Narrative:

Our aircraft had 5 mels and numerous other nefs in ZZZ that we briefed thoroughly before departure. One of these was a deferred pack 1. During cruise flight we spent a good amount of time briefing the arrival giving consideration to the icing reports; ficons (field conditions); and gusty crosswinds we could expect. 45 mins prior to landing we received an ECAM for hydraulic G rsvr lo lvl and hydraulic G engine 1 pump lo pr. We ran the ECAM and began to consider the ramifications. As speed breaks were partially affected; we knew the MEL for 1 pack inoperative now had an altitude restriction of FL310. We requested that altitude and advised ATC we were working a hydraulic issue and would get back to them with our intentions. With the ECAM complete we began to work through and brief the accompanying procedures. We ran the QRH landing distance numbers with G hydraulic lo press and asked dispatch to do the same via ACARS. Dispatch gave numbers quickly considering the ficons and suggested 22L as the longest runway. We reviewed the now required landing gear gravity extension procedure and other inoperative items used for landing such as the number 1 thrust reverser; alternate brakes with accumulator; lack of auto brake; and slats flaps slow. Next the flight attendants were briefed and I told them I would soon talk with the passengers. We [requested priority handling] with ATC. Once down the landing gear could not be raised again and we wanted to decrease the chances of a go around in icing conditions with the gear down. We asked for trucks to inspect the aircraft after landing before taxiing into the gate. Passengers were then informed of the issue. I told the passengers this is not an emergency and that they would not notice anything different other than emergency vehicles meeting us at the runway to give us a quick inspection. Their pilots are frequently trained for these things and other than the pilots having a slightly increased workload it would be a normal landing. On approach to 22L we extended the gear via gravity extension and flaps sooner than normal. The landing gear doors remained down and we discussed the need to ensure they would clear anything we might taxi over later. The landing was normal and soft and the first officer (first officer) verified the correct brake pressures. We stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. As the first officer coordinated with ATC for our inspection which ATC preferred on the runway; I said a quick word to the passengers. Fire crews found no issues upon inspection and we taxied to the gate. Upon shutdown passengers were invited to ask the pilots any questions they had; all were happy. Flight attendants were happy and thanked for keeping passengers so content. Maintenance control and the [operations] were called. A mechanic upon arrival showed us hydraulic fluid draining from the engine one pylon. No additional commentsthe workload on the pilots was significantly higher throughout this flight due to the large number of deferrals even before our loss of a hydraulic system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain reported an ECAM message in flight; HYD G RSVR LO LVL and HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LOPR; causing an inflight shut down and a precautionary landing.

Narrative: Our aircraft had 5 MELs and numerous other NEFs in ZZZ that we briefed thoroughly before departure. One of these was a deferred Pack 1. During cruise flight we spent a good amount of time briefing the arrival giving consideration to the icing reports; FICONs (Field Conditions); and gusty crosswinds we could expect. 45 mins prior to landing we received an ECAM for HYD G RSVR LO LVL and HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR. We ran the ECAM and began to consider the ramifications. As speed breaks were partially affected; we knew the MEL for 1 pack inoperative now had an altitude restriction of FL310. We requested that altitude and advised ATC we were working a hydraulic issue and would get back to them with our intentions. With the ECAM complete we began to work through and brief the accompanying procedures. We ran the QRH landing distance numbers with G HYD LO PRESS and asked Dispatch to do the same via ACARS. Dispatch gave numbers quickly considering the FICONS and suggested 22L as the longest runway. We reviewed the now required landing gear gravity extension procedure and other inoperative items used for landing such as the number 1 thrust reverser; alternate brakes with accumulator; lack of auto brake; and slats flaps slow. Next the Flight Attendants were briefed and I told them I would soon talk with the passengers. We [requested priority handling] with ATC. Once down the landing gear could not be raised again and we wanted to decrease the chances of a go around in icing conditions with the gear down. We asked for trucks to inspect the aircraft after landing before taxiing into the gate. Passengers were then informed of the issue. I told the passengers this is not an emergency and that they would not notice anything different other than emergency vehicles meeting us at the runway to give us a quick inspection. Their pilots are frequently trained for these things and other than the pilots having a slightly increased workload it would be a normal landing. On approach to 22L we extended the gear via gravity extension and flaps sooner than normal. The landing gear doors remained down and we discussed the need to ensure they would clear anything we might taxi over later. The landing was normal and soft and the FO (First Officer) verified the correct brake pressures. We stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. As the FO coordinated with ATC for our inspection which ATC preferred on the runway; I said a quick word to the passengers. Fire crews found no issues upon inspection and we taxied to the gate. Upon shutdown passengers were invited to ask the pilots any questions they had; all were happy. Flight attendants were happy and thanked for keeping passengers so content. Maintenance control and the [Operations] were called. A Mechanic upon arrival showed us hydraulic fluid draining from the engine one pylon. No additional commentsThe workload on the pilots was significantly higher throughout this flight due to the large number of deferrals even before our loss of a hydraulic system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.