Narrative:

We tried too many approaches and our closest alternate was unsuitable at the time we decided to deviate. We then had to deviate to a further alternate knowing that we would arrive with less than 45 minute reserve and critical fuel. My captain did not plan a suitable alternate; and may have not researched weather despite those being his company delegated pre-flight tasks. I did not receive detailed weather briefing and deviation plan from the captain. My captain failed to give detailed approach briefing including visibility restrictions and deviation to alternate and had a lack of personal minimums. We may have been able to land on the first and second approach attempts but my captain's instrument approach skills were extremely poor; resulting in full scale deflection and lack of descent rate after the FAF; so despite my advisories and attempts to correct the situation we were forced to go missed. I suggested after the first two missed approaches that we hold and assess fuel; deviation plans and weather conditions; but the captain insisted on doing the procedure turn and attempting two more approaches. I was very distracted in my radio communications because my captain had very poor CRM; doing many pilot not flying (PNF) tasks himself without notifying or requesting that I perform them because of this he was not maintaining directional control and he was also attempting to turn for missed approach instructions before the aircraft was under control resulting in very unstable missed approaches. The two additional times we attempted approaches the weather was too showery and inconsistent; and despite receiving reports from the tower that visibility was above minimums; we did not see the runway on either approach. After four consecutive approaches we finally received a long climb and turnout from tower for our missed approach instructions and had the chance to slow down and assess our situation. I immediately asked captain for alternate options and requested weather for our alternates from tower. The closest alternate was low IFR and the weather we were experiencing was headed toward our alternate. I asked the captain if we had enough fuel to deviate to farthest (second) alternate which was VFR. The captain did not know. The captain calculated the fuel to get there and reported could but with less than 45 min reserve. He still did not make decision to stay or to deviate. With weather still below minimums at current airport and 4 approach attempts failed and an inactive captain; I demanded an immediate deviation to the farther (second alternate). I did not feel experienced enough or prepared to make the decision but felt at that point I had no other choice (only XXX hrs approximately xx flights and X months flying 135 and sf 340 under my belt). It was risky but at that point everything was. The captain agreed to deviate. I requested immediate deviation from the tower and the captain reported fuel critical and requesting priority handling. The captain gained altitude for better fuel burn. Enroute we received a fuel low warning and the captain did not call for QRH; so I suggested and followed QRH procedures (turning on the standby pumps). The captain agreed. I brought up and discussed the possible scenario of engine failure due to fuel loss on approach with the captain. The captain decided to continue with both engines running. We briefed and discussed descent and approach in detail. My captain decided not [to] declare emergency for fear of reprimand/paperwork. We landed with both engines running but without enough fuel to conduct a go around or missed approach. The deviation took over and hour and we had 25 minutes or less fuel for normal cruise when we touched down. I requested a post flight briefing with the captain. I reported the details of the flight to chief pilot and director of operations (do). I have confirmed plans to meet with the chief pilot and do to discuss the details. The do and chief pilot said they would speak with the captain. I requested chief pilot give me and additional training session on actual planned alternates; fuel planning and applicable weather trends. I suggested planning materials be made more available to first officers (first officer) and that fos should be encouraged to share that duty with the captains. I resolved to practice a 2-approach personal minimum and only a second attempt if there are significant weather changes and if fuel generously allows. I resolved to memorize each route alternate choices and the minimum fuel for each so I know exactly when the last opportunity is to deviate; even if the captain does not; and lastly to take a much stronger stance on my responsibility to also route; fuel and weather plan and exercise full discipline in questioning the captain when they are vague or omit details of planning and or weather.we received distracting and tempting weather updates from tower that the visibility was increasing to '2 miles' again and 'this was our only chance' just as crossing the final approach fix outboard (perfect timing for procedure turn and not for hold) which made the temptation of trying again hard to suppress. This helped contribute to the momentum of the situation resulting in four continuous approach attempts in the minimum amount of time. We failed to realize each visibility report from the tower was not accurate or if it was; they were; conditions were changing so rapidly we did not have time complete our approaches. This was the first time I was ever forced to go missed on a non-training flight; exercise personal approach minimums or deviate in flying career so though I had the right instincts I had a lack of insight on the overall situation and the experience not just to suggest; but to demand to hold and deviate earlier. The captain had an attitude like he had to begrudgingly use the QRH I called for it after the fuel warning. He also harbored an attitude that everything was someone else's fault - it was the plane; or the weather or my fault as a new first officer.my company has showed the attitude and specifically said in training multiple times that fos are not responsible and do not need to be trained on routes; alternates; and fuel planning which are considered captains duties. This creates a poor attitude and culture for fos. Captains briefing fos on above topics was suggested but nowhere and no time stressed. Materials for actual routes flown; alternates used and fuel plans are either nonexistent or not readily available for fos. Additionally; the company has a reputation of protecting captains who have received multiple serious complaints.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier turboprop First Officer (FO) reported landing at an alternate in a low fuel situation following multiple unsuccessful instrument approaches at intended destination. FO stated the Captain's planning and decision making were weak.

