Narrative:

After a ground delay of approximately 1 hour due to weather; boarding all up; closing all doors; the captain attempted to make communication with the push back ground crew several times. Rainy conditions occurring at the time of push back which had just began. Appearing from the top of the tug was a tug driver standing on the tug indicating to the captain that they had no head-sets. At no point prior to this were we informed that they had no headsets. We did wonder at the time if their protocol was to not use headsets during wet rainy conditions. Hand signals were given and we commenced pushback. Brakes were set; disconnect occurred and the captain was shown rather quickly the nose gear pin as the ramp member(s) ran off to escape the rain and others followed. Upon climbing out to FL340 and as we leveled off at FL340 (approximately FL335) there was a vibration and sound coming from around the cockpit area. The vibration was noticeable on the floor; on the walls and on the windscreens in numerous locations throughout the cockpit. The vibration and tone would change in pitch/ tone with the change of airspeed. Numerous discussions and attempts to discuss the issue with dispatch; maintenance; and flight operations were made. We attempted to discuss the issues via the satellite phone and VHF radio. Each time we had difficulties maintaining contact which made the decision process more difficult. After numerous broken discussions with dispatch; maintenance; and a phone patch involving flight operations office we (flight crew) discussed all of our options. Every attempt was made to determine the root cause of the vibration without success. We utilized a dead-heading crew-member to walk throughout aircraft to also gain a perspective if the vibration was felt further along in the fuselage. Unable to determine the cause or source of the vibration; we elected that the safest course of action would be to proceed with caution and land to resolve the vibration since we were unable in flight. We attempted to burn off as much fuel as possible in order to land within weight limits as our takeoff weight was approximately 152;000 pounds. We held on the arrival and anticipated additional vectors to land however ATC provided vectors which put us on the final approach sooner than anticipated and therefore we elected to continue the landing approximately 1;500 pounds over landing weight. Extra precautions were made to ensure a very smooth and successful landing. Upon arriving at the gate it was determined that the forward service door (external power panel) was in the open position. The ground crew made a brief comment that the potable water door appeared to be iced over. The aft flight attendant notified us during the descent that the potable water tank indicated empty and that she believed (but was not completely sure) that it was full upon departure during her per-flight duties.use of head-sets during pushback and if anticipating no-headsets due to weather or other operational matters than to ensure that flight deck communication is made between ramp push crew and captain before all doors being closed and secured. In my humble opinion no aircraft should ever push without the use of a functioning headset. No functioning headset = no push. That should be the rule. If that is not to be the rule then there needs to be a way to communicate that all doors are closed and secure after pushback and that the final walk-around and proper closing of external power door is complete prior to taxi.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain experiences a strange vibration upon level off at FL340 that seems to vary with speed. After discussion and consultation a decision is made to divert. The external power panel door is found unlatched on post flight.

Narrative: After a ground delay of approximately 1 hour due to weather; boarding all up; closing all doors; the Captain attempted to make communication with the push back ground crew several times. Rainy conditions occurring at the time of push back which had just began. Appearing from the top of the tug was a tug driver standing on the tug indicating to the Captain that they had no head-sets. At no point prior to this were we informed that they had no headsets. We did wonder at the time if their protocol was to not use headsets during wet rainy conditions. Hand signals were given and we commenced pushback. Brakes were set; disconnect occurred and the Captain was shown rather quickly the nose gear pin as the ramp member(s) ran off to escape the rain and others followed. Upon climbing out to FL340 and as we leveled off at FL340 (approximately FL335) there was a vibration and sound coming from around the cockpit area. The vibration was noticeable on the floor; on the walls and on the windscreens in numerous locations throughout the cockpit. The vibration and tone would change in pitch/ tone with the change of airspeed. Numerous discussions and attempts to discuss the issue with Dispatch; Maintenance; and Flight Operations were made. We attempted to discuss the issues via the Satellite Phone and VHF radio. Each time we had difficulties maintaining contact which made the decision process more difficult. After numerous broken discussions with Dispatch; Maintenance; and a phone patch involving flight operations office we (flight crew) discussed all of our options. Every attempt was made to determine the root cause of the vibration without success. We utilized a dead-heading crew-member to walk throughout aircraft to also gain a perspective if the vibration was felt further along in the fuselage. Unable to determine the cause or source of the vibration; we elected that the safest course of action would be to proceed with caution and land to resolve the vibration since we were unable in flight. We attempted to burn off as much fuel as possible in order to land within weight limits as our takeoff weight was approximately 152;000 LBS. We held on the arrival and anticipated additional vectors to land however ATC provided vectors which put us on the final approach sooner than anticipated and therefore we elected to continue the landing approximately 1;500 LBS over landing weight. Extra precautions were made to ensure a very smooth and successful landing. Upon arriving at the gate it was determined that the forward service door (External Power Panel) was in the open position. The ground crew made a brief comment that the Potable water door appeared to be iced over. The aft Flight Attendant notified us during the descent that the potable water tank indicated empty and that she believed (but was not completely sure) that it was full upon departure during her per-flight duties.Use of head-sets during pushback and if anticipating no-headsets due to weather or other operational matters than to ensure that flight deck communication is made between ramp push crew and Captain BEFORE all doors being closed and secured. In my humble opinion NO aircraft should EVER push without the use of a functioning headset. No Functioning Headset = No Push. That should be the rule. If that is not to be the rule then there needs to be a way to communicate that all doors are closed and secure after pushback and that the final walk-around and proper closing of external power door is complete prior to taxi.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.