Narrative:

Arrived at NDB. ZLC advised hold, efc +15 could only let us down to 8600' in and out of scattered to broken layer, good visibility below. At NDB passage inbound slow decision by crew to cancel IFR, go VFR. PIC lost 300-600' while I attempted to cancel IFR with ZLC. Frequency was very busy. Upon cancelling ZLC queried as to what altitude we had broken out at (which was 8600'). I said '8000' (our current altitude, airport in sight.' my concerns: 1) poor crew coordination on decision to cancel IFR, go VFR 5, or to continue holding and ask for different options. 2) captain's look-see or inadvertent descent 300-600' below assigned before the decision to cancel IFR. I called this to him 2-3 times. 3) continuing 2 mi past NDB-DME west/O turning back to outbnd hold leg, mostly a result of slow and poor crew coordination. Captain's look-see. We'll have a discussion on what was what (look-see or poor coordination). 4) the next day the PIC, responsible for FSS/WX and preflight route planes, was still wondering why we weren't cleared for the approach (NDB-DME at sun). My idea was traffic/airspace conflicts ZLC may have had. The next evening as I revised my charts I saw that there was a NOTAM for hailey--...NDB-DME-a IFR procedure na. Also the IFR departure procedure is na. Did he check or question? I also carefully reviewed these procedures for arrival and departure. Now I wonder about the departure too. I'll double-check NOTAMS too before each flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC DEVIATES FROM CLRNC WITH AN ALT EXCURSION WHILE IN IMC CONDITIONS TO OBTAIN VMC CONDITIONS TO MAKE AN APCH THAT WAS NOTAMED UNAUTH.

Narrative: ARRIVED AT NDB. ZLC ADVISED HOLD, EFC +15 COULD ONLY LET US DOWN TO 8600' IN AND OUT OF SCATTERED TO BROKEN LAYER, GOOD VISIBILITY BELOW. AT NDB PASSAGE INBND SLOW DECISION BY CREW TO CANCEL IFR, GO VFR. PIC LOST 300-600' WHILE I ATTEMPTED TO CANCEL IFR WITH ZLC. FREQ WAS VERY BUSY. UPON CANCELLING ZLC QUERIED AS TO WHAT ALT WE HAD BROKEN OUT AT (WHICH WAS 8600'). I SAID '8000' (OUR CURRENT ALT, ARPT IN SIGHT.' MY CONCERNS: 1) POOR CREW COORD ON DECISION TO CANCEL IFR, GO VFR 5, OR TO CONTINUE HOLDING AND ASK FOR DIFFERENT OPTIONS. 2) CAPT'S LOOK-SEE OR INADVERTENT DSCNT 300-600' BELOW ASSIGNED BEFORE THE DECISION TO CANCEL IFR. I CALLED THIS TO HIM 2-3 TIMES. 3) CONTINUING 2 MI PAST NDB-DME W/O TURNING BACK TO OUTBND HOLD LEG, MOSTLY A RESULT OF SLOW AND POOR CREW COORD. CAPT'S LOOK-SEE. WE'LL HAVE A DISCUSSION ON WHAT WAS WHAT (LOOK-SEE OR POOR COORD). 4) THE NEXT DAY THE PIC, RESPONSIBLE FOR FSS/WX AND PREFLT RTE PLANES, WAS STILL WONDERING WHY WE WEREN'T CLRED FOR THE APCH (NDB-DME AT SUN). MY IDEA WAS TFC/AIRSPACE CONFLICTS ZLC MAY HAVE HAD. THE NEXT EVENING AS I REVISED MY CHARTS I SAW THAT THERE WAS A NOTAM FOR HAILEY--...NDB-DME-A IFR PROC NA. ALSO THE IFR DEP PROC IS NA. DID HE CHK OR QUESTION? I ALSO CAREFULLY REVIEWED THESE PROCS FOR ARR AND DEP. NOW I WONDER ABOUT THE DEP TOO. I'LL DOUBLE-CHK NOTAMS TOO BEFORE EACH FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.