Narrative:

We were conducting a scheduled, short (typically 12-14 min) flight from cleveland hopkins, oh, to canton/akron, oh. I (acting as first officer) was performing PF duties while the captain was performing PNF duties (ie, communications, checklists, etc). We were being vectored for the ILS 23 into canton/akron. Our altitude was approximately 3000' MSL and flight conditions were IMC. Normally upon being cleared for the approach, akron approach tells us to contact akron tower at the OM. In this instance, akron approach cleared us for the approach and told us to monitor tower frequency while we were still 5-6 mi outside the OM. Approach told us to wait until reaching the OM to contact the tower. We then switched over to monitor tower frequency. At this point, I was tracking the localizer, I was holding altitude (around 3000' MSL), and I was waiting to intercept the G/south. Due to the short duration of the flight, pilot workload becomes somewhat greater than normal. Because of the increased workload, we failed to contact akron tower at the OM. We were, however, monitoring tower frequency and could hear the tower controling other aircraft. The tower was aware that we were making the approach because we heard the tower instruct another aircraft which was ready for takeoff at runway 23 to 'hold short for landing traffic.' since we did not contact the tower, we were not given a 'cleared to land.' the landing was made uneventfully. Then we turned left onto a turnoff when speed permitted. At this point the captain steers the aircraft on the ground and the first officer does communications and checklists. Upon turning off the runway, we waited for instructions to contact ground control. When an excessive amount of time passed, I called the tower to see if he wanted us to stay with him for taxi instructions or to contact ground control. At this time he indicated that this was our first communication with him (akron tower). He then instructed us to contact ground control for taxi instructions. We did so and taxied to our gate. After shutting down the aircraft and deplaning passengers, the captain went into the terminal to telephone the tower to discuss our miscom. The tower operator indicated that no safety was compromised. I believe our failure to contact the tower occurred mainly for two reasons: increased workload on short duration flight. Approach control gave us instructions to switch over to tower frequency, but not to contact them until crossing the OM. Normally when making a frequency change, it is a communication priority to establish contact with the next controller as soon as possible. Since we were told to wait to contact the tower, we moved onto other duties and overlooked contacting the tower. One other important point is that akron tower never attempted to contact us even though he knew we were making the approach. It was our responsibility to initially make contact with the tower, but our failure to do so should have prompted him T contact us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: WE WERE CONDUCTING A SCHEDULED, SHORT (TYPICALLY 12-14 MIN) FLT FROM CLEVELAND HOPKINS, OH, TO CANTON/AKRON, OH. I (ACTING AS F/O) WAS PERFORMING PF DUTIES WHILE THE CAPT WAS PERFORMING PNF DUTIES (IE, COMS, CHKLISTS, ETC). WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE ILS 23 INTO CANTON/AKRON. OUR ALT WAS APPROX 3000' MSL AND FLT CONDITIONS WERE IMC. NORMALLY UPON BEING CLRED FOR THE APCH, AKRON APCH TELLS US TO CONTACT AKRON TWR AT THE OM. IN THIS INSTANCE, AKRON APCH CLRED US FOR THE APCH AND TOLD US TO MONITOR TWR FREQ WHILE WE WERE STILL 5-6 MI OUTSIDE THE OM. APCH TOLD US TO WAIT UNTIL REACHING THE OM TO CONTACT THE TWR. WE THEN SWITCHED OVER TO MONITOR TWR FREQ. AT THIS POINT, I WAS TRACKING THE LOC, I WAS HOLDING ALT (AROUND 3000' MSL), AND I WAS WAITING TO INTERCEPT THE G/S. DUE TO THE SHORT DURATION OF THE FLT, PLT WORKLOAD BECOMES SOMEWHAT GREATER THAN NORMAL. BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED WORKLOAD, WE FAILED TO CONTACT AKRON TWR AT THE OM. WE WERE, HOWEVER, MONITORING TWR FREQ AND COULD HEAR THE TWR CTLING OTHER ACFT. THE TWR WAS AWARE THAT WE WERE MAKING THE APCH BECAUSE WE HEARD THE TWR INSTRUCT ANOTHER ACFT WHICH WAS READY FOR TKOF AT RWY 23 TO 'HOLD SHORT FOR LNDG TFC.' SINCE WE DID NOT CONTACT THE TWR, WE WERE NOT GIVEN A 'CLRED TO LAND.' THE LNDG WAS MADE UNEVENTFULLY. THEN WE TURNED L ONTO A TURNOFF WHEN SPD PERMITTED. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT STEERS THE ACFT ON THE GND AND THE F/O DOES COMS AND CHKLISTS. UPON TURNING OFF THE RWY, WE WAITED FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GND CTL. WHEN AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF TIME PASSED, I CALLED THE TWR TO SEE IF HE WANTED US TO STAY WITH HIM FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS OR TO CONTACT GND CTL. AT THIS TIME HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS OUR FIRST COM WITH HIM (AKRON TWR). HE THEN INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT GND CTL FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. WE DID SO AND TAXIED TO OUR GATE. AFTER SHUTTING DOWN THE ACFT AND DEPLANING PAXS, THE CAPT WENT INTO THE TERMINAL TO TELEPHONE THE TWR TO DISCUSS OUR MISCOM. THE TWR OPERATOR INDICATED THAT NO SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED. I BELIEVE OUR FAILURE TO CONTACT THE TWR OCCURRED MAINLY FOR TWO REASONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD ON SHORT DURATION FLT. APCH CTL GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO SWITCH OVER TO TWR FREQ, BUT NOT TO CONTACT THEM UNTIL XING THE OM. NORMALLY WHEN MAKING A FREQ CHANGE, IT IS A COM PRIORITY TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE NEXT CTLR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINCE WE WERE TOLD TO WAIT TO CONTACT THE TWR, WE MOVED ONTO OTHER DUTIES AND OVERLOOKED CONTACTING THE TWR. ONE OTHER IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT AKRON TWR NEVER ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT US EVEN THOUGH HE KNEW WE WERE MAKING THE APCH. IT WAS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIALLY MAKE CONTACT WITH THE TWR, BUT OUR FAILURE TO DO SO SHOULD HAVE PROMPTED HIM T CONTACT US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.