Narrative:

On the departure from ZZZZ passing somewhere between 10;000 and 16;000 feet; with the aircraft in a clean configuration I started a left turn as we were cleared direct to the fir and we received the following; 1. EICAS warning; hydraulic qty (QRH abnormal). In less than 30 seconds we received the second message. 2. Hydraulic system press (C only) 767 (QRH emergency). I pressed the status page to see the volume of the center hydraulic system rapidly reaching zero (with RF). I can't remember how much we had when I first hit the status page but we were at zero in seconds. I was a little taken back by how fast the entire system was lost. My first officer started QRH and I made a radio call to ARTCC declaring emergency and gave them notice of our intent to divert. Prior to my call to ATC we had some discussions as to the best airport for our divert and we both agreed that ZZZZ was the best choice. As it turned out; it was the perfect choice. We started to divert and started the QRH procedures in order above. No action items required for hydraulic qty. First officer started to run the hydraulic system press QRH as we diverted. I focused on flying the plane and my first officer ran the performed the PNF duties. He speaks some spanish and this helped with communications and he continued the QRH procedures. I called the #1 flight attendant and told her we would be on the ground in 30 minutes or so. I told her about the center system loss and I did not expect any issues with the landing. She was very professional in the way she took care of the cabin and the other flight attendant all commended the cool and collected performance. We continued our divert while we reviewed items lost with the failure of the center hydraulic system. We reached VMC conditions and had the airport in sight when we started the altitude flap extension portion of the QRH procedure. The day was not so bad until we attempted to select flaps 5 - we received a trailing edge disagree light and EICAS warning. We did a quick run though of the check list trying to see if we had made an error as our training has proven this emergency check lists can sometimes be confusing. With no error evident we called dispatch for some assistances. I called the #1 flight attendant for the second time and told her things were not going a planned and asked her to start her 30 minute checklist. We covered the test items; reviewing them to make sure we were exactly on the same page. Again her professionalism was superior. After the fact; I learned about some minor cabin issues that were handled by the crew vs. Contacting us. I was impressed and pleased that our cabin crew handled the issue vs. Interrupting us with what would have only been an unnecessary distraction. We initiated satcom link with dispatch and asked for help from maintenance as we advised dispatch of our situation. He patched maintenance control into the call. After a few short discussions it became evident that the advisors accent was very difficult to understand. This made us both agitated due to the problems we were already having. We should not have had difficulties communicating in simple english. When the first officer and maintenance control were not making any progress; I asked if dispatch was still on the line. Dispatch said yes and I asked him to get the assistant chief pilot. We ran through checklists until we were all together. At which point all 3 of us confirmed we were having multiple system failure. My first officer and I could tell when we hit the same point in the checklist as the tone of his voice changed as he realized we had a major problem. At this point; he starting getting help from others in the training department. I am not sure exactly who joined him but I know they had some discussions as to how we should proceed. We then all agreed and started the no flap/no slat landing and the landing other than flaps 30 procedures. We finished the hydraulic system press (C only) checklist and extended the gear. We computed our approach as ref of 210K. I intercepted the final approach and shot the VOR to a visual approach. The extended final allowed for stable approach to landing. I touched down in the first 1000 feet at somewhere around 200Kts. Part of the discussions prior to starting the approach were around what level of auto brakes to use. I discussed max auto or auto brakes 4. After discussion; I elected to use auto 3. We came to a stop with 1000+ ft remaining; using automatic brakes 3. I felt it is important to note that our auto brakes stayed armed all the way to stop. I never once applied braking and allowed the auto brakes to do the job. We asked to be towed to parking after the fire marshal inspected the aircraft and brakes for fires.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain experiences loss of Center Hydraulic system during climb and elects to divert to nearby alternate airport with an 11000 foot runway. When flap extension is attempted using the alternate flap switch; a TE FLAP disagree is annunciated. After much discussion with the Company a no flap landing ensues.

Narrative: On the departure from ZZZZ passing somewhere between 10;000 and 16;000 feet; with the aircraft in a clean configuration I started a left turn as we were cleared direct to the FIR and we received the following; 1. EICAS warning; HYD QTY (QRH abnormal). In less than 30 seconds we received the second message. 2. HYD SYS PRESS (C only) 767 (QRH EMER). I pressed the status page to see the volume of the Center Hydraulic System rapidly reaching zero (with RF). I can't remember how much we had when I first hit the status page but we were at zero in seconds. I was a little taken back by how fast the entire system was lost. My FO started QRH and I made a radio call to ARTCC declaring Emergency and gave them notice of our intent to divert. Prior to my call to ATC we had some discussions as to the best airport for our divert and we both agreed that ZZZZ was the best choice. As it turned out; it was the perfect choice. We started to divert and started the QRH procedures in order above. No action items required for HYD QTY. First Officer started to run the HYD SYS PRESS QRH as we diverted. I focused on flying the plane and my First Officer ran the performed the PNF duties. He speaks some Spanish and this helped with communications and he continued the QRH procedures. I called the #1 FA and told her we would be on the ground in 30 minutes or so. I told her about the center system loss and I did not expect any issues with the landing. She was very professional in the way she took care of the cabin and the other FA all commended the cool and collected performance. We continued our divert while we reviewed Items lost with the failure of the center HYD system. We reached VMC conditions and had the airport in sight when we started the ALT FLAP Extension portion of the QRH procedure. The day was not so bad until we attempted to select Flaps 5 - we received a Trailing Edge Disagree light and EICAS warning. We did a quick run though of the check list trying to see if we had made an error as our training has proven this emergency check lists can sometimes be confusing. With no error evident we called dispatch for some assistances. I called the #1 FA for the second time and told her things were not going a planned and asked her to start her 30 minute checklist. We covered the TEST items; reviewing them to make sure we were exactly on the same page. Again her professionalism was superior. After the fact; I learned about some minor cabin issues that were handled by the crew vs. contacting us. I was impressed and pleased that our cabin crew handled the issue vs. interrupting us with what would have only been an unnecessary distraction. We initiated Satcom link with Dispatch and asked for help from Maintenance as we advised Dispatch of our situation. He patched Maintenance Control into the call. After a few short discussions it became evident that the advisors accent was very difficult to understand. This made us both agitated due to the problems we were already having. We should not have had difficulties communicating in simple English. When the First Officer and Maintenance Control were not making any progress; I asked if Dispatch was still on the line. Dispatch said yes and I asked him to get the Assistant Chief Pilot. We ran through checklists until we were all together. At which point all 3 of us confirmed we were having multiple system failure. My First Officer and I could tell when we hit the same point in the checklist as the tone of his voice changed as he realized we had a major problem. At this point; he starting getting help from others in the training department. I am not sure exactly who joined him but I know they had some discussions as to how we should proceed. We then all agreed and started the NO FLAP/NO SLAT LANDING and the Landing other than Flaps 30 procedures. We finished the HYD SYS PRESS (C only) checklist and extended the gear. We computed our approach as ref of 210K. I intercepted the final approach and shot the VOR to a visual approach. The extended final allowed for stable approach to landing. I touched down in the first 1000 feet at somewhere around 200Kts. Part of the discussions prior to starting the approach were around what level of auto brakes to use. I discussed Max auto or auto brakes 4. After discussion; I elected to use auto 3. We came to a stop with 1000+ ft remaining; using AUTO BRAKES 3. I felt it is important to note that our auto brakes stayed armed all the way to stop. I never once applied braking and allowed the auto brakes to do the job. We asked to be towed to parking after the fire marshal inspected the aircraft and brakes for fires.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.