|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : rdu|
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : rdu|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Route In Use||arrival star : star|
enroute : on vectors
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
pilot : flight engineer
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 150|
flight time total : 4000
flight time type : 700
|Affiliation||government : faa|
|Function||controller : approach|
|Qualification||controller : radar|
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||controller : issued new clearance|
|Consequence||faa : reviewed incident with flight crew|
|Primary Problem||ATC Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
We were on the brade 2 arrival transitioning from wilmington 012 right for vectors to rdu (rdu 117.2 was OTS). The first approach control assigned us a heading towards rdu and told us to expect 5L during this time the controller was extremely busy and remarked over the air that he was working 4 frequencys. After being handed off to the second approach controller we continued with vectors, descent and speed reductions to what appeared to be a right base leg for 5L during our entire time with the second approach control our landing runway was never mentioned. From the base leg we were then given an intercept heading of 050 degrees that paralleled the 5L localizer course but would never have allowed us to intercept. This was our first clue that the controller had something different in mind for us that what we had been told to expect. After questioning him on the intercept heading the controller had us turn to 030 degrees which appeared to be a good intercept for 5L. About this time we borke out with the airport in sight. The controller then cleared us for a visibility no runway mentioned. It was not until the captain verified the runway that this controller said we were cleared for the visibility to 5R. Our remark was that we were told to plan on 5L the controller said he had been planning on 5R the entire time. We made the correction back to 5R and after landing called approach control and talked to the supervisor he said that approach control was overloaded at that point and apologized for the mistake. It is interesting to note that 1 aircraft ahead of us had the same situation. It appears that not only was there miscom between pilots and controllers, but between the individual controllers.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT CREW WAS EXPECTING VECTORS TO 05L. APCHING RWY CENTERLINE INTERCEPT WERE INFORMED THAT VECTORS WERE FOR 05R AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.
Narrative: WE WERE ON THE BRADE 2 ARR TRANSITIONING FROM WILMINGTON 012 R FOR VECTORS TO RDU (RDU 117.2 WAS OTS). THE FIRST APCH CTL ASSIGNED US A HDG TOWARDS RDU AND TOLD US TO EXPECT 5L DURING THIS TIME THE CTLR WAS EXTREMELY BUSY AND REMARKED OVER THE AIR THAT HE WAS WORKING 4 FREQS. AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO THE SECOND APCH CTLR WE CONTINUED WITH VECTORS, DSCNT AND SPD REDUCTIONS TO WHAT APPEARED TO BE A RIGHT BASE LEG FOR 5L DURING OUR ENTIRE TIME WITH THE SECOND APCH CTL OUR LNDG RWY WAS NEVER MENTIONED. FROM THE BASE LEG WE WERE THEN GIVEN AN INTERCEPT HDG OF 050 DEGS THAT PARALLELED THE 5L LOC COURSE BUT WOULD NEVER HAVE ALLOWED US TO INTERCEPT. THIS WAS OUR FIRST CLUE THAT THE CTLR HAD SOMETHING DIFFERENT IN MIND FOR US THAT WHAT WE HAD BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT. AFTER QUESTIONING HIM ON THE INTERCEPT HDG THE CTLR HAD US TURN TO 030 DEGS WHICH APPEARED TO BE A GOOD INTERCEPT FOR 5L. ABOUT THIS TIME WE BORKE OUT WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR A VIS NO RWY MENTIONED. IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE CAPT VERIFIED THE RWY THAT THIS CTLR SAID WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VIS TO 5R. OUR REMARK WAS THAT WE WERE TOLD TO PLAN ON 5L THE CTLR SAID HE HAD BEEN PLANNING ON 5R THE ENTIRE TIME. WE MADE THE CORRECTION BACK TO 5R AND AFTER LNDG CALLED APCH CTL AND TALKED TO THE SUPVR HE SAID THAT APCH CTL WAS OVERLOADED AT THAT POINT AND APOLOGIZED FOR THE MISTAKE. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT 1 ACFT AHEAD OF US HAD THE SAME SITUATION. IT APPEARS THAT NOT ONLY WAS THERE MISCOM BTWN PLTS AND CTLRS, BUT BTWN THE INDIVIDUAL CTLRS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.