Narrative:

[It was the] first officer's leg to ord. First officer is a recent return from 10 year leave and was unfamiliar with ord. We set up for arrival to [runway] 10C. We briefed the approach; clearing the runway and taxi route to the gate. Upon contact with approach; they assigned us [runway] 9R. We set up for [runway] 9R; briefed the approach; briefed clearing the runway; and taxi route to the gate. On short final; a regional jet was told to clear the runway and failed to comply in a reasonable time so we were sent around. On downwind; we were given runway 9L. I set the up the approach and the first officer briefed it. Fuel was 5;600 pounds at go-around but extended vectors put us under 5;000 pounds and another go-around would put us at emergency fuel. We landed uneventfully and cleared the runway. We were handed off to a ground controller that fired off a long taxi clearance. I went to type the clearance into the scratch pad; but the keyboard lights were so dim I couldn't see the letters and missed the clearance. I remembered as far as weight right on F1 and cross runway. The first officer had written down the entire clearance and read back to the controller. I was heads up looking at the taxi signs. Weight made a right bend and when I saw the F1 sign I called out 'right on fox 1'. She repeated right on fox 1. I misread the sign that after the right bend I was on F1; but later review found I was still on weight. I was now approaching [runway] 4L. I called out 'cleared to cross 4L' and she repeated 'cleared to cross'. I turned on the runway turnoff lights and was starting to clear right when the ground controller yelled out 'stop'. I stopped short of the hold short line. There was an aircraft on takeoff roll on that runway. I made several mistakes. First; after clearing the runway; I should have stopped the aircraft; gotten a piece of paper and requested the clearance again at a slower speed. I then should have reviewed the clearance with the first officer on the airport diagram until we were both in agreement. I should not have let the first officer go heads down between hot spot 7 and [runway] 4L. It is possible the go-around and low fuel concern were a distraction which would have been an even bigger reason to stop and get it right. With runways 4L and 14L being so similar and so close together at hot spot 7; there should never be a clearance to cross either runway until the aircraft is near the hold short line. My clearing to the right would have been the last safety net before a serious potential incident and it bothers me greatly that it got to that point. I am not putting down the first officer at all; but we have had senior co-pilots for so long; that myself and I'm sure many other captains need to be reminded that new hires and recalls may not be on the same page as us yet and we need to step up to cover this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reports being issued a complicated taxi clearance after landing on Runway 9L at ORD. When the First Officer is head down the Captain gets off track and nearly has a runway incursion.

Narrative: [It was the] First Officer's leg to ORD. First Officer is a recent return from 10 year leave and was unfamiliar with ORD. We set up for arrival to [Runway] 10C. We briefed the approach; clearing the runway and taxi route to the gate. Upon contact with Approach; they assigned us [Runway] 9R. We set up for [Runway] 9R; briefed the approach; briefed clearing the runway; and taxi route to the gate. On short final; a Regional Jet was told to clear the runway and failed to comply in a reasonable time so we were sent around. On downwind; we were given Runway 9L. I set the up the approach and the First Officer briefed it. Fuel was 5;600 LBS at go-around but extended vectors put us under 5;000 LBS and another go-around would put us at emergency fuel. We landed uneventfully and cleared the runway. We were handed off to a Ground Controller that fired off a long taxi clearance. I went to type the clearance into the scratch pad; but the keyboard lights were so dim I couldn't see the letters and missed the clearance. I remembered as far as WT right on F1 and cross runway. The First Officer had written down the entire clearance and read back to the Controller. I was heads up looking at the taxi signs. WT made a right bend and when I saw the F1 sign I called out 'right on Fox 1'. She repeated right on Fox 1. I misread the sign that after the right bend I was on F1; but later review found I was still on WT. I was now approaching [Runway] 4L. I called out 'cleared to cross 4L' and she repeated 'cleared to cross'. I turned on the runway turnoff lights and was starting to clear right when the Ground Controller yelled out 'stop'. I stopped short of the hold short line. There was an aircraft on takeoff roll on that runway. I made several mistakes. First; after clearing the runway; I should have stopped the aircraft; gotten a piece of paper and requested the clearance again at a slower speed. I then should have reviewed the clearance with the First Officer on the airport diagram until we were both in agreement. I should not have let the First Officer go heads down between hot spot 7 and [Runway] 4L. It is possible the go-around and low fuel concern were a distraction which would have been an even bigger reason to stop and get it right. With Runways 4L and 14L being so similar and so close together at hot spot 7; there should never be a clearance to cross either runway until the aircraft is near the hold short line. My clearing to the right would have been the last safety net before a serious potential incident and it bothers me greatly that it got to that point. I am not putting down the First Officer at all; but we have had senior co-pilots for so long; that myself and I'm sure many other captains need to be reminded that new hires and recalls may not be on the same page as us yet and we need to step up to cover this.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.