Narrative:

The copilot has 5 yrs experience in his seat. The so is a retired air force pilot with about 2 yrs in his seat. This was the third day and 6TH leg of a 3 day trip. An observer of the first 2 days would have said we were a well oiled crew. Our airline does a good job of training in and stressing SOP's, which we followed. Crew interaction and application clear principles were quintessential. The so's attention to detail and performance were as good and as professional as I have seen, easily in the top 10, looking back on 24 yrs with the airline. Planned takeoff runway was 15, flaps 5, normal (reduced) EPR. Ground control assigned runway 21. I checked the airport diagram, saw that 21 was 7000 and questioned the flap/EPR settings. The so after checking the gross weight/flap/EPR computer printout, said that we were ok. The problem became apparent during takeoff roll, due to the runway used. Although we were airborne with room to spare, if an engine had failed just prior to V1, there would have been no stopping on the runway. I should have followed up on my instincts and checked the printout myself when I saw that runway 21 was only 7000' however, I did observe a downhill gradient and accepted the so's assurance. It is not my intention to cast blame on the so. He does an outstanding job. This was clearly a crew error, and in my opinion, entirely attributable to fatigue. Day 1 of this trip requires a xz:00 (body clock time) get up, day 2 xy:30 get up and day 3 a xx:15 get up. This was our second leg of day 3, scheduled for 2 hours, with a 4 hour leg to follow. There were other mistakes made during that 6 hours of flying, missed frequencys, misread radials, miscalculations of required descent distances, and a sloppy ILS approach. Nothing that caused any conflict, or impinged significantly on safety, but would certainly be looked at as poor airmanship. The 6 hours of flying, were all VMC and we were never loaded up. If a CAT ii approach had been required, I'm not sure I would have attempted it. The problems cited by a senior fatigue researcher NASA ames research center were certainly apparent in myself and my crew. 3 air carrier pilots were just found guilty of being impaired by alcohol. According to dr XXX's studies, my crew and I, due to fatigue, were more impaired then those air carrier pilots. I have flown international trips with crews that would have made mine look super alert. The airline companies refuse to address this problem. Where fatigue may well have been a factor in an accident, it has always been discounted by the airline, the NTSB, and the FAA. If my plane had ended up a smoking heap off the end of runway 21, it would have been written off as 100% pilot error, and once again the fatigue factor would have been ignored. I believe it was an air force study that showed that pilots on the back side of the clock were 60% effective. Another study showed that pilots who were legally drunk were 75% effective. We have just witnessed the uproar caused by drinking pilots, yet hundreds of flts operate nightly (bct), where the crews are in worse shape, and nobody, not even authorities aware of the problem do anything about it. I am not suggesting that we stop night operations, but scheduling crews as we were scheduled, is irresponsible. Our body clocks are on west coast time. Our airline has crews based on the east coast that could have flown those early morning departures. Just as west coast crews could fly late night west coast departures. That isn't a factor in building schedules, minimizing crew cost is. It will take NASA, the NTSB, and the FAA, to build rules that prohibit the type of scheduling that puts crews on flts that are more impaired then if they were legally drunk. My submission of this report is not prompted by the fear of FAA sanctions, no one knows of this occurrence but the crew. I could have just forgotten about, as I am sure many other crews have. But the potential for disaster here is extreme. I suggest that NASA actively seek input from airline crews, domestic and international, concerning any occurrences which the crew attributes to fatigue, and 'back side of the clock' scheduling. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter described his schedule during this flight and pointed out how it contributed to his crew's fatigue. He pointed out just how the so entered the takeoff data message wrong and missed the fact that a 5 degree takeoff is not permitted on runway 21. He said that, since this incident, he always checks the runway takeoff data himself.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT CREW TOOK OFF FROM RWY 21 AT CHS USING 5 DEGREES OF FLAP. THIS IS ILLEGAL AT CHS.

