Narrative:

We were on a visual approach to runway 16L. I was the pilot not flying and the captain was flying. We had been cleared for a visual approach and the captain set 7;000 ft in the preselect. We were about 10 miles away from the airport. I could see the PAPI indications and knew that we were low. I also saw that he had set 7;000 ft and knew that he would level off at that altitude. Then when the glideslope came in we would configure and continue the descent. We never briefed it; but it's a relatively common way to fly the visual approach. At this point I looked out of my window to scan for traffic on runway 16R. The aircraft banked to the left as we intercepted the localizer and still looking out the window I noticed that we were getting pretty low to the ground. When I looked back ahead I noticed we were way too low on the PAPI's and a glance at the RA showed about 1;000 ft above the ground. We both caught it simultaneously and the captain added power and returned to the glideslope. It turns out; when the aircraft intercepted the localizer the captain mistook the 'captured' indication on the fcp to mean that it had captured 7;000 ft. He then rolled the altitude preselect to 10;000 ft so he could begin the descent when ready. As a result the aircraft continued the descent. I never caught it either because I was looking out the side window. Root cause was a misinterpretation of the automation that went unnoticed by both the captain and I until the aircraft reached about 1;000 ft AGL. Contributing to the event was distraction with me looking out the window for traffic. In the future; we both agreed to verify every time the fcp captures something. I also plan on being more focused on the flight profile. Scanning for traffic is fine; but not if it results in a loss of situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 reports getting very low during a visual approach with the Captain flying due to lack of attention by both pilots.

Narrative: We were on a visual approach to Runway 16L. I was the pilot not flying and the Captain was flying. We had been cleared for a visual approach and the Captain set 7;000 FT in the preselect. We were about 10 miles away from the airport. I could see the PAPI indications and knew that we were low. I also saw that he had set 7;000 FT and knew that he would level off at that altitude. Then when the glideslope came in we would configure and continue the descent. We never briefed it; but it's a relatively common way to fly the visual approach. At this point I looked out of my window to scan for traffic on Runway 16R. The aircraft banked to the left as we intercepted the localizer and still looking out the window I noticed that we were getting pretty low to the ground. When I looked back ahead I noticed we were way too low on the PAPI's and a glance at the RA showed about 1;000 FT above the ground. We both caught it simultaneously and the Captain added power and returned to the glideslope. It turns out; when the aircraft intercepted the localizer the Captain mistook the 'captured' indication on the FCP to mean that it had captured 7;000 FT. He then rolled the altitude preselect to 10;000 FT so he could begin the descent when ready. As a result the aircraft continued the descent. I never caught it either because I was looking out the side window. Root cause was a misinterpretation of the automation that went unnoticed by both the Captain and I until the aircraft reached about 1;000 FT AGL. Contributing to the event was distraction with me looking out the window for traffic. In the future; we both agreed to verify every time the FCP captures something. I also plan on being more focused on the flight profile. Scanning for traffic is fine; but not if it results in a loss of situational awareness.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.