Narrative:

[We] experienced a 'burning electrical fumes' event in cruise flight. Utilized CRM; and followed standard practices and procedures. Event was stabilized and resolved satisfactorily. A very big concern to me is the fact that this aircraft had four previous maintenance problems with the lav-galley fan system and each time the 'fix' was to cycle circuit breakers; and sign the bird back online. This is the same as if a pilot had reset circuit breakers four times for a faulty system which is specifically forbidden. My suggestion is to have a procedure in place that maintenance control can use to track these types of events. A second instance of a fault in any electromechanical system should warrant more than a system reset; that is; be treated as if a circuit breaker had popped; which would be indicative of a possible serious electrical problem. This event caused major inconvenience to our passengers and crew. It very well could have had much more terrible results. Another fault in the system; while not specifically safety related; is that there is a communication disconnect in getting information to the departments that need them. Part of our response to an in flight event is to 'team build'. A wrap up communication with dispatch confirmed that my request to have a 'passenger recovery' team meet the passengers when we landed was forwarded into the system. When we blocked in; over seven hours after the request was made; the station had no idea there was a problem and nothing had been done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747 flight had a 'Burning Electrical Fumes' event in cruise flight. The incident was successfully resolved in flight partly due to the events recurring nature. The Lav-Galley fan system had been written up four times previously and signed off with circuit breaker resets.

Narrative: [We] experienced a 'Burning Electrical Fumes' event in cruise flight. Utilized CRM; and followed standard practices and procedures. Event was stabilized and resolved satisfactorily. A very big concern to me is the fact that this aircraft had four previous maintenance problems with the Lav-Galley fan system and each time the 'fix' was to cycle circuit breakers; and sign the bird back online. This is the same as if a pilot had reset circuit breakers four times for a faulty system which is specifically forbidden. My suggestion is to have a procedure in place that Maintenance Control can use to track these types of events. A second instance of a fault in any electromechanical system should warrant more than a system reset; that is; be treated as if a circuit breaker had popped; which would be indicative of a possible serious electrical problem. This event caused major inconvenience to our passengers and crew. It very well could have had much more terrible results. Another fault in the system; while not specifically safety related; is that there is a communication disconnect in getting information to the departments that need them. Part of our response to an in flight event is to 'team build'. A wrap up communication with Dispatch confirmed that my request to have a 'passenger recovery' team meet the passengers when we landed was forwarded into the system. When we blocked in; over seven hours after the request was made; the station had no idea there was a problem and nothing had been done.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.