Narrative: THE COPLT HAS 5 YRS EXPERIENCE IN HIS SEAT. THE SO IS A RETIRED AIR FORCE PLT WITH ABOUT 2 YRS IN HIS SEAT. THIS WAS THE THIRD DAY AND 6TH LEG OF A 3 DAY TRIP. AN OBSERVER OF THE FIRST 2 DAYS WOULD HAVE SAID WE WERE A WELL OILED CREW. OUR AIRLINE DOES A GOOD JOB OF TRAINING IN AND STRESSING SOP'S, WHICH WE FOLLOWED. CREW INTERACTION AND APPLICATION CLR PRINCIPLES WERE QUINTESSENTIAL. THE SO'S ATTN TO DETAIL AND PERFORMANCE WERE AS GOOD AND AS PROFESSIONAL AS I HAVE SEEN, EASILY IN THE TOP 10, LOOKING BACK ON 24 YRS WITH THE AIRLINE. PLANNED TKOF RWY WAS 15, FLAPS 5, NORMAL (REDUCED) EPR. GND CTL ASSIGNED RWY 21. I CHKED THE ARPT DIAGRAM, SAW THAT 21 WAS 7000 AND QUESTIONED THE FLAP/EPR SETTINGS. THE SO AFTER CHKING THE GROSS WT/FLAP/EPR COMPUTER PRINTOUT, SAID THAT WE WERE OK. THE PROB BECAME APPARENT DURING TKOF ROLL, DUE TO THE RWY USED. ALTHOUGH WE WERE AIRBORNE WITH ROOM TO SPARE, IF AN ENG HAD FAILED JUST PRIOR TO V1, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO STOPPING ON THE RWY. I SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED UP ON MY INSTINCTS AND CHKED THE PRINTOUT MYSELF WHEN I SAW THAT RWY 21 WAS ONLY 7000' HOWEVER, I DID OBSERVE A DOWNHILL GRADIENT AND ACCEPTED THE SO'S ASSURANCE. IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO CAST BLAME ON THE SO. HE DOES AN OUTSTANDING JOB. THIS WAS CLRLY A CREW ERROR, AND IN MY OPINION, ENTIRELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO FATIGUE. DAY 1 OF THIS TRIP REQUIRES A XZ:00 (BODY CLOCK TIME) GET UP, DAY 2 XY:30 GET UP AND DAY 3 A XX:15 GET UP. THIS WAS OUR SECOND LEG OF DAY 3, SCHEDULED FOR 2 HOURS, WITH A 4 HOUR LEG TO FOLLOW. THERE WERE OTHER MISTAKES MADE DURING THAT 6 HOURS OF FLYING, MISSED FREQS, MISREAD RADIALS, MISCALCULATIONS OF REQUIRED DSNT DISTANCES, AND A SLOPPY ILS APCH. NOTHING THAT CAUSED ANY CONFLICT, OR IMPINGED SIGNIFICANTLY ON SAFETY, BUT WOULD CERTAINLY BE LOOKED AT AS POOR AIRMANSHIP. THE 6 HOURS OF FLYING, WERE ALL VMC AND WE WERE NEVER LOADED UP. IF A CAT II APCH HAD BEEN REQUIRED, I'M NOT SURE I WOULD HAVE ATTEMPTED IT. THE PROBS CITED BY A SENIOR FATIGUE RESEARCHER NASA AMES RESEARCH CTR WERE CERTAINLY APPARENT IN MYSELF AND MY CREW. 3 ACR PLTS WERE JUST FOUND GUILTY OF BEING IMPAIRED BY ALCOHOL. ACCORDING TO DR XXX'S STUDIES, MY CREW AND I, DUE TO FATIGUE, WERE MORE IMPAIRED THEN THOSE ACR PLTS. I HAVE FLOWN INTL TRIPS WITH CREWS THAT WOULD HAVE MADE MINE LOOK SUPER ALERT. THE AIRLINE COMPANIES REFUSE TO ADDRESS THIS PROB. WHERE FATIGUE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN AN ACCIDENT, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN DISCOUNTED BY THE AIRLINE, THE NTSB, AND THE FAA. IF MY PLANE HAD ENDED UP A SMOKING HEAP OFF THE END OF RWY 21, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN OFF AS 100% PLT ERROR, AND ONCE AGAIN THE FATIGUE FACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN IGNORED. I BELIEVE IT WAS AN AIR FORCE STUDY THAT SHOWED THAT PLTS ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK WERE 60% EFFECTIVE. ANOTHER STUDY SHOWED THAT PLTS WHO WERE LEGALLY DRUNK WERE 75% EFFECTIVE. WE HAVE JUST WITNESSED THE UPROAR CAUSED BY DRINKING PLTS, YET HUNDREDS OF FLTS OPERATE NIGHTLY (BCT), WHERE THE CREWS ARE IN WORSE SHAPE, AND NOBODY, NOT EVEN AUTHORITIES AWARE OF THE PROB DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT WE STOP NIGHT OPS, BUT SCHEDULING CREWS AS WE WERE SCHEDULED, IS IRRESPONSIBLE. OUR BODY CLOCKS ARE ON W COAST TIME. OUR AIRLINE HAS CREWS BASED ON THE E COAST THAT COULD HAVE FLOWN THOSE EARLY MORNING DEPS. JUST AS W COAST CREWS COULD FLY LATE NIGHT W COAST DEPS. THAT ISN'T A FACTOR IN BUILDING SCHEDULES, MINIMIZING CREW COST IS. IT WILL TAKE NASA, THE NTSB, AND THE FAA, TO BUILD RULES THAT PROHIBIT THE TYPE OF SCHEDULING THAT PUTS CREWS ON FLTS THAT ARE MORE IMPAIRED THEN IF THEY WERE LEGALLY DRUNK. MY SUBMISSION OF THIS RPT IS NOT PROMPTED BY THE FEAR OF FAA SANCTIONS, NO ONE KNOWS OF THIS OCCURRENCE BUT THE CREW. I COULD HAVE JUST FORGOTTEN ABOUT, AS I AM SURE MANY OTHER CREWS HAVE. BUT THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER HERE IS EXTREME. I SUGGEST THAT NASA ACTIVELY SEEK INPUT FROM AIRLINE CREWS, DOMESTIC AND INTL, CONCERNING ANY OCCURRENCES WHICH THE CREW ATTRIBUTES TO FATIGUE, AND 'BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK' SCHEDULING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR DESCRIBED HIS SCHEDULE DURING THIS FLT AND POINTED OUT HOW IT CONTRIBUTED TO HIS CREW'S FATIGUE. HE POINTED OUT JUST HOW THE SO ENTERED THE TKOF DATA MESSAGE WRONG AND MISSED THE FACT THAT A 5 DEG TKOF IS NOT PERMITTED ON RWY 21. HE SAID THAT, SINCE THIS INCIDENT, HE ALWAYS CHKS THE RWY TKOF DATA HIMSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.