Narrative:

We started out day three of a three-day trip delayed one hour and 30 minutes late. By the last leg we were approximately two hours late. On downwind the captain called for flaps 1. I selected the flap lever to flap 1. The trailing edge (te) flap position indicator barely moved off of 0 and then stopped. The leading edge (le) devices never moved. The captain then asked me to try flap 2; and then flap 5. Again there was no movement. I then contacted ATC and asked to break off the approach; and asked for a downwind heading and altitude. I was given a heading of approximately 350; and altitude of 9000 feet. I then pulled out the QRH and began to search for the correct checklist; however; the captain asked for the QRH instead; and gave me control of the aircraft. He then proceeded to run the trailing edge flap up landing checklist. We conferred on a couple items; whether a flap asymmetry existed or not; etc. As he approached the end of the checklist and then asked me to ask ATC for a turn back toward the airport and I complied. I was confused because I kept waiting for him to use the alternate flaps via the checklist but never did. I inquired; and he told me that they would not be used in this case. He also ran the numbers in the operational program configuration (opc); which directed him to use autobrakes 2. By this point we had intercepted final and needed to begin preparing for the approach. I returned controls to him and took back the QRH; and picked up at deferred items. At some point we were cleared for a visual approach; and I completed all checklists. Our final approach speed was 188 with flaps up. He asked me to make a mental note at what speed we touched down at (since this would be the brakes on speed with autobrakes); so we could enter it in the opc after landing. The remainder of the approach went as planned; and we touched down at 180 KIAS. After taxiing clear of the runway and headed toward our gate; I pulled out the opc and entered our brakes on speed. It advised us not to taxi; and alert fire equipment. I asked tower if we could pull into the deice pad; and asked them to send the fire equipment to inspect our landing gear and brakes. Within a couple minutes they were there; inspected them; and said everything looked normal. We contacted operations and maintenance (mx) and advised them of the situation. We also asked operations to relay to the ramp crew not to approach the aircraft after parking until mx gave the ok. (They never got this message. The captain yelled it to them out of the window after we parked.) mx did an inspection and said everything was ok. After the flight; I reviewed the checklist and discovered that we had done the wrong checklist. We should have done the trailing edge flap disagree first; which would have directed us to use the alternate flaps. This would have given us a much lower approach speed; and there would not have been a danger of brake fire or melting fuse plugs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737NG flight crew reported a flap mechanical issue necessitating a near no flap landing with a high approach and landing speeds. Flight landed and parked without issues.

Narrative: We started out day three of a three-day trip delayed one hour and 30 minutes late. By the last leg we were approximately two hours late. On downwind the Captain called for flaps 1. I selected the flap lever to flap 1. The Trailing Edge (TE) flap position indicator barely moved off of 0 and then stopped. The Leading Edge (LE) devices never moved. The Captain then asked me to try flap 2; and then flap 5. Again there was no movement. I then contacted ATC and asked to break off the approach; and asked for a downwind heading and altitude. I was given a heading of approximately 350; and altitude of 9000 feet. I then pulled out the QRH and began to search for the correct checklist; however; the Captain asked for the QRH instead; and gave me control of the aircraft. He then proceeded to run the Trailing Edge Flap Up Landing Checklist. We conferred on a couple items; whether a flap asymmetry existed or not; etc. as he approached the end of the checklist and then asked me to ask ATC for a turn back toward the airport and I complied. I was confused because I kept waiting for him to use the alternate flaps via the checklist but never did. I inquired; and he told me that they would not be used in this case. He also ran the numbers in the Operational Program Configuration (OPC); which directed him to use autobrakes 2. By this point we had intercepted final and needed to begin preparing for the approach. I returned controls to him and took back the QRH; and picked up at deferred items. At some point we were cleared for a visual approach; and I completed all checklists. Our final approach speed was 188 with flaps up. He asked me to make a mental note at what speed we touched down at (since this would be the brakes on speed with autobrakes); so we could enter it in the OPC after landing. The remainder of the approach went as planned; and we touched down at 180 KIAS. After taxiing clear of the runway and headed toward our gate; I pulled out the OPC and entered our brakes on speed. It advised us not to taxi; and alert fire equipment. I asked Tower if we could pull into the deice pad; and asked them to send the fire equipment to inspect our landing gear and brakes. Within a couple minutes they were there; inspected them; and said everything looked normal. We contacted OPS and Maintenance (MX) and advised them of the situation. We also asked OPS to relay to the Ramp Crew not to approach the aircraft after parking until MX gave the OK. (They never got this message. The Captain yelled it to them out of the window after we parked.) MX did an inspection and said everything was OK. After the flight; I reviewed the checklist and discovered that we had done the wrong checklist. We should have done the Trailing Edge Flap Disagree first; which would have directed us to use the alternate flaps. This would have given us a much lower approach speed; and there would not have been a danger of brake fire or melting fuse plugs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.