Narrative:

During taxi out for departure; our aircraft nearly impacted an MD80 at taxiway M near T intersection. Prior to the near miss we departed the ramp with instruction from atl ground to join taxiway M for a 9L/M2 intersection departure. Shortly after joining the taxiway there were no more aircraft ahead of us so I instructed the first officer to start the #1 engine since we were going to have a short taxi time. Atl ground instructed us to monitor tower and we switched and continued taxi. Both the first officer and I are in agreement that this instruction was received and to the best of our knowledge we did not change over to tower frequency on our own accord since that is not practiced procedure. We had finished notifying the cabin and completed the before takeoff check when I suddenly noticed a MD80 joining taxiway M at T intersection from our right to left. I was the only one that noticed the MD80 and received no instruction from ATC. I abruptly applied the brakes and brought the aircraft to a stop. The MD80 continued its taxi and joined M ahead of us for departure. I quickly asked atl tower where the MD80 was going and the tower responded in a rather unusual way. Tower first asked where we were; which was strange to me since we were the only two aircraft near the runway and then said that atl ground was trying to reach us earlier and he asked us if we switched frequency without authorization. I replied that we had stopped now; and then asserted that we did not change frequency without authorization. The atl tower did not provide any more information and I did not wish to be unprofessional over the radio so we spoke no further on the matter and received takeoff clearance. I thought it to be strange that even if we did indeed change over to the tower frequency without ground permission; that atl ground would authorize the MD80 that had just left the ramp to join a taxiway ahead of another aircraft that it could not establish communication with. I also thought it was strange that the MD80 pilot would join the taxiway ahead of an aircraft that was clearly not stopping or slowing short of an intersecting taxiway. My assessment of the situation is that first atl ground forgot we were on taxiway M heading to 9L/M2. Then the MD80 called for taxi; and atl ground then issued instructions to join taxiway T to M for 9L/M2 departure. Since the MD80 was going to be #1 for departure the crew had their hands full preparing for departure and simply did not see us on taxiway M. Fortunately I did see them taxiing out and was able to stop short of the intersection prior to collision.one thing that seriously concerns me with our departure procedures is the before takeoff check. I believe that this checklist can present a serious distraction to the crew. When we run this checklist the first officer's eyes are on the checklist reading it and my eyes are flowing everywhere in the cockpit from the trim verification; thrust reverser verification; FMS verification; speed verification; flap verification etc. It requires a great effort to divide my attention between aircraft taxi and checklist verifications. I firmly believe that had we not had run this checklist well before this potential collision that I would had not seen the MD80 and I would have taxied the aircraft directly into the left wing of the MD80. It really surprised me how difficult it was to see the 80 from my right moving to left; and just how quickly a situation of very serious danger can present itself in an environment where there was almost no workload at all. That is why I think that running this checklist (even during times of low workload) presents a serious danger to our flights. I would suggest running the before takeoff check on the ramp area prior to joining taxiways for departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain experiences a near collision with an MD80 during taxi at ATL. The CRJ crew had been instructed to monitor Tower by the Ground Controller after issuing taxi instructions.

Narrative: During taxi out for departure; our aircraft nearly impacted an MD80 at Taxiway M near T Intersection. Prior to the near miss we departed the ramp with instruction from ATL Ground to join Taxiway M for a 9L/M2 Intersection departure. Shortly after joining the taxiway there were no more aircraft ahead of us so I instructed the First Officer to start the #1 engine since we were going to have a short taxi time. ATL Ground instructed us to monitor Tower and we switched and continued taxi. Both the First Officer and I are in agreement that this instruction was received and to the best of our knowledge we did NOT change over to Tower frequency on our own accord since that is not practiced procedure. We had finished notifying the cabin and completed the before takeoff check when I suddenly noticed a MD80 joining Taxiway M at T Intersection from our right to left. I was the only one that noticed the MD80 and received no instruction from ATC. I abruptly applied the brakes and brought the aircraft to a stop. The MD80 continued its taxi and joined M ahead of us for departure. I quickly asked ATL Tower where the MD80 was going and the Tower responded in a rather unusual way. Tower first asked where we were; which was strange to me since we were the only two aircraft near the runway and then said that ATL Ground was trying to reach us earlier and he asked us if we switched frequency without authorization. I replied that we had stopped now; and then asserted that we did not change frequency without authorization. The ATL Tower did not provide any more information and I did not wish to be unprofessional over the radio so we spoke no further on the matter and received takeoff clearance. I thought it to be strange that even if we did indeed change over to the Tower frequency without ground permission; that ATL Ground would authorize the MD80 that had just left the ramp to join a taxiway ahead of another aircraft that it could not establish communication with. I also thought it was strange that the MD80 pilot would join the taxiway ahead of an aircraft that was clearly not stopping or slowing short of an intersecting taxiway. My assessment of the situation is that first ATL Ground forgot we were on Taxiway M heading to 9L/M2. Then the MD80 called for taxi; and ATL Ground then issued instructions to join Taxiway T to M for 9L/M2 departure. Since the MD80 was going to be #1 for departure the crew had their hands full preparing for departure and simply did not see us on Taxiway M. Fortunately I did see them taxiing out and was able to stop short of the intersection prior to collision.One thing that seriously concerns me with our departure procedures is the Before Takeoff Check. I believe that this checklist can present a serious distraction to the crew. When we run this checklist the First Officer's eyes are on the checklist reading it and my eyes are flowing everywhere in the cockpit from the trim verification; thrust reverser verification; FMS verification; speed verification; flap verification etc. It requires a great effort to divide my attention between aircraft taxi and checklist verifications. I firmly believe that had we not had run this checklist well before this potential collision that I would had not seen the MD80 and I would have taxied the aircraft directly into the left wing of the MD80. It really surprised me how difficult it was to see the 80 from my right moving to left; and just how quickly a situation of very serious danger can present itself in an environment where there was almost no workload at all. That is why I think that running this checklist (even during times of low workload) presents a serious danger to our flights. I would suggest running the Before Takeoff Check on the ramp area prior to joining taxiways for departure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.