Narrative:

Climbing through 10000' MSL a short fire warning bell sounded (no crew member saw a light). Climbing out of 12500', another short bell sounded. Climbing out of 13500' the wheel well fire warning bell and light came on steady. At the direction of the captain, I asked ATC for a level-off at 15000' and a speed reduction to 200 KTS. This was approved. The captain had the so contact company, and had me lower the landing gear (when gear was lowered wheel well light went out), and the captain began advising the F/a's. At the same time the captain leveled the aircraft at 15000' and slowed to 200 KTS. I called for the wheel well fire checklists and someone said 'its down'. ATC was asking our intentions when I noticed our altitude was 14800' and descending I called the altitude to the captain's attention and he stopped the descent. The captain was busy with the second officer and communications with the company. ATC still wanted our intentions. The captain directed me to get a clearance back to the airport. Before I could call ATC, ATC asked if we wanted a lower altitude. I looked at the altimeter and we were descending through 14300'. We were then cleared to 7000' and a heading to join the localizer. Approach and landing made west/O further incident. The captain did not prioritize and develop a plan of action. Instead of dealing with the problem directly, he chose to talk to F/a, the company, and didn't call for checklists which would have focused all 3 crew members on the immediate task: flying the aircraft. I, as first officer, was busy trying to clean up checklists and get # of people on board when I should have been monitoring the flight of the aircraft. The second officer should have been doing the checklists, determining souls aboard, etc, instead of talking to company. Had the captain called for the checklists and directed the first officer and second officer to work together on it (as we do in training) while he flew the aircraft and developed his own plan of action, delaying communication with the company and F/a's until things were under control, I think we would not have deviated off altitude. The captain had 3 individual crew members (not a crew) all trying to do someone else's job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT DEVIATION FROM AMENDED CLRNC ALT AFTER WHEEL WELL FIRE WARNING ACTIVATED.

Narrative: CLBING THROUGH 10000' MSL A SHORT FIRE WARNING BELL SOUNDED (NO CREW MEMBER SAW A LIGHT). CLBING OUT OF 12500', ANOTHER SHORT BELL SOUNDED. CLBING OUT OF 13500' THE WHEEL WELL FIRE WARNING BELL AND LIGHT CAME ON STEADY. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE CAPT, I ASKED ATC FOR A LEVEL-OFF AT 15000' AND A SPD REDUCTION TO 200 KTS. THIS WAS APPROVED. THE CAPT HAD THE SO CONTACT COMPANY, AND HAD ME LOWER THE LNDG GEAR (WHEN GEAR WAS LOWERED WHEEL WELL LIGHT WENT OUT), AND THE CAPT BEGAN ADVISING THE F/A'S. AT THE SAME TIME THE CAPT LEVELED THE ACFT AT 15000' AND SLOWED TO 200 KTS. I CALLED FOR THE WHEEL WELL FIRE CHKLISTS AND SOMEONE SAID 'ITS DOWN'. ATC WAS ASKING OUR INTENTIONS WHEN I NOTICED OUR ALT WAS 14800' AND DSNDING I CALLED THE ALT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN AND HE STOPPED THE DSCNT. THE CAPT WAS BUSY WITH THE S/O AND COMS WITH THE COMPANY. ATC STILL WANTED OUR INTENTIONS. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO GET A CLRNC BACK TO THE ARPT. BEFORE I COULD CALL ATC, ATC ASKED IF WE WANTED A LOWER ALT. I LOOKED AT THE ALTIMETER AND WE WERE DSNDING THROUGH 14300'. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO 7000' AND A HDG TO JOIN THE LOC. APCH AND LNDG MADE W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. THE CAPT DID NOT PRIORITIZE AND DEVELOP A PLAN OF ACTION. INSTEAD OF DEALING WITH THE PROB DIRECTLY, HE CHOSE TO TALK TO F/A, THE COMPANY, AND DIDN'T CALL FOR CHKLISTS WHICH WOULD HAVE FOCUSED ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS ON THE IMMEDIATE TASK: FLYING THE ACFT. I, AS F/O, WAS BUSY TRYING TO CLEAN UP CHKLISTS AND GET # OF PEOPLE ON BOARD WHEN I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MONITORING THE FLT OF THE ACFT. THE S/O SHOULD HAVE BEEN DOING THE CHKLISTS, DETERMINING SOULS ABOARD, ETC, INSTEAD OF TALKING TO COMPANY. HAD THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE CHKLISTS AND DIRECTED THE F/O AND S/O TO WORK TOGETHER ON IT (AS WE DO IN TRNING) WHILE HE FLEW THE ACFT AND DEVELOPED HIS OWN PLAN OF ACTION, DELAYING COM WITH THE COMPANY AND F/A'S UNTIL THINGS WERE UNDER CONTROL, I THINK WE WOULD NOT HAVE DEVIATED OFF ALT. THE CAPT HAD 3 INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBERS (NOT A CREW) ALL TRYING TO DO SOMEONE ELSE'S JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.