Narrative:

Yuma approach cleared us for a visual approach to runway 35 from the bard VOR; entering the right downwind at 1;200 MSL (1;000 afe) and we flew towards bard; complying with this clearance. Our TCAS was inoperative; so I was spending more time than usual looking outside for traffic. There was a gulfstream on frequency that had been cleared for a visual approach to runway 3L; to enter on the right downwind at 1;700 MSL. I visually acquired this aircraft and was focused on following its flight path in relation with ours. We were then switched to the tower frequency; and I reported that we were over bard for a visual approach to 35 with right traffic. The controller reiterated the 1;200 ft restriction and told us to report 2 miles east. Since we would never be east of the airport; I suggested that we report 2 miles north and the controller concurred. As we were heading south towards the airport and configuring the airplane for landing; I heard a light twin on frequency. I do not know where it was coming from. The controller called us out as traffic for the light twin; but did not call out the twin for us. The twin called us in sight and I was trying to acquire it visually while also tracking the gulfstream. About a minute later; I saw the twin and determined that it would safely pass over us. At this point; I noticed our proximity to the airport and reported our position as 1 mile north. The controller then asked if we were on the left downwind. I replied that we were on the right downwind as previously cleared. The controller responded that he had instructed us twice to enter the left downwind. He issued a new clearance for us to continue in the right downwind and cleared us to land on runway 35. The gulfstream landed on 3L and held short of 35 as instructed. We landed uneventfully on 35. Neither I; nor the pilot flying; ever heard any instruction to change to a left traffic pattern. I was task saturated; looking for traffic without the aid of TCAS while working the radios and configuring the airplane for landing. The controller's instruction to report 'east' of the airport (subsequently changed to reporting north) reinforced my expectation of operating in right traffic for runway 35. If the controller actually told us to make left traffic; he failed to emphasize it; perhaps saying; 'enter the left downwind'; rather than saying; 'change to left traffic; enter the left downwind.' there seems to be a lack of coordination between the approach controllers and the tower at yuma. It is quite common in my experience to be issued one set of instructions for a visual approach from the approach controller; only to have it revised by the tower controller. Additionally; I believe that the yuma controllers have the mindset that our transport-category airliner is equivalent to a light weight piston airplane. The controllers at this facility may need to be informed that the way they handle us often adds unneeded complications during a critical phase of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier on a Visual Approach to Runway 35 reported confusion regarding pattern entry instructions with regard to right vs. left traffic; the reporter noting a seeming lack of coordination between the TRACON and Tower.

Narrative: Yuma Approach cleared us for a Visual Approach to Runway 35 from the Bard VOR; entering the right downwind at 1;200 MSL (1;000 AFE) and we flew towards Bard; complying with this clearance. Our TCAS was inoperative; so I was spending more time than usual looking outside for traffic. There was a Gulfstream on frequency that had been cleared for a Visual Approach to Runway 3L; to enter on the right downwind at 1;700 MSL. I visually acquired this aircraft and was focused on following its flight path in relation with ours. We were then switched to the Tower frequency; and I reported that we were over Bard for a Visual Approach to 35 with right traffic. The Controller reiterated the 1;200 FT restriction and told us to report 2 miles east. Since we would never be east of the airport; I suggested that we report 2 miles north and the Controller concurred. As we were heading south towards the airport and configuring the airplane for landing; I heard a light twin on frequency. I do not know where it was coming from. The Controller called us out as traffic for the light twin; but did not call out the twin for us. The twin called us in sight and I was trying to acquire it visually while also tracking the Gulfstream. About a minute later; I saw the twin and determined that it would safely pass over us. At this point; I noticed our proximity to the airport and reported our position as 1 mile north. The Controller then asked if we were on the left downwind. I replied that we were on the right downwind as previously cleared. The Controller responded that he had instructed us twice to enter the left downwind. He issued a new clearance for us to continue in the right downwind and cleared us to land on Runway 35. The Gulfstream landed on 3L and held short of 35 as instructed. We landed uneventfully on 35. Neither I; nor the pilot flying; ever heard any instruction to change to a left traffic pattern. I was task saturated; looking for traffic without the aid of TCAS while working the radios and configuring the airplane for landing. The Controller's instruction to report 'East' of the airport (subsequently changed to reporting north) reinforced my expectation of operating in right traffic for Runway 35. If the Controller actually told us to make left traffic; he failed to emphasize it; perhaps saying; 'Enter the left downwind'; rather than saying; 'change to left traffic; enter the left downwind.' There seems to be a lack of coordination between the Approach Controllers and the Tower at Yuma. It is quite common in my experience to be issued one set of instructions for a Visual Approach from the Approach Controller; only to have it revised by the Tower Controller. Additionally; I believe that the Yuma Controllers have the mindset that our transport-category airliner is equivalent to a light weight piston airplane. The Controllers at this facility may need to be informed that the way they handle us often adds unneeded complications during a critical phase of flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.