Narrative:

I arrived at the gate approximately 45 minutes prior to departure. There was a mechanic in the jetway. He asked if I called maintenance. I said no. He told me that somebody called him about engine #1 EPR probe. He told me maintenance had worked on the EPR probe and there was some excess material on the probe. He told me the aircraft could operate with the EPR probe in this condition for 14 days. He also told me that the probe had already been written up. He also informed me that the EPR probe was on maintenance watch. I meet the first officer in the cockpit. I asked him if he called maintenance. He said he did call because there was some kind of material around the EPR probe. I checked the log book and discovered that engine #1 EPR probe had been written up twice. The write ups were both the same: on climb out EPR #1 fault. Departed [and] at about fl 190 received ECAM message: engine #1 EPR fault. We completed the ECAM; the QRH and then consulted ECAM non-normal supplemental manual. The manual recommended we try to recover EPR mode by switching off both engine N1 mode pb. The EPR recovery failed. I sent dispatcher/maintenance control a message about the EPR fault. Dispatch informed me that our destination was VFR and to proceed. I agreed and continued. The following contains some of the acar messages between dispatch and me. Dispatch: this is a chronic problem. They recommended a return to departure airport. I didn't print my messages to dispatch but the following is close to what I actually sent. Captain: are you sure you want me to return to departure airport. I'm 20;000 pounds overweight. Dispatch: technicians and parts to destination please return to departure airport at this time. Please advise landing weight. Captain: I need to burn down to 142.2 I now weight 160.0K. Dispatch: we are doing this under strong recommendation from maintenance control. Captain: in an emergency I will land overweight but this is a convenience not an emergency. Dispatch: landings can be accomplished safely if as a crew you think it is not prudent in the area of safety to continue holding in your current ATC environment. Etc. I personally do not see a need to declare an emergency. Dispatch: maintenance advises no problem with overweight landing as long as you record rate of descent an actual weight. Captain: I will do an overweight landing. Dispatch: maintenance is ok with overweight landing; your dispatcher in full agreement with your decision to do and overweight landing. I had the first officer fly the approach and landing. I informed the flight attendants and passengers that we were returning. We landed at 151;500 pounds at 200 FPM on the longest runway. Touchdown was normal with normal brake temperatures once we parked the aircraft.I agreed to land overweight but I had a gut feeling that this was the wrong decision. I decided to try and burn as much fuel as possible enroute. We descended to 12;000 ft; extended the speed brake and started the APU. I then consulted the fom and the QRH to see if I could find some information that would support an overweight landing. There is no information in the fom under overweight landing that supports or denies such an event. There is one note about overweight landing at a non-maintenance station. The note indicates that a captain with maintenance control's help can sign off an overweight landing and return the aircraft to service. I felt this was still a weak argument for an overweight landing. I then checked the QRH and found nothing to support or deny the landing. In the end I landed overweight. I let dispatch and maintenance talk me into a landing that should have never happened. I knew I could land and stop the aircraft on a 12;000 ft runway. I also knew I would land with less than a 200 FPM sink rate. I also knew the landing would be safe but a limitation is a limitation is a limitation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 returned to their departure airport for an overweight landing when a chronic EPR Probe ECAM warning recurred during the climb.

Narrative: I arrived at the gate approximately 45 minutes prior to departure. There was a mechanic in the jetway. He asked if I called Maintenance. I said no. He told me that somebody called him about ENG #1 EPR probe. He told me Maintenance had worked on the EPR probe and there was some excess material on the probe. He told me the aircraft could operate with the EPR probe in this condition for 14 days. He also told me that the probe had already been written up. He also informed me that the EPR probe was on maintenance watch. I meet the First Officer in the cockpit. I asked him if he called Maintenance. He said he did call because there was some kind of material around the EPR probe. I checked the log book and discovered that engine #1 EPR probe had been written up twice. The write ups were both the same: On climb out EPR #1 fault. Departed [and] at about FL 190 received ECAM message: Engine #1 EPR fault. We completed the ECAM; the QRH and then consulted ECAM Non-Normal Supplemental Manual. The manual recommended we try to recover EPR mode by switching off both ENG N1 Mode PB. The EPR recovery failed. I sent Dispatcher/Maintenance Control a message about the EPR fault. Dispatch informed me that our destination was VFR and to proceed. I agreed and continued. The following contains some of the ACAR messages between Dispatch and me. Dispatch: This is a chronic problem. They recommended a return to departure airport. I didn't print my messages to Dispatch but the following is close to what I actually sent. Captain: Are you sure you want me to return to departure airport. I'm 20;000 LBS overweight. Dispatch: Technicians and parts to destination please return to departure airport at this time. Please advise landing weight. Captain: I need to burn down to 142.2 I now weight 160.0K. Dispatch: We are doing this under strong recommendation from Maintenance Control. Captain: In an emergency I will land overweight but this is a convenience not an emergency. Dispatch: Landings can be accomplished safely if as a crew you think it is not prudent in the area of safety to continue holding in your current ATC environment. etc. I personally do not see a need to declare an emergency. Dispatch: Maintenance advises no problem with overweight landing as long as you record rate of descent an actual weight. Captain: I will do an overweight landing. Dispatch: Maintenance is ok with overweight landing; your Dispatcher in full agreement with your decision to do and overweight landing. I had the First Officer fly the approach and landing. I informed the Flight Attendants and passengers that we were returning. We landed at 151;500 LBS at 200 FPM on the longest runway. Touchdown was normal with normal brake temperatures once we parked the aircraft.I agreed to land overweight but I had a gut feeling that this was the wrong decision. I decided to try and burn as much fuel as possible enroute. We descended to 12;000 FT; extended the speed brake and started the APU. I then consulted the FOM and the QRH to see if I could find some information that would support an overweight landing. There is no information in the FOM under Overweight landing that supports or denies such an event. There is one note about overweight landing at a non-maintenance station. The note indicates that a Captain with Maintenance Control's help can sign off an overweight landing and return the aircraft to service. I felt this was still a weak argument for an overweight landing. I then checked the QRH and found nothing to support or deny the landing. In the end I landed overweight. I let Dispatch and Maintenance talk me into a landing that should have never happened. I knew I could land and stop the aircraft on a 12;000 FT runway. I also knew I would land with less than a 200 FPM sink rate. I also knew the landing would be safe but a limitation is a limitation is a limitation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.