Narrative: We tried too many approaches and our closest alternate was unsuitable at the time we decided to deviate. We then had to deviate to a further alternate knowing that we would arrive with less than 45 minute reserve and critical fuel. My Captain did not plan a suitable alternate; and may have not researched weather despite those being his company delegated pre-flight tasks. I did not receive detailed weather briefing and deviation plan from the Captain. My Captain failed to give detailed approach briefing including visibility restrictions and deviation to alternate and had a lack of personal minimums. We may have been able to land on the first and second approach attempts but my Captain's instrument approach skills were extremely poor; resulting in full scale deflection and lack of descent rate after the FAF; so despite my advisories and attempts to correct the situation we were forced to go missed. I suggested after the first two missed approaches that we hold and assess fuel; deviation plans and weather conditions; but the Captain insisted on doing the procedure turn and attempting two more approaches. I was very distracted in my radio communications because my Captain had very poor CRM; doing many Pilot Not Flying (PNF) tasks himself without notifying or requesting that I perform them because of this he was not maintaining directional control and he was also attempting to turn for missed approach instructions before the aircraft was under control resulting in very unstable missed approaches. The two additional times we attempted approaches the weather was too showery and inconsistent; and despite receiving reports from the tower that visibility was above minimums; we did not see the runway on either approach. After four consecutive approaches we finally received a long climb and turnout from Tower for our missed approach instructions and had the chance to slow down and assess our situation. I immediately asked Captain for alternate options and requested weather for our alternates from tower. The closest alternate was low IFR and the weather we were experiencing was headed toward our alternate. I asked the Captain if we had enough fuel to deviate to farthest (second) alternate which was VFR. The Captain did not know. The Captain calculated the fuel to get there and reported could but with less than 45 min reserve. He still did not make decision to stay or to deviate. With weather still below minimums at current airport and 4 approach attempts failed and an inactive Captain; I demanded an immediate deviation to the farther (second alternate). I did not feel experienced enough or prepared to make the decision but felt at that point I had no other choice (only XXX hrs approximately XX flights and X months flying 135 and SF 340 under my belt). It was risky but at that point everything was. The Captain agreed to deviate. I requested immediate deviation from the tower and the Captain reported fuel critical and requesting priority handling. The Captain gained altitude for better fuel burn. Enroute we received a fuel low warning and the Captain did not call for QRH; so I suggested and followed QRH procedures (turning on the standby pumps). The Captain agreed. I brought up and discussed the possible scenario of engine failure due to fuel loss on approach with the Captain. The Captain decided to continue with both engines running. We briefed and discussed descent and approach in detail. My Captain decided not [to] declare emergency for fear of reprimand/paperwork. We landed with both engines running but without enough fuel to conduct a go around or missed approach. The deviation took over and hour and we had 25 minutes or less fuel for normal cruise when we touched down. I requested a post flight briefing with the Captain. I reported the details of the flight to Chief Pilot and Director of Operations (DO). I have confirmed plans to meet with the Chief Pilot and DO to discuss the details. The DO and chief pilot said they would speak with the Captain. I requested Chief Pilot give me and additional training session on actual planned alternates; fuel planning and applicable weather trends. I suggested planning materials be made more available to First Officers (FO) and that FOs should be encouraged to share that duty with the Captains. I resolved to practice a 2-approach personal minimum and only a second attempt if there are significant weather changes and if fuel generously allows. I resolved to memorize each route alternate choices and the minimum fuel for each so I know exactly when the last opportunity is to deviate; even if the captain does not; and lastly to take a much stronger stance on my responsibility to also route; fuel and weather plan and exercise full discipline in questioning the Captain when they are vague or omit details of planning and or weather.We received distracting and tempting weather updates from tower that the visibility was increasing to '2 miles' again and 'this was our only chance' just as crossing the final approach fix outboard (perfect timing for procedure turn and not for hold) which made the temptation of trying again hard to suppress. This helped contribute to the momentum of the situation resulting in four continuous approach attempts in the minimum amount of time. We failed to realize each visibility report from the tower was not accurate or if it was; they were; conditions were changing so rapidly we did not have time complete our approaches. This was the first time I was ever forced to go missed on a non-training flight; exercise personal approach minimums or deviate in flying career so though I had the right instincts I had a lack of insight on the overall situation and the experience not just to suggest; but to demand to hold and deviate earlier. The Captain had an attitude like he had to begrudgingly use the QRH I called for it after the fuel warning. He also harbored an attitude that everything was someone else's fault - it was the plane; or the weather or my fault as a new FO.My company has showed the attitude and specifically said in training multiple times that FOs are not responsible and do not need to be trained on routes; alternates; and fuel planning which are considered captains duties. This creates a poor attitude and culture for FOs. Captains briefing FOs on above topics was suggested but nowhere and no time stressed. Materials for actual routes flown; alternates used and fuel plans are either nonexistent or not readily available for FOs. Additionally; the Company has a reputation of protecting Captains who have received multiple serious complaints.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.