Narrative:

Initial taxi clearance from east ground was to runway 35L, intersection 32 for departure. Jets were departing from the end and intersection 34. East local controller then cleared us to cross runway 35L, taxi to runway 35R intersection 32. A fairly extensive delay ensued (10-15 mins), although we were #1 for departure on that runway, the runway was being primarily used for jet arrs. The local controller then made a transmission to our flight which we received as a clearance to taxi into position and hold, be ready for an immediate takeoff, traffic on 3 mi final. I acknowledged, but unfortunately did not read back this clearance. The captain called for the takeoff checklist, which I completed. During the checklist, I heard the arriving flight transmit twice, 'aircraft on the runway.' the local controller continued to make xmissions to other aircraft, ignoring our situation. The local controller did ultimately send the arriving flight around, and told us to taxi clear of the runway, stating that she had not told us to take the runway. I responded that we had indeed received a position and hold clearance, which she disputed. Nothing further was said, and our flight departed west/O incident 5 mins later. Several factors contributed to this incident. The most important is dfw's policy of departing turboprops from the outboard (arrival) runways, while jets depart the inboard runways. This creates extensive delays and mixes low speed departures with high speed arrs. This situation could be corrected by departing all aircraft from the same runways, with turboprops making expeditious turns to the east and west to avoid wake turbulence. This is the operational policy at atl. Additional factors: the local controller made a transmission to our flight during a high density situation which she said was not a clearance. Such non-clearance xmissions not related to safety of flight items should not be made during peak load times. Similarly, I failed to read back the clearance. Readback of all clrncs should be required at all times. At this airport I have heard many clrncs issued with specific instructions not to read back. Finally, both the captain and I were fatigued after a long, difficult day. We both wanted to be under way, as this was the last leg prior to the overnight. While difficult, increased vigilance is necessary in these situations. Normally, I am able to recall a transmission from a controller verbatim. Due to fatigue in this situation, I was unable to do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLEARED INTO POSITION AND HOLD. ACFT ON FINAL FORCED TO MAKE GO AROUND.

Narrative: INITIAL TAXI CLRNC FROM E GND WAS TO RWY 35L, INTXN 32 FOR DEP. JETS WERE DEPARTING FROM THE END AND INTXN 34. E LCL CTLR THEN CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 35L, TAXI TO RWY 35R INTXN 32. A FAIRLY EXTENSIVE DELAY ENSUED (10-15 MINS), ALTHOUGH WE WERE #1 FOR DEP ON THAT RWY, THE RWY WAS BEING PRIMARILY USED FOR JET ARRS. THE LCL CTLR THEN MADE A XMISSION TO OUR FLT WHICH WE RECEIVED AS A CLRNC TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD, BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF, TFC ON 3 MI FINAL. I ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT UNFORTUNATELY DID NOT READ BACK THIS CLRNC. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE TKOF CHKLIST, WHICH I COMPLETED. DURING THE CHKLIST, I HEARD THE ARRIVING FLT XMIT TWICE, 'ACFT ON THE RWY.' THE LCL CTLR CONTINUED TO MAKE XMISSIONS TO OTHER ACFT, IGNORING OUR SITUATION. THE LCL CTLR DID ULTIMATELY SEND THE ARRIVING FLT AROUND, AND TOLD US TO TAXI CLR OF THE RWY, STATING THAT SHE HAD NOT TOLD US TO TAKE THE RWY. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD INDEED RECEIVED A POS AND HOLD CLRNC, WHICH SHE DISPUTED. NOTHING FURTHER WAS SAID, AND OUR FLT DEPARTED W/O INCIDENT 5 MINS LATER. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. THE MOST IMPORTANT IS DFW'S POLICY OF DEPARTING TURBOPROPS FROM THE OUTBOARD (ARR) RWYS, WHILE JETS DEPART THE INBOARD RWYS. THIS CREATES EXTENSIVE DELAYS AND MIXES LOW SPD DEPS WITH HIGH SPD ARRS. THIS SITUATION COULD BE CORRECTED BY DEPARTING ALL ACFT FROM THE SAME RWYS, WITH TURBOPROPS MAKING EXPEDITIOUS TURNS TO THE E AND W TO AVOID WAKE TURB. THIS IS THE OPERATIONAL POLICY AT ATL. ADDITIONAL FACTORS: THE LCL CTLR MADE A XMISSION TO OUR FLT DURING A HIGH DENSITY SITUATION WHICH SHE SAID WAS NOT A CLRNC. SUCH NON-CLRNC XMISSIONS NOT RELATED TO SAFETY OF FLT ITEMS SHOULD NOT BE MADE DURING PEAK LOAD TIMES. SIMILARLY, I FAILED TO READ BACK THE CLRNC. READBACK OF ALL CLRNCS SHOULD BE REQUIRED AT ALL TIMES. AT THIS ARPT I HAVE HEARD MANY CLRNCS ISSUED WITH SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO READ BACK. FINALLY, BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE FATIGUED AFTER A LONG, DIFFICULT DAY. WE BOTH WANTED TO BE UNDER WAY, AS THIS WAS THE LAST LEG PRIOR TO THE OVERNIGHT. WHILE DIFFICULT, INCREASED VIGILANCE IS NECESSARY IN THESE SITUATIONS. NORMALLY, I AM ABLE TO RECALL A XMISSION FROM A CTLR VERBATIM. DUE TO FATIGUE IN THIS SITUATION, I WAS UNABLE TO DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.