Narrative:

When the first officer called for flaps 10 from flaps 5 we noticed a momentary split in flap indicator. Upon calling for gear down flaps 15 the flap indicator did not move from flaps 10. We called for a go around; declared an emergency and asked for a heading towards a nearby airport with longer runways. We then ran the 'trailing edge flap disagree' checklist and; upon completion; landed on the longest runway at the nearby airport.fuel on board [fob] was approximately 4;900 pounds at the initiation of the go around. Fob at touch down was approximately 3.0 and 2.7 at the gate. Both fuel quantity indicators were amber shortly after completion of the checklist. In hindsight we should have declared a fuel emergency and we forgot (did not have time) to contact dispatch about the diversion. I also momentarily misinterpreted the fuel in minutes when I relayed it to ATC. The first officer actually relayed more accurate information. The checklist seemed convoluted and took too long to run properly in a low fuel situation. For only three items to be actually done; flap inhibit switch; alternate flap switch; and extend flaps with electrical switch it should take about 45 seconds. I did miss a step in that I did not put the flap handle to 15. We burned up a considerable amount of fuel just determining which of the checklist items to run. We did not have enough fuel on board at touch down to do a go around and landing. I realized after I left the airport that I had neglected to contact dispatch.our fuel consideration was immediate and overshadowed the entire event. It made it hard to concentrate on the task at hand and split our attention. We also should not have allowed ourselves to be vectored so far from our divert airport. ATC was very concerned about fuel and souls on board and continually made calls to us; which was very distracting. I asked them to stop calling us while we ran the checklist. I should have informed them more accurately and sooner about our fuel situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-NG's diversion from the short runways at their planned destination to the longer ones at a nearby airport due to a failure of the flaps to extend was complicated by the minimum legal fuel reserves boarded for the flight.

Narrative: When the First Officer called for flaps 10 from flaps 5 we noticed a momentary split in flap indicator. Upon calling for gear down flaps 15 the flap indicator did not move from flaps 10. We called for a go around; declared an emergency and asked for a heading towards a nearby airport with longer runways. We then ran the 'TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE' Checklist and; upon completion; landed on the longest runway at the nearby airport.Fuel on board [FOB] was approximately 4;900 LBS at the initiation of the go around. FOB at touch down was approximately 3.0 and 2.7 at the gate. Both fuel quantity indicators were amber shortly after completion of the checklist. In hindsight we should have declared a fuel emergency and we forgot (did not have time) to contact Dispatch about the diversion. I also momentarily misinterpreted the fuel in minutes when I relayed it to ATC. The First Officer actually relayed more accurate information. The checklist seemed convoluted and took too long to run properly in a low fuel situation. For only three items to be actually done; flap inhibit switch; alternate flap switch; and extend flaps with electrical switch it should take about 45 seconds. I did miss a step in that I did not put the flap handle to 15. We burned up a considerable amount of fuel just determining which of the checklist items to run. We did not have enough fuel on board at touch down to do a go around and landing. I realized after I left the airport that I had neglected to contact Dispatch.Our fuel consideration was immediate and overshadowed the entire event. It made it hard to concentrate on the task at hand and split our attention. We also should not have allowed ourselves to be vectored so far from our divert airport. ATC was very concerned about fuel and souls on board and continually made calls to us; which was very distracting. I asked them to stop calling us while we ran the checklist. I should have informed them more accurately and sooner about our fuel situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.