Narrative:

We departed; and upon gear retraction; the nose gear amber door advisory light remain illuminated. All other gear indication lights indicated normally. I instructed the pilot flying to remain below 140 KTS. Due to the phase of flight we continued to clean the aircraft up; retract flaps; set climb power; and were handed off to departure. At this time; we ran the abnormal checklist. We selected gear down; and the nose gear amber door light remained illuminated. The checklist instructed us to leave the gear down; which the pilot flying and I agreed with. I contacted the flight attendant to inform her why the gear was in the down position; and informed her I would give her further information after I spoke with company. I contacted my dispatcher. I initially explained our situation; configuration; airspeed limitation; and suggested a diversion airport. I was then handed off to maintenance control. I explained our situation again. At first; maintenance commented that if we ran the appropriate checklist; there was not really anything else to do. I agreed; and suggest handing me back to dispatch. At this time; someone from maintenance mentioned re-cycling our gear up again. I explained that our abnormal checklist was clear that we were to leave the gear in the down position. Dispatch then authorized us to divert to ZZZ. I informed the pilot flying to contact ATC and divert; but to not declare an emergency. I updated our flight attendant about the diversion; and told her it would be a normal landing. She said she was already seated; and the cabin was prepared for arrival. I made a PA to the passengers; and we landed uneventfully.there was some sort of landing gear system malfunction. I have no specifics; because no one from the company followed up with us as to why the nose gear door did not close. This information should be passed on anytime there is an equipment failure with an unknown cause. I do have some observations and suggestions with our procedures. Some of these are recurring problems that I have seen; and I believe need to get addressed. From a flight crew as well as CRM perspective; we are required to contact company to inform them of incidents like this. The communications between myself and company took way longer than necessary. This happens almost every time I call dispatch in flight with a problem. Ground personnel need to keep in mind that we are busy in the airplane. We have checklists to run; many people to contact; and situations to monitor. A long call to dispatch very much takes the pilot not flying 'out of the cockpit' temporarily. This leaves the other pilot to fly the aircraft; and try to answer ATC's questions. In this case; this should have been a fairly straight-forward scenario. We had an abnormal indication. We ran the appropriate checklist to its entirety. I contacted dispatch and explained this and even gave suggestions on initial call up about where we could divert to. If there was any thought of continuing to destination; dispatch could have run fuel burn numbers during the time I was passed off to maintenance; in order to save time/work more efficiently. While talking to maintenance there seemed to be much confusion on what our exact situation was. I had to explain it I'm estimating 3 or 4 times. I tried to speak as slowly; clearly and accurately as possible. Perhaps it would help if someone wrote down the details on initial call. Ultimately; we were asked to cycle the gear up again. This is the last thing that should ever happen with a gear door advisory light being illuminated. There could very well be a mechanical problem inside the gear well; or a door out of position that could cause the gear to get stuck in the up position. I had to reiterate to maintenance several times of what our abnormal checklist says. I would hope that maintenance control has a copy of our checklist that they can also refer to when we are on the phone with them. If this isn't the case; then I would recommend thatthis becomes procedure. In summary; I believe the biggest reason to contact company with an abnormal situation is for them to be able to assist the crew involved; and help relieve some of the task loading placed on the crew. In this instance; and too many others; I believe it added to our task saturation. This was a relatively simple abnormal event; and a good weather day; thankfully. It worries me to think of a bad situation; on a bad weather day; when dispatch is severely task saturated themselves. In hind-sight; my time would have been better spent having my eyes and ears in the cockpit; with the pilot flying than contacting company. This is not how CRM or our procedures are supposed to work. My intent is not to have any individuals singled out or disciplined. However; these are recurring problems that I keep seeing; and need to be addressed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC8 Captain experiences a failure of the nose gear doors to close after gear retraction. The gear is extended using the abnormal checklist and left down. A great deal of discussion with Dispatch and Maintenance is required before a diversion field is selected. An uneventful landing ensues.

Narrative: We departed; and upon gear retraction; the nose gear amber door advisory light remain illuminated. All other gear indication lights indicated normally. I instructed the pilot flying to remain below 140 KTS. Due to the phase of flight we continued to clean the aircraft up; retract flaps; set climb power; and were handed off to departure. At this time; we ran the abnormal checklist. We selected gear down; and the nose gear amber door light remained illuminated. The checklist instructed us to leave the gear down; which the pilot flying and I agreed with. I contacted the Flight Attendant to inform her why the gear was in the down position; and informed her I would give her further information after I spoke with company. I contacted my Dispatcher. I initially explained our situation; configuration; airspeed limitation; and suggested a diversion airport. I was then handed off to Maintenance Control. I explained our situation again. At first; Maintenance commented that if we ran the appropriate checklist; there was not really anything else to do. I agreed; and suggest handing me back to Dispatch. At this time; someone from Maintenance mentioned re-cycling our gear up again. I explained that our abnormal checklist was clear that we were to leave the gear in the down position. Dispatch then authorized us to divert to ZZZ. I informed the pilot flying to contact ATC and divert; but to not declare an emergency. I updated our Flight Attendant about the diversion; and told her it would be a normal landing. She said she was already seated; and the cabin was prepared for arrival. I made a PA to the passengers; and we landed uneventfully.There was some sort of landing gear system malfunction. I have no specifics; because no one from the company followed up with us as to why the nose gear door did not close. This information should be passed on anytime there is an equipment failure with an unknown cause. I do have some observations and suggestions with our procedures. Some of these are recurring problems that I have seen; and I believe need to get addressed. From a flight crew as well as CRM perspective; we are required to contact company to inform them of incidents like this. The communications between myself and company took way longer than necessary. This happens almost every time I call Dispatch in flight with a problem. Ground personnel need to keep in mind that we are busy in the airplane. We have checklists to run; many people to contact; and situations to monitor. A long call to Dispatch very much takes the pilot not flying 'out of the cockpit' temporarily. This leaves the other pilot to fly the aircraft; and try to answer ATC's questions. In this case; this should have been a fairly straight-forward scenario. We had an abnormal indication. We ran the appropriate checklist to its entirety. I contacted Dispatch and explained this and even gave suggestions on initial call up about where we could divert to. If there was any thought of continuing to destination; Dispatch could have run fuel burn numbers during the time I was passed off to Maintenance; in order to save time/work more efficiently. While talking to Maintenance there seemed to be much confusion on what our exact situation was. I had to explain it I'm estimating 3 or 4 times. I tried to speak as slowly; clearly and accurately as possible. Perhaps it would help if someone wrote down the details on initial call. Ultimately; we were asked to cycle the gear up again. This is the last thing that should ever happen with a gear door advisory light being illuminated. There could very well be a mechanical problem inside the gear well; or a door out of position that could cause the gear to get stuck in the up position. I had to reiterate to Maintenance several times of what our abnormal checklist says. I would hope that Maintenance Control has a copy of our checklist that they can also refer to when we are on the phone with them. If this isn't the case; then I would recommend thatthis becomes procedure. In summary; I believe the biggest reason to contact company with an abnormal situation is for them to be able to assist the crew involved; and help relieve some of the task loading placed on the crew. In this instance; and too many others; I believe it added to our task saturation. This was a relatively simple abnormal event; and a good weather day; thankfully. It worries me to think of a bad situation; on a bad weather day; when Dispatch is severely task saturated themselves. In hind-sight; my time would have been better spent having my eyes and ears in the cockpit; with the pilot flying than contacting company. This is not how CRM or our procedures are supposed to work. My intent is not to have any individuals singled out or disciplined. However; these are recurring problems that I keep seeing; and need to be addressed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.