Narrative:

In cruise at FL350 over bna on J39 with first officer flying. Instead of continuing on J39 as cleared on the flight plan, first officer turned to intercept another airway. I questioned the heading and stated the correct heading for J39. First officer replied that he was following flight plan forecast #2. I requested to see it since I was not aware that one had been issued. At that time ZME controller questioned our routing clearance. I read back the clearance from fpf #2. The controller replied that his routing showed us on J39 not another airway. I continued to study fpf #2, as the first officer turned to the correct heading to continue on J39, and saw that it said fpf #2 (for information only). We informed the center of what had occurred, and discussed the error among the crew. The error occurred because I had not seen every copy of the paperwork prepared by operations and the first officer had not completely read what he believed to be the correct fpf, ie, #2, and the second officer was not following a flight plan to xchk the captain and first officer. In addition to the above, if fpf #2 (for information only) had been printed directly after the clearance on the PF #2 instead of at the bottom below the entire body of the fpf the error probably would never have occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT TRACK ERROR.

Narrative: IN CRUISE AT FL350 OVER BNA ON J39 WITH F/O FLYING. INSTEAD OF CONTINUING ON J39 AS CLRED ON THE FLT PLAN, F/O TURNED TO INTERCEPT ANOTHER AIRWAY. I QUESTIONED THE HDG AND STATED THE CORRECT HDG FOR J39. F/O REPLIED THAT HE WAS FOLLOWING FLT PLAN FORECAST #2. I REQUESTED TO SEE IT SINCE I WAS NOT AWARE THAT ONE HAD BEEN ISSUED. AT THAT TIME ZME CTLR QUESTIONED OUR ROUTING CLRNC. I READ BACK THE CLRNC FROM FPF #2. THE CTLR REPLIED THAT HIS ROUTING SHOWED US ON J39 NOT ANOTHER AIRWAY. I CONTINUED TO STUDY FPF #2, AS THE F/O TURNED TO THE CORRECT HDG TO CONTINUE ON J39, AND SAW THAT IT SAID FPF #2 (FOR INFO ONLY). WE INFORMED THE CENTER OF WHAT HAD OCCURRED, AND DISCUSSED THE ERROR AMONG THE CREW. THE ERROR OCCURRED BECAUSE I HAD NOT SEEN EVERY COPY OF THE PAPERWORK PREPARED BY OPERATIONS AND THE F/O HAD NOT COMPLETELY READ WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE THE CORRECT FPF, IE, #2, AND THE S/O WAS NOT FOLLOWING A FLT PLAN TO XCHK THE CAPT AND F/O. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, IF FPF #2 (FOR INFO ONLY) HAD BEEN PRINTED DIRECTLY AFTER THE CLRNC ON THE PF #2 INSTEAD OF AT THE BOTTOM BELOW THE ENTIRE BODY OF THE FPF THE ERROR PROBABLY WOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.