Narrative:

I was the captain and the responsibility for the situation is entirely mine. Due to the covid situation; I have not flown much in the last several months. This station requires a special noise abatement procedure to be flown by the captain. I did an extensive briefing covering all aspects of the special procedure. The before start checklist procedure was normal. The problem occurred when; with all the discussion surrounding the procedure; we pushed back without completing the before push checklist. Once the pushback was complete and the ground crew cleared off; and the first officer about to call for flaps; we both realized I had not called for and we had not completed the before push checklist. I then called for the before push checklist and we completed it. I believe this put us in an expectation bias that; having completed a checklist; albeit not the before taxi checklist; shortly after starting engines and clearing the crew off; we called for taxi. We had; in effect; substituted one checklist (before push) for another (before taxi). We then taxied out to the runway without having completed the before taxi checklist. As we approached the runway; I completed my captain before takeoff flows; which includes a throttle slide / takeoff warning check. This resulted in a takeoff warning horn. At that point; we realized the before taxi checklist had not been completed and the flaps were still in the up position. We advised the tower we needed some extra time to complete some checks and were given taxi instructions to a location where we could stop the aircraft. At that point; I directed the first officer to begin at the post engine start point and to call for flaps. He called for flaps; I responded with the takeoff flap selection and directed a control check. After the control check; I called for the before taxi checklist. We completed the before taxi checklist normally. I then apologized to the first officer and asked if he was comfortable with our situation and that we were ready to continue. Upon a positive response; I accomplished a before takeoff flow; and called for the before takeoff checklist. The before takeoff checklist was completed normally and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.I am at a loss as to how I missed calling for the before push checklist - which precipitated the subsequent problems. But; once we realized that checklist was missed; I should have added a comment (which I subsequently did shortly before takeoff) that we had an error (missing before push checklist); and to take a moment to think about where we were (not in the green) and was there possibly anything else we might be missing (like the before taxi checklist) before we continued.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported failure to call for the Before Push checklist; then also failing to call for the Before Taxi checklist; citing lack of flying due to COVID-19 cutbacks as contributing.

Narrative: I was the Captain and the responsibility for the situation is entirely mine. Due to the COVID situation; I have not flown much in the last several months. This station requires a special noise abatement procedure to be flown by the Captain. I did an extensive briefing covering all aspects of the special procedure. The Before Start Checklist procedure was normal. The problem occurred when; with all the discussion surrounding the procedure; we pushed back without completing the Before Push Checklist. Once the pushback was complete and the Ground Crew cleared off; and the First Officer about to call for flaps; we both realized I had not called for and we had not completed the Before Push Checklist. I then called for the Before Push Checklist and we completed it. I believe this put us in an expectation bias that; having completed a checklist; albeit not the Before Taxi Checklist; shortly after starting engines and clearing the Crew off; we called for taxi. We had; in effect; substituted one checklist (Before Push) for another (Before Taxi). We then taxied out to the runway without having completed the Before Taxi Checklist. As we approached the runway; I completed my Captain before takeoff flows; which includes a throttle slide / takeoff warning check. This resulted in a takeoff warning horn. At that point; we realized the Before Taxi Checklist had not been completed and the flaps were still in the UP position. We advised the Tower we needed some extra time to complete some checks and were given taxi instructions to a location where we could stop the aircraft. At that point; I directed the First Officer to begin at the post engine start point and to call for flaps. He called for flaps; I responded with the takeoff flap selection and directed a control check. After the control check; I called for the Before Taxi Checklist. We completed the Before Taxi Checklist normally. I then apologized to the First Officer and asked if he was comfortable with our situation and that we were ready to continue. Upon a positive response; I accomplished a Before Takeoff Flow; and called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. The Before Takeoff Checklist was completed normally and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.I am at a loss as to how I missed calling for the Before Push Checklist - which precipitated the subsequent problems. But; once we realized that checklist was missed; I should have added a comment (which I subsequently did shortly before takeoff) that we had an error (missing Before Push Checklist); and to take a moment to think about where we were (not in the Green) and was there possibly anything else we might be missing (like the Before Taxi Checklist) before we continued.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.