Narrative:

On downwind for 35R in den; ATC advised us with our final descent that the goal was to get us below the cloud layer for a visual approach. We were issued a descent to 8;000 ft. At 8;500 ft we broke out and made visual contact with the field at a range of ten to twelve miles. Visibility was excellent. We turned toward the approach course to join just outside the FAF when the tower said we were cleared direct to the runway. The first officer was the flying pilot and he turned to comply. I reminded him to account for a stabilized approach and to shoot for a longer final to allow for this. He complied with that instruction. At this time; ATC advised of multiple aircraft on final to 35L; and I believe one other piece of GA traffic; but I'm not sure. I do know that I was outside looking for traffic. Simultaneously I came back inside; noticed we were low; and received a warning from ATC about terrain clearance. I can't recall exactly what his terminology was; but he had a warning in the tower that we were too low. I checked altitude; and we were just below 7;000 ft. I sharply told the first officer to check the descent which he did immediately. Radar altimeter showed 1;000 ft which is in no way acceptable to me. This occurred about five miles out and east of the approach corridor. I think the terrain in that area was a little higher than the field; which contributed to some complications in planning for the visual.also; while scanning for and locating traffic in the immediate area; I was unable to catch the descent in a more timely fashion; there was a compression of events; and we configured a little slower than I would have liked. At the bottom of a speed assigned descent in a 190; configuration can be problematic; but we held altitude; maintained visual separation from everything; and configured well in time for a stabilized visual approach never going below 7;000 ft until appropriate for descent to landing.the only reason I am submitting the report is because the tower called a warning to me; in short; I'm covering myself. It was VFR; I was on a VFR approach at a legal VFR altitude. Configuration was somewhat in question; but you can only do so much so fast in the 190; and we addressed it accordingly. Also; a concern I have is that when ATC tells us to do something (i.e.; 'cleared direct to the runway') many of our pilots; captains and first officers alike; feel compelled to comply when we can't. In our case; direct to the runway precludes a stabilized visual approach since you can't line up appropriately. I think this sets us up for problems when people with no skin in the game call the shots for crews and the crews let them do it. Afterwards; I had a very productive tem [threat and error management] style discussion with the first officer to learn from what happened and how we can prevent it from happening again. One of the biggest things to see is how easily a benign situation can escalate into something with a lot of negative potential. While we didn't really have a problem develop; we certainly ran out of margin which then required maximum vigilance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An ERJ-190 flight crew cleared for a visual approach 'direct to' Runway 35R at DEN received a low altitude alert from the Tower when they descended too low while complying.

Narrative: On downwind for 35R in DEN; ATC advised us with our final descent that the goal was to get us below the cloud layer for a visual approach. We were issued a descent to 8;000 FT. At 8;500 FT we broke out and made visual contact with the field at a range of ten to twelve miles. Visibility was excellent. We turned toward the approach course to join just outside the FAF when the Tower said we were cleared direct to the runway. The First Officer was the flying pilot and he turned to comply. I reminded him to account for a stabilized approach and to shoot for a longer final to allow for this. He complied with that instruction. At this time; ATC advised of multiple aircraft on final to 35L; and I believe one other piece of GA traffic; but I'm not sure. I do know that I was outside looking for traffic. Simultaneously I came back inside; noticed we were low; and received a warning from ATC about terrain clearance. I can't recall exactly what his terminology was; but he had a warning in the Tower that we were too low. I checked altitude; and we were just below 7;000 FT. I sharply told the First Officer to check the descent which he did immediately. Radar altimeter showed 1;000 FT which is in no way acceptable to me. This occurred about five miles out and east of the approach corridor. I think the terrain in that area was a little higher than the field; which contributed to some complications in planning for the visual.Also; while scanning for and locating traffic in the immediate area; I was unable to catch the descent in a more timely fashion; there was a compression of events; and we configured a little slower than I would have liked. At the bottom of a speed assigned descent in a 190; configuration can be problematic; but we held altitude; maintained visual separation from everything; and configured well in time for a stabilized visual approach never going below 7;000 FT until appropriate for descent to landing.The only reason I am submitting the report is because the tower called a warning to me; in short; I'm covering myself. It was VFR; I was on a VFR approach at a legal VFR altitude. Configuration was somewhat in question; but you can only do so much so fast in the 190; and we addressed it accordingly. Also; a concern I have is that when ATC tells us to do something (i.e.; 'cleared direct to the runway') many of our pilots; Captains and First Officers alike; feel compelled to comply when we can't. In our case; direct to the runway precludes a stabilized visual approach since you can't line up appropriately. I think this sets us up for problems when people with no skin in the game call the shots for crews and the crews let them do it. Afterwards; I had a very productive TEM [Threat and Error Management] style discussion with the First Officer to learn from what happened and how we can prevent it from happening again. One of the biggest things to see is how easily a benign situation can escalate into something with a lot of negative potential. While we didn't really have a problem develop; we certainly ran out of margin which then required maximum vigilance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.