SOMEWHAT DISTURBING THING) WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE CTLR IN ALL THIS. IT WAS ONE OF 'YOU CAN'T DO ANYTHING UNLESS I TELL YOU IT'S OK, YOU NEED MY PERMISSION FIRST'! WHILE IN SOME SITUATIONS A TCASII RA MAY MAKE THINGS 'INTERESTING', IN A COMPOUND TFC SCENARIO, THIS WAS NOT ONE OF THEM. IT WAS FAIRLY CUT AND DRIED. FIRST THE CTLR SAID HE DIDN'T SHOW THE TFC ON HIS SCREEN, AND HE SOUNDED LIKE HE DIDN'T BELIEVE US. THEN HE ASKED WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO AFTER WE HAD STARTED THE CLB. (THIS WAS IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IF WE HAD DSNDED TO 11000 FT AT A SLOWER RATE A MIN OR 2 EARLIER, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE ALT THAT WE WERE CLBING TO AS A RESULT OF THE RA.) HE DIDN'T SOUND ALL 'RATTLED UP', JUST VERY ANNOYED THAT WE WOULD TAKE SEPARATION INTO OUR OWN HANDS. SOMEHOW ATTITUDES HAVE TO CHANGE. WHETHER IT'S A TCASII RA, OR A MANEUVER UNDERTAKEN TO VISUALLY AVOID A COLLISION, PLTS SHOULD NOT FEEL LIKE THEY WILL BE CRITICIZED OR SECOND-GUESSED BY ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.