Narrative:

While working satellite sector 4 aircraft were inbound to land runway 19. I determined the sequence to be a BE58 from the south to be number one. A corporate jet from the west to be number 2. A boeing 737 from the east to be number 3. A boeing 737 from the west to be number 4. I coordinated with the canyon sector to leave the BE58 at a higher speed to make it number 1. I coordinated the number 2; and 4 aircraft with final sector; and pointed out the number 3 aircraft to that sector. I advised the pilot of the BE58 to descend to the lowest useable altitude and begin to reduce speed in preparation for a base turn. I then advised the pilot to make the base turn and he said he would be unable to land because he was too high and too fast; and he needed to extend his downwind to make a safe landing. I called the nellis sector to make a point out and was told unable on the point out. I asked the pilot how long until he could make his base turn and he said maybe a mile and a half. I decided that due to the proximity of the following traffic; and the terrain and the pilot needing a mile or less to start his turn; the safest option was to continue with the visual approach. The pilot extended longer than anticipated and violated the airspace of the nellis controller and a deviation occurred.this problem continues to be on going. The proximity of lsv and las and vgt and hnd being very close; precludes precise safe air traffic control with the current procedures in place; which essentially are none. During busy traffic periods; the controller is expected to control situations that are not controllable due to the inconsistency of other controller actions; aircraft characteristics; and pilot actions. Precise procedures are necessary for route guidance between these airports and airspace delegations. Proper management of traffic into this area combined with precise procedures will prevent the re occurrence of this type of event. As long as management continues to refuse to implement precise procedures; and manage the traffic workload into these sectors; recurrence of this type of event will absolutely occur; on a regular basis.you have my permission to share this report with whoever they deem necessary to improve the safety of L30.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: L30 Controller reports of an aircraft he wants to turn base but the aircraft reports its too high and needs to extend its downwind. The aircraft then violated another areas airspace because the controller wouldn't accept a point out.

Narrative: While working satellite sector 4 aircraft were inbound to land runway 19. I determined the sequence to be a BE58 from the south to be number one. A Corporate Jet from the west to be number 2. A Boeing 737 from the east to be number 3. A Boeing 737 from the west to be number 4. I coordinated with the Canyon sector to leave the BE58 at a higher speed to make it number 1. I coordinated the number 2; and 4 aircraft with final sector; and pointed out the number 3 aircraft to that sector. I advised the pilot of the BE58 to descend to the lowest useable altitude and begin to reduce speed in preparation for a base turn. I then advised the pilot to make the base turn and he said he would be unable to land because he was too high and too fast; and he needed to extend his downwind to make a safe landing. I called the Nellis sector to make a point out and was told unable on the point out. I asked the pilot how long until he could make his base turn and he said maybe a mile and a half. I decided that due to the proximity of the following traffic; and the terrain and the pilot needing a mile or less to start his turn; the safest option was to continue with the visual approach. The pilot extended longer than anticipated and violated the airspace of the Nellis Controller and a deviation occurred.This problem continues to be on going. The proximity of LSV and LAS and VGT and HND being very close; precludes precise safe air traffic control with the current procedures in place; which essentially are none. During busy traffic periods; the controller is expected to control situations that are not controllable due to the inconsistency of other controller actions; aircraft characteristics; and pilot actions. Precise procedures are necessary for route guidance between these airports and airspace delegations. Proper management of traffic into this area combined with precise procedures will prevent the re occurrence of this type of event. As long as management continues to refuse to implement precise procedures; and manage the traffic workload into these sectors; recurrence of this type of event will absolutely occur; on a regular basis.You have my permission to share this report with whoever they deem necessary to improve the safety of L30.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.