Narrative:

On this date controller a (developmental 3 positions certified) was working final radar with small aircraft X on back course 28R talking to tower on 6 mi final. Air carrier Y inbound on downwind from south 5 mi abeam airport. Controller a turned air carrier Y north for visual approach to runway 28R. Neither aircraft saw each other and at last moment air carrier Y was turned to the east directly at small aircraft X. Controller B & C saw the situation and called to the attention of 2 supervisors. When asked in regards to what separation was being used controller a replied 'I've got 2.2 and increasing'. No corrective action or systems error documented. Less than 5 mins later controller a descended an aircraft in another controller's airspace. Controller a just 2 weeks ago was working the same position, he had 4 aircraft all at same altitude with 5 mi total airspace. He then descended one of these through another IFR aircraft. Again the supervisor was made aware of the situation with no action or error called. The supervisor was one of the two involved in the oct/xx/89 problem. The problem is an ongoing problem with not only this developmental but others in training with partial certification and others recently certified. The errors by these individuals are overlooked by management. Management will take no action on any situation unless a pilot complains. The philosophy here is don't make waves or paperwork. New supervisors or a shakeup is needed. Operations officer and qa officer don't do the job assigned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT ON VISUAL APCH WAS VECTORED TOWARDS ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: ON THIS DATE CTLR A (DEVELOPMENTAL 3 POSITIONS CERTIFIED) WAS WORKING FINAL RADAR WITH SMA X ON BC 28R TALKING TO TWR ON 6 MI FINAL. ACR Y INBND ON DOWNWIND FROM S 5 MI ABEAM ARPT. CTLR A TURNED ACR Y N FOR VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28R. NEITHER ACFT SAW EACH OTHER AND AT LAST MOMENT ACR Y WAS TURNED TO THE E DIRECTLY AT SMA X. CTLR B & C SAW THE SITUATION AND CALLED TO THE ATTN OF 2 SUPVRS. WHEN ASKED IN REGARDS TO WHAT SEPARATION WAS BEING USED CTLR A REPLIED 'I'VE GOT 2.2 AND INCREASING'. NO CORRECTIVE ACTION OR SYSTEMS ERROR DOCUMENTED. LESS THAN 5 MINS LATER CTLR A DESCENDED AN ACFT IN ANOTHER CTLR'S AIRSPACE. CTLR A JUST 2 WEEKS AGO WAS WORKING THE SAME POSITION, HE HAD 4 ACFT ALL AT SAME ALT WITH 5 MI TOTAL AIRSPACE. HE THEN DESCENDED ONE OF THESE THROUGH ANOTHER IFR ACFT. AGAIN THE SUPVR WAS MADE AWARE OF THE SITUATION WITH NO ACTION OR ERROR CALLED. THE SUPVR WAS ONE OF THE TWO INVOLVED IN THE OCT/XX/89 PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM IS AN ONGOING PROBLEM WITH NOT ONLY THIS DEVELOPMENTAL BUT OTHERS IN TRAINING WITH PARTIAL CERTIFICATION AND OTHERS RECENTLY CERTIFIED. THE ERRORS BY THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE OVERLOOKED BY MGMNT. MGMNT WILL TAKE NO ACTION ON ANY SITUATION UNLESS A PLT COMPLAINS. THE PHILOSOPHY HERE IS DON'T MAKE WAVES OR PAPERWORK. NEW SUPVRS OR A SHAKEUP IS NEEDED. OPS OFFICER AND QA OFFICER DON'T DO THE JOB ASSIGNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.