Narrative:

Shortly after level off at FL220 in intermittent light icing conditions and light to moderate turbulence; my IAS speed tapes/indication on my pfd went smoothly and expeditiously to around 50 KTS indication. The autopilot kicked off and clicks were heard suggesting other switches and systems were dropping off. The compound situation of turbulence; IMC flight conditions and numerous unknown system losses made for a very interesting 2 minutes of quick evaluation and prudent action on our part as a crew. I initially maintained pilot flying duties. There were no sensory inputs that we had left level; constant speed flight. This (sensory awareness of normal controlled flight path) was lightly brought into question by the frequent change in light to moderate turbulence we were encountering. It amounted to very quickly ensuring what was working and what wasn't by referring to standby instruments and comparing them to primary sources. With my focus on aviating I did not notice that the autothrottles had dropped off (one of the 'clicks' we heard I suspect) and the aircraft was slowly accelerating. The combination of my pfd primary speed showing 50-60 KTS; me hand flying in turbulence; the first officer's IAS tapes on his pfd showing overspeed; my referencing the standby gyro and the alternate airspeed indicator to accurately maintain safe flight trajectory had us loaded for about 2 minutes. The variability of instrument indications presented to us during the short time frame was the challenge. During this high workload 2 minutes and limited confidence it what exactly was 'correct' and therefore able to rely upon for safe instrument flight I had climbed approximately 350 ft high. It is worth noting that the altitude warning horn was on intermittently during this time; aggravating our mutual verbalization between us of what we actually were being challenged with. Turbulence; unreliable instrumentation; IMC; reduced autoflight; night; moderately loud audio warning input. Definitely and eyeful; I gave the aircraft to the first officer after I flew it back down to FL220. Looking cross cockpit I determined it was best to pass pilot flying duties to the first officer as he had what I felt the best 'correct indications' on his side. I did the ecams which included fadec and autothrottle related issues and a yaw damper that would not reset. I reviewed the red tabs and manually calculated and set the GA N1s in fadec alternate mode as per the red tabs. My speed tape on my pfd remained at 50-60 KTS until descending back through 14;000 on the arrival then everything seemed to return to normal. It is worth noting my electric altimeter reading displayed 250 ft higher than the first officer altimeter for the remainder of level flight at FL220. We chose to fly his primary electric altimeter as our altitude determinant and there was no input from ATC concerning same. This concluded this event. A second minor one occurred on turn to final for [runway] 5R and I am unable to determine if there is a direct relationship between the two events from an aircraft discrepancy standpoint. About 35 minutes after the event referenced above we were turning final with a seeming 100% capable aircraft (since descending through 14;000 ft into the destination area); copilot now pilot flying and myself pilot not flying because his side had been determined to be the 'reliable' side for instrumentation. He had chosen and I supported the use of the autopilot on his side for the approach. We turned to final near out marker waypoint for 5R; after the approach checklist was completed (good identification) with a nice intercept from the southeast and a nominal undershooting crosswind at 3;000 MSL. The aircraft captured the localizer and started a right hand turn to align with the final approach course. The first officer had called for landing gear transition and the before landing checklist and we were engaged in its progress and the attendant challenge and reply at this time. As we captured the localizer I set runway heading and I continued with the checklist items and their proper positioning as the aircraft continued right through final course alignment and continued right at 30 degrees angle of bank. By the time I realized there was an abnormal event the first officer had kicked off the autopilot and began to reverse course to return the aircraft back to the final approach course. At this same 'realization' moment for me and reversal action by the first officer; tower called and questioned our position and asked were we intercepting the final approach course. I replied we were correcting to the [runway] 5R final approach course. Tower did not say to us that we had a conflict with another aircraft. I believe they were just very attentive to our position. At the point of farthest deviation we were momentarily off scale right on the localizer. The first officer made a correct decision to disconnect automation and hand fly the aircraft back to the localizer. The aircraft automation was not reconnected for the short remainder of the flight. I do not believe the undershooting crosswind had anything to do with this. I do not know what caused the aircraft to do what it did. There were no discernible aircraft abnormal indications visible to either of us during this period or for the remainder of this flight. All the raw data appeared normal and did lead us properly to a hand flown successful approach and landing with approximately a 500 ft ceiling. With hindsight I feel this 'event' by circumstance happened at the critical moment where I was focused on my checklist duties; momentarily distracting the first officer from his pilot flying (monitoring the autopilot) duties to verify critical checklist items; and the jet doing something that we were not expecting at that same precise moment. With the preceding event en route (attached reference) we were happy to safely get on the ground and park the jet. I would like to mention that this jet had an interesting 5 days maintenance history.I do not feel crew rest or fatigue played a factor. We were both attentive and responsive as a team within the standardization system we operate within. Stuff just happens. Again with hindsight; it would have been nice if I; in the performance of the checklist items as pilot not flying had not likely distracted of the first officer; the pilot flying; with same; and this had not occurred at the critical moment of simultaneous aircraft malfunction and localizer intercept. There is likely a maintenance issue beyond the scope of my report. My suggestion about this event is; be rested; use the resources available: pilot not flying as necessary. Aviate first of course. It didn't hurt that I had an event much worse than this a few years back with a pitot static issue on this type aircraft that caused all the primary instruments (except attitude) to go absolutely bonkers in very similar flight conditions so I was a little 'experienced' in this regard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A300 Captain reported unreliable pitot static instruments in icing and turbulence at FL220; but both pilots' instrument indications returned to normal at about 14;000 FT descending.

