Narrative:

The event took place at a landing zone (lz) which was off of the interstate. This accident required two helicopters to be simultaneously launched to the scene. My crew and I had established radio contact with each other mid-flight and it was determined that [the other helicopter] would be on scene first; and [I] would be approximately two to three minutes in trail. After [the other helicopter] communicated that he had landed I was informed to land directly behind his helicopter on the road turnout. After my reconnaissance of the lz I was informed by the ground units (fire department) that I had 'as much room as I needed' behind the helicopter on the ground which was at idle. I intended to land 75 ft behind the other helicopter as I made my final approach to the lz at a 45 degree angle. I had nvg goggles on from the in-flight phase to the approach phase and to the ground. The nurse in the co-pilot's seat had the goggles on as well during all phases of flight to the ground. The event occurred approximately two to three feet off of the ground in an approach hover to the ground. As I was reaching my point of intended landing I felt a high frequency shudder in the pedals and immediately landed about three to five feet short of my intended touch down zone. After landing I began the shutdown phase of the helicopter while communicating to the crew what had happened till the rotors came to a complete stop. Once the rotors had stopped I checked with the crew to see if everyone was alright and stepped out of the aircraft; assuming a tail rotor strike; to visually inspect the tail rotor and the rest of the aircraft. Upon reaching the tail rotor I noticed the tips of the tail rotor blades to be damaged and dirty as well as the mound of dirt to the aft and left of the tail. I assumed that I struck the tail rotor on the mound of dirt during the final approach hover to the ground. Neither I nor either crew member saw the mound during any phase of flight.after careful reconsideration of the events; I would have continued circling the lz and waited for the first aircraft to load the passenger and take-off; procede to his/her original lz and then load the second patient. I also would have suggested the fire rescue crew illuminate my lz from behind; giving them an opportunity to scout the lz again and providing more information regarding potential ground hazards; as well as a better view for the pilot from a low-recon altitude. I would also recommend that the fire rescue first responders set up an lz on solid asphalt when it is available.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BHT-222 Medevac helicopter pilot approaching to land at night behind another helicopter near an interstate highway; struck a mound of dirt causing damage to the tail rotor.

Narrative: The event took place at a Landing Zone (LZ) which was off of the Interstate. This accident required two helicopters to be simultaneously launched to the scene. My crew and I had established radio contact with each other mid-flight and it was determined that [the other helicopter] would be on scene first; and [I] would be approximately two to three minutes in trail. After [the other helicopter] communicated that he had landed I was informed to land directly behind his helicopter on the road turnout. After my reconnaissance of the LZ I was informed by the Ground Units (Fire Department) that I had 'as much room as I needed' behind the helicopter on the ground which was at idle. I intended to land 75 FT behind the other helicopter as I made my final approach to the LZ at a 45 degree angle. I had NVG goggles on from the in-flight phase to the approach phase and to the ground. The Nurse in the co-pilot's seat had the goggles on as well during all phases of flight to the ground. The event occurred approximately two to three feet off of the ground in an approach hover to the ground. As I was reaching my point of intended landing I felt a high frequency shudder in the pedals and immediately landed about three to five feet short of my intended touch down zone. After landing I began the shutdown phase of the helicopter while communicating to the crew what had happened till the rotors came to a complete stop. Once the rotors had stopped I checked with the crew to see if everyone was alright and stepped out of the aircraft; assuming a tail rotor strike; to visually inspect the tail rotor and the rest of the aircraft. Upon reaching the tail rotor I noticed the tips of the tail rotor blades to be damaged and dirty as well as the mound of dirt to the aft and left of the tail. I assumed that I struck the tail rotor on the mound of dirt during the final approach hover to the ground. Neither I nor either crew member saw the mound during any phase of flight.After careful reconsideration of the events; I would have continued circling the LZ and waited for the first aircraft to load the passenger and take-off; procede to his/her original LZ and then load the second patient. I also would have suggested the Fire Rescue Crew illuminate my LZ from behind; giving them an opportunity to scout the LZ again and providing more information regarding potential ground hazards; as well as a better view for the pilot from a low-recon altitude. I would also recommend that the Fire Rescue first responders set up an LZ on solid asphalt when it is available.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.