Narrative:

I was working an A330 [that] took off and was on a 160 degree heading and climbing to 10;000 ft. I had a crossing restriction to make at 5;000 ft at 10 miles southeast of the airport. The A330 departed and was climbing extremely well. The A330 was at 4;000 ft; 5 NM from the end of the runway. I knew if I turned the A330 eastbound; based on his current climb rate; I would easily make my 5;000 ft restriction in 5 miles since he had already climbed 4;000 ft in the previous 5 miles and I would top the crossing traffic that was at 4;000 ft. When I turned the A330 eastbound he completely stopped climbing and leveled at 4;000 ft for approximately 6 miles without stating he had any type of problem or letting me know that he was going to have to stop his climb for some reason. The controller that was working the crossing traffic at 4;000 ft; and I; realized that the situation was not going to work so I turned the A330 southeast-bound and told him to expedite his climb and the adjacent controller turned and descended his 4;000 ft traffic to ensure we maintained separation. It was not how the situation was planned but we adjusted to the A330 stopping his climb without giving notice and did what we needed to do to maintain separation. I alerted the flm immediately after the incident. A few weeks later I was alerted that there was a qar involving this incident and that basically I was being blamed for the A330 stopping his climb and us having to take evasive action to adjust for his actions. Our qa department is basically at war with the controller workforce at the TRACON. This is not an exaggeration. The qa manager/office abuses their power to attack controllers and interject opinions into oe reports; od reports; and qars. This was a pilot deviation; plain and simple. You cannot just stop climbing on departure; level off; and not say anything. If the pilot had some type of issue; all he had to do was mention it and we would have vectored him to an area that he could level off. Yet our qa office continues to run rampant and target controllers and create 'deficiencies' when in reality we busted our butts to save separation in spite of the pilot deviation. We did not cause the incident; we prevented the incident from becoming a loss of separation. Did qa contact the A330 to question him about the incident and ask why he leveled at 4;000 ft? Did qa file a pilot deviation? No; because they think their job is to try to find ways to pin things on controllers. Many controllers are scared to speak up for fear of retaliation. Recommendation; first; pilots must let us know if they are going to deviate from assigned control instructions so we can plan for it and make the necessary adjustments. Second; we need something done about our qa office.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event caused by an aircraft leveling off unexpectedly after a normal climb; the reporter voicing criticism towards management's indictment of controller's performance.

Narrative: I was working an A330 [that] took off and was on a 160 degree heading and climbing to 10;000 FT. I had a crossing restriction to make at 5;000 FT at 10 miles southeast of the airport. The A330 departed and was climbing extremely well. The A330 was at 4;000 FT; 5 NM from the end of the runway. I knew if I turned the A330 eastbound; based on his current climb rate; I would easily make my 5;000 FT restriction in 5 miles since he had already climbed 4;000 FT in the previous 5 miles and I would top the crossing traffic that was at 4;000 FT. When I turned the A330 eastbound he completely stopped climbing and leveled at 4;000 FT for approximately 6 miles without stating he had any type of problem or letting me know that he was going to have to stop his climb for some reason. The Controller that was working the crossing traffic at 4;000 FT; and I; realized that the situation was not going to work so I turned the A330 southeast-bound and told him to expedite his climb and the adjacent Controller turned and descended his 4;000 FT traffic to ensure we maintained separation. It was not how the situation was planned but we adjusted to the A330 stopping his climb without giving notice and did what we needed to do to maintain separation. I alerted the FLM immediately after the incident. A few weeks later I was alerted that there was a QAR involving this incident and that basically I was being blamed for the A330 stopping his climb and us having to take evasive action to adjust for his actions. Our QA Department is basically at war with the controller workforce at the TRACON. This is NOT an exaggeration. The QA Manager/Office abuses their power to attack controllers and interject opinions into OE reports; OD reports; and QARs. This was a pilot deviation; plain and simple. You cannot just stop climbing on departure; level off; and not say anything. If the pilot had some type of issue; all he had to do was mention it and we would have vectored him to an area that he could level off. Yet our QA Office continues to run rampant and target controllers and create 'deficiencies' when in reality we busted our butts to save separation in spite of the pilot deviation. We did not CAUSE the incident; we prevented the incident from becoming a loss of separation. Did QA contact the A330 to question him about the incident and ask why he leveled at 4;000 FT? Did QA file a pilot deviation? No; because they think their job is to try to find ways to pin things on controllers. Many controllers are scared to speak up for fear of retaliation. Recommendation; first; pilots MUST let us know if they are going to deviate from assigned control instructions so we can plan for it and make the necessary adjustments. Second; we NEED something done about our QA Office.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.