Narrative:

The first officer and I briefed and executed a visual approach in daytime VMC conditions to runway 29 at cae. Although I do not recall if the briefing included a specific runway exit; I do remember briefing a right turn-off. Upon landing; I deployed reverse thrust and applied normal braking. Around 60 knots; I realized we were too fast to take the first available high-speed exit (A5) and opted to take the reverse high-speed (A4); which we were subsequently cleared to take anyway. After I realized we were too fast to take the high-speed exit at A5; I also noticed there was an airport worker on the high-speed itself; clearly on the taxiway; near the middle of the pavement. It quickly dawned on me that had we been slow enough to make A5; we would not have had enough room to stop or swerve out of the way to avoid the worker.I have always understood and flew by the understanding that upon landing; we must exit the runway without delay at the first available exit; unless directed otherwise by ATC. With this understanding; I believe we narrowly avoided a serious incident; and merely by luck based on the fact that we were slightly too fast to take A5. After pulling into the gate; I queried the first officer about whether or not we had missed something on the ATIS regarding men and equipment near any taxiways or runways - we had nothing written down about any such thing; and listened to the ATIS again to confirm we hadn't missed anything. I also took a second look at the notams for the airport; and there was no mention of anything regarding what we saw.since there was no mention of anything in either of those sources of airport information; I called up ground control and asked if they knew about the worker's position; and if they were planning on broadcasting their location over the ATIS; or maybe even shutting down the taxiways associated with where the worker was located. They mentioned that they were already in the process of publishing a NOTAM; or broadcasting more information on the ATIS (I do not recall exactly which one they said). Although I believe we had a dose of bad timing with regard to landing as soon as more information was in the process of being posted; I do think we should have been advised of ground personnel near the landing runway either on the ATIS; or by the tower controller while on the approach to runway 29. Having that information would have put us in a better position to brief the runway exit plan more effectively; therefore mitigating the threat of workers being present on taxiways.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported landing on Runway 29 at CAE to discover an airport worker in the middle of Taxiway A5; which he may have used to exit speed allowing. Ground Control indicated that they were in the process of updating the ATIS and issuing a NOTAM.

Narrative: The First Officer and I briefed and executed a visual approach in daytime VMC conditions to Runway 29 at CAE. Although I do not recall if the briefing included a specific runway exit; I do remember briefing a right turn-off. Upon landing; I deployed reverse thrust and applied normal braking. Around 60 knots; I realized we were too fast to take the first available high-speed exit (A5) and opted to take the reverse high-speed (A4); which we were subsequently cleared to take anyway. After I realized we were too fast to take the high-speed exit at A5; I also noticed there was an airport worker on the high-speed itself; clearly on the taxiway; near the middle of the pavement. It quickly dawned on me that had we been slow enough to make A5; we would not have had enough room to stop or swerve out of the way to avoid the worker.I have always understood and flew by the understanding that upon landing; we must exit the runway without delay at the first available exit; unless directed otherwise by ATC. With this understanding; I believe we narrowly avoided a serious incident; and merely by luck based on the fact that we were slightly too fast to take A5. After pulling into the gate; I queried the FO about whether or not we had missed something on the ATIS regarding men and equipment near any taxiways or runways - We had nothing written down about any such thing; and listened to the ATIS again to confirm we hadn't missed anything. I also took a second look at the NOTAMs for the airport; and there was no mention of anything regarding what we saw.Since there was no mention of anything in either of those sources of airport information; I called up Ground Control and asked if they knew about the worker's position; and if they were planning on broadcasting their location over the ATIS; or maybe even shutting down the taxiways associated with where the worker was located. They mentioned that they were already in the process of publishing a NOTAM; or broadcasting more information on the ATIS (I do not recall exactly which one they said). Although I believe we had a dose of bad timing with regard to landing as soon as more information was in the process of being posted; I do think we should have been advised of ground personnel near the landing runway either on the ATIS; or by the tower controller while on the approach to RWY 29. Having that information would have put us in a better position to brief the runway exit plan more effectively; therefore mitigating the threat of workers being present on taxiways.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.