Narrative:

Per [company] sops: 'the pilot flying (PF) will give a crew briefing to ensure an understanding by both pilots as to the conduct of the flight. The crew briefing must be completed before engine start. This briefing must include:seat-left/rightrunway-identifierexpected taxi-briefdeparture clearance -briefnotams: airport; runway or departure proceduresweather current for takeoff'questions; comments; clarifications; addition'this briefing was not given and because of the lack of the briefing; the captain did not follow ATC instructions upon taxi-out. We were parked on the ramp in ZZZ near taxiway a. The runway in use was runway xx. Passengers came out with bags; and I loaded. Upon entry in cockpit; I buckled up and was waiting for the captain. He buckled up and called for the 'engine starting checklist'. After engine start; captain called for the 'after starting checklist'. Once completed; captain told me to ground for taxi. Ground told us runway xx; turn right out of the ramp; then left on B that parallels the runway (it was a). Captain never looked at taxi route and release parking brake and started taxiing without the taxi light on. He turned right out of ramp and before we left ramp he called for flaps 20 taxi check. My head was down selecting flaps 20 as was requested of me. When I looked up; I realized he never made the left turn on a as instructed. I was in the middle of advising him when ground told him to make a 180 on a. I made a comment ' that's why we should really brief'. Had the captain followed sops; then I feel this error would have been caught and this would not have happened. I waited to start reading the checklist to ensure we were going the proper way.our show time today was xb:00. The captain wanted to leave at xa:00 to get at the airport earlier than show time. We were at the airport at xa:23. Everything was done by xa:50 with the exception of obtaining the clearance because it was too early. There was plenty of time to perform a proper brief. In addition; flaps to 20 is supposed to be done on taxi out and not on the ramp area. In addition; popping the thrust reversers on the ramp as the captain did to satisfy the taxi checklist should also be done away from the ramp because there were a lot of small planes on the ramp. In addition; on the taxi checklist; when I got to crew briefing; I was told to call 500 and not 400 on the takeoff. This is also against sops.peer pressure: I have flown with a lot of different operators with a lot of experience. I find it very difficult to operate with this individual because he literally does not want to follow sops and reminds me that he has a ton more of time in this plane. I feel that deviating from sops does nothing but lead to unwanted outcomes and deviations; and the direct reason for this as soon as possible.[later at our destination;] visual approach in ZZZ1; but utilizing the ILS. Wind shear advisories were in effect. Gusts were affecting airspeed with +15 to + 20 kts; and -10. The wind was a direct quartering headwind. In landing and approach; the plane should have been crabbing into the wind; not away from the wind. I made the announcement twice to advise him where the wind was coming. The PF should have had the yoke turned into the wind; but instead had it turned away which allows the wind to push under the left side wing. Upon landing; I was immediately given the yoke when he reached for the tiller. We were around 120 kts when he reached for the tiller. I immediately put the yoke in the crab towards the wind as trained. Reaching for a tiller to steer the plane at high ground speeds can become a hazard in my opinion. Upon taxiing into ramp; and parking brake set; I was ordered back to the cargo bin to unload bags while the captain was accomplishing his shutdown flow. He normally always accomplishes a flow; but has never sat in his seat nor calls for the 'shutdown checklist' when he is PF. I normally ask him if I can run the checklist because ifeel that someone needs to do this. This time he told me he has the checklist. However; I do not feel confident that he actually picked up the checklist. Per the sops: 'both pilots will remain seated at their position until the shutdown checklist is completed.' this has never happened as long as I have been flying with this individual when he is PF. I usually always run it alone. I am writing this as soon as possible so it can be properly addressed since it has been brought up to others in the past and continues to happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: G-IV First Officer described a Captain who disregarded company SOPs at every stage of the flight.

Narrative: Per [Company] SOPs: 'the Pilot Flying (PF) will give a Crew Briefing to ensure an understanding by both pilots as to the conduct of the flight. The Crew Briefing MUST be completed before ENGINE START. This briefing must include:Seat-Left/RightRunway-IdentifierExpected Taxi-BriefDeparture Clearance -BriefNOTAMs: Airport; Runway or Departure ProceduresWeather Current for Takeoff'Questions; Comments; Clarifications; Addition'This briefing was NOT given and because of the lack of the briefing; the Captain did NOT follow ATC instructions upon taxi-out. We were parked on the ramp in ZZZ near Taxiway A. The runway in use was Runway XX. Passengers came out with bags; and I loaded. Upon entry in cockpit; I buckled up and was waiting for the Captain. He buckled up and called for the 'Engine Starting Checklist'. After engine start; Captain called for the 'After Starting Checklist'. Once completed; Captain told me to Ground for taxi. Ground told us Runway XX; turn right out of the ramp; then left on B that parallels the Runway (it was A). Captain never looked at taxi route and release parking brake and started taxiing without the taxi light on. He turned right out of ramp and before we left ramp he called for flaps 20 taxi check. My head was down selecting flaps 20 as was requested of me. When I looked up; I realized he never made the left turn on A as instructed. I was in the middle of advising him when Ground told him to make a 180 on A. I made a comment ' that's why we should really brief'. Had the Captain followed SOPs; then I feel this error would have been caught and this would not have happened. I waited to start reading the checklist to ensure we were going the proper way.Our show time today was XB:00. The Captain wanted to leave at XA:00 to get at the airport earlier than show time. We were at the airport at XA:23. Everything was done by XA:50 with the exception of obtaining the clearance because it was too early. There was PLENTY of time to perform a proper brief. In addition; flaps to 20 is supposed to be done on taxi out and not on the ramp area. In addition; popping the thrust reversers on the ramp as the Captain did to satisfy the taxi checklist should also be done away from the ramp because there were a lot of small planes on the ramp. In addition; on the taxi checklist; when I got to crew briefing; I was told to call 500 and not 400 on the takeoff. This is also against SOPs.Peer pressure: I have flown with a lot of different operators with a lot of experience. I find it very difficult to operate with this individual because he literally does not want to follow SOPs and reminds me that he has a ton more of time in this plane. I feel that deviating from SOPs does nothing but lead to unwanted outcomes and deviations; and the direct reason for this ASAP.[Later at our destination;] visual approach in ZZZ1; but utilizing the ILS. Wind shear advisories were in effect. Gusts were affecting airspeed with +15 to + 20 kts; and -10. The wind was a direct quartering headwind. In landing and approach; the plane should have been crabbing into the wind; not away from the wind. I made the announcement twice to advise him where the wind was coming. The PF should have had the yoke turned into the wind; but instead had it turned away which allows the wind to push under the left side wing. Upon landing; I was immediately given the yoke when he reached for the tiller. We were around 120 kts when he reached for the tiller. I immediately put the yoke in the crab towards the wind as trained. Reaching for a tiller to steer the plane at high ground speeds can become a hazard in my opinion. Upon taxiing into ramp; and parking brake set; I was ordered back to the cargo bin to unload bags while the Captain was accomplishing his shutdown flow. He normally always accomplishes a flow; but has NEVER sat in his seat nor calls for the 'SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST' when he is PF. I normally ask him if I can run the checklist because Ifeel that someone needs to do this. This time he told me he has the checklist. However; I do not feel confident that he actually picked up the checklist. Per the SOPs: 'Both pilots will remain seated at their position until the SHUTDOWN Checklist is completed.' This has NEVER happened as long as I have been flying with this individual when he is PF. I usually always run it alone. I am writing this ASAP so it can be properly addressed since it has been brought up to others in the past and continues to happen.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.