Narrative: Shortly after level off at FL220 in intermittent light icing conditions and light to moderate turbulence; my IAS speed tapes/indication on my PFD went smoothly and expeditiously to around 50 KTS indication. The autopilot kicked off and clicks were heard suggesting other switches and systems were dropping off. The compound situation of turbulence; IMC flight conditions and numerous unknown system losses made for a very interesting 2 minutes of quick evaluation and prudent action on our part as a crew. I initially maintained pilot flying duties. There were no sensory inputs that we had left level; constant speed flight. This (sensory awareness of normal controlled flight path) was lightly brought into question by the frequent change in light to moderate turbulence we were encountering. It amounted to very quickly ensuring what was working and what wasn't by referring to standby instruments and comparing them to primary sources. With my focus on aviating I did not notice that the autothrottles had dropped off (one of the 'clicks' we heard I suspect) and the aircraft was slowly accelerating. The combination of my PFD primary speed showing 50-60 KTS; me hand flying in turbulence; the First Officer's IAS tapes on his PFD showing overspeed; my referencing the standby gyro and the alternate airspeed indicator to accurately maintain safe flight trajectory had us loaded for about 2 minutes. The variability of instrument indications presented to us during the short time frame was the challenge. During this high workload 2 minutes and limited confidence it what exactly was 'correct' and therefore able to rely upon for safe instrument flight I had climbed approximately 350 FT high. It is worth noting that the altitude warning horn was on intermittently during this time; aggravating our mutual verbalization between us of what we actually were being challenged with. Turbulence; unreliable instrumentation; IMC; reduced autoflight; night; moderately loud audio warning input. Definitely and eyeful; I gave the aircraft to the First Officer after I flew it back down to FL220. Looking cross cockpit I determined it was best to pass pilot flying duties to the First Officer as he had what I felt the best 'correct indications' on his side. I did the ECAMs which included FADEC and autothrottle related issues and a Yaw Damper that would not reset. I reviewed the red tabs and manually calculated and set the GA N1s in FADEC alternate mode as per the red tabs. My speed tape on my PFD remained at 50-60 KTS until descending back through 14;000 on the arrival then everything seemed to return to normal. It is worth noting my electric altimeter reading displayed 250 FT higher than the First Officer altimeter for the remainder of level flight at FL220. We chose to fly his primary electric altimeter as our altitude determinant and there was no input from ATC concerning same. This concluded this event. A second minor one occurred on turn to final for [Runway] 5R and I am unable to determine if there is a direct relationship between the two events from an aircraft discrepancy standpoint. About 35 minutes after the event referenced above we were turning final with a seeming 100% capable aircraft (since descending through 14;000 FT into the destination area); copilot now pilot flying and myself pilot not flying because his side had been determined to be the 'reliable' side for instrumentation. He had chosen and I supported the use of the autopilot on his side for the approach. We turned to final near out marker waypoint for 5R; after the approach checklist was completed (good ID) with a nice intercept from the southeast and a nominal undershooting crosswind at 3;000 MSL. The aircraft captured the localizer and started a right hand turn to align with the final approach course. The First Officer had called for landing gear transition and the before landing checklist and we were engaged in its progress and the attendant challenge and reply at this time. As we captured the localizer I set runway heading and I continued with the checklist items and their proper positioning as the aircraft continued right through final course alignment and continued right at 30 degrees angle of bank. By the time I realized there was an abnormal event the First Officer had kicked off the autopilot and began to reverse course to return the aircraft back to the final approach course. At this same 'realization' moment for me and reversal action by the First Officer; Tower called and questioned our position and asked were we intercepting the final approach course. I replied we were correcting to the [Runway] 5R final approach course. Tower did not say to us that we had a conflict with another aircraft. I believe they were just very attentive to our position. At the point of farthest deviation we were momentarily off scale right on the localizer. The First Officer made a correct decision to disconnect automation and hand fly the aircraft back to the localizer. The aircraft automation was not reconnected for the short remainder of the flight. I do not believe the undershooting crosswind had anything to do with this. I do not know what caused the aircraft to do what it did. There were no discernible aircraft abnormal indications visible to either of us during this period or for the remainder of this flight. All the raw data appeared normal and did lead us properly to a hand flown successful approach and landing with approximately a 500 FT ceiling. With hindsight I feel this 'event' by circumstance happened at the critical moment where I was focused on my checklist duties; momentarily distracting the First Officer from his pilot flying (monitoring the autopilot) duties to verify critical checklist items; and the jet doing something that we were not expecting at that same precise moment. With the preceding event en route (attached reference) we were happy to safely get on the ground and park the jet. I would like to mention that this jet had an interesting 5 days maintenance history.I do not feel crew rest or fatigue played a factor. We were both attentive and responsive as a team within the standardization system we operate within. Stuff just happens. Again with hindsight; it would have been nice if I; in the performance of the checklist items as pilot not flying had not likely distracted of the First Officer; the pilot flying; with same; and this had not occurred at the critical moment of simultaneous aircraft malfunction and localizer intercept. There is likely a maintenance issue beyond the scope of my report. My suggestion about this event is; be rested; Use the resources available: Pilot not flying as necessary. Aviate first of course. It didn't hurt that I had an event much worse than this a few years back with a pitot static issue on this type aircraft that caused all the primary instruments (except attitude) to go absolutely bonkers in very similar flight conditions so I was a little 'experienced' in this regard.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.