Narrative:

Flight was cleared the visual 31 to lga and approaching dials the captain recognized that he had too much energy and attempted to correct the profile by lowering the gear and flaps as appropriate. Once established on final; he determined that we were too high to make a normal landing and directed a go-around. Tower directed us to climb to 1;000 feet to avoid another aircraft overflying the field and switched us to approach and we complied. About the time of the radio switch; we leveled at 1;000 feet and the captain engaged the autopilot. Upon checking in with approach control; we were instructed to turn to a 340 heading and climb and maintain 3;000 feet. I visually verified the captain selecting 340 heading and 3;000 feet in the MCP however I did not visually verify that the heading mode was selected. We began a right turn and a climb and began setting up to prepare for another visual approach by loading the FMC. At this time; ATC asked if we were on a 340 heading and I looked at our heading passing roughly a 095 heading still in a right turn. I replied that we had missed our heading and asked ATC what heading he would like us to fly; and was instructed to fly a 090 heading. Once established on the 090 heading; the rest of the climb out and subsequent visual approach were uneventful. Once we had landed; the captain and I discussed what had occurred and both agreed that the correct 340 heading had been selected in the MCP; and the captain thought that we must have been in control wheel steering (cws) which would explain why we turned through our assigned heading. Strict adherence to the CRM principles would have ensured that we had selected heading select for our lateral control mode and through monitoring; would have trapped and corrected the error.once I saw the 340 heading selected in the heading window and observed the aircraft start a right turn in the correct direction; I assumed that we were in heading mode without verifying and monitoring; resulting in overshooting the assigned heading. I believe both the captain and myself were pushed out of the green by a challenging visual approach followed by an unplanned go-around. I believe the situation would have been avoided if we had slowed down; strictly followed procedures; and not been in a rush to get set up for the next approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew experienced an unstabilized approach during the Visual to Runway 31 at LGA and goes around. The crew levels at 1;000 feet on runway heading and is then instructed to climb to 3;000 feet and head 340 degrees. The climb and turn are initiated; but heading select is never engaged resulting in a turn to 095 degrees before ATC questioned the heading.

Narrative: Flight was cleared the visual 31 to LGA and approaching DIALS the Captain recognized that he had too much energy and attempted to correct the profile by lowering the gear and flaps as appropriate. Once established on final; he determined that we were too high to make a normal landing and directed a go-around. Tower directed us to climb to 1;000 feet to avoid another aircraft overflying the field and switched us to Approach and we complied. About the time of the radio switch; we leveled at 1;000 feet and the Captain engaged the autopilot. Upon checking in with Approach Control; we were instructed to turn to a 340 heading and climb and maintain 3;000 feet. I visually verified the Captain selecting 340 heading and 3;000 feet in the MCP however I did not visually verify that the heading mode was selected. We began a right turn and a climb and began setting up to prepare for another visual approach by loading the FMC. At this time; ATC asked if we were on a 340 heading and I looked at our heading passing roughly a 095 heading still in a right turn. I replied that we had missed our heading and asked ATC what heading he would like us to fly; and was instructed to fly a 090 heading. Once established on the 090 heading; the rest of the climb out and subsequent visual approach were uneventful. Once we had landed; the Captain and I discussed what had occurred and both agreed that the correct 340 heading had been selected in the MCP; and the Captain thought that we must have been in Control Wheel Steering (CWS) which would explain why we turned through our assigned heading. Strict adherence to the CRM principles would have ensured that we had selected Heading Select for our lateral control mode and through monitoring; would have trapped and corrected the error.Once I saw the 340 heading selected in the heading window and observed the aircraft start a right turn in the correct direction; I assumed that we were in heading mode without verifying and monitoring; resulting in overshooting the assigned heading. I believe both the Captain and myself were pushed out of the green by a challenging visual approach followed by an unplanned go-around. I believe the situation would have been avoided if we had slowed down; strictly followed procedures; and not been in a rush to get set up for the next approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.