Narrative:

We received an anti skid outboard EICAS message during the boarding process. We contacted maintenance and attempted to troubleshoot. The message remained and maintenance then stated that we could MEL the one channel. I told him that we could not because the runway was contaminated (per MEL). He did not object and stated he would call station maintenance to get to the aircraft. I was told to try unpowering and repowering the aircraft and call back. It didn't work. When I called them back I was transferred to dispatch (a coordinator; I believe) and was told that we were going to MEL the channel. I told him that the runway was contaminated. He said that it was reported as 1/8 of an inch and that it is not considered contaminated. I told him it was because there is ice and snow on the runway and I did not feel comfortable with that. He was noticeably irritated and told me that I would have to board the passengers again and make a determination at the end of the runway. I told him again I didn't feel comfortable with that. He seemed more annoyed and stated that he was going to tell them the captain was refusing to fly the aircraft. I told him to do what he wanted; but I was not going to take off under this condition. We were being pressured by dispatch to takeoff on a contaminated runway contrary to MEL constraints. They were trying to make us feel guilty for a maintenance issue. Here is why I felt uncomfortable. It had been snowing all day. We were watching snow plows plow the runway every 30 minutes with snow blowing in all directions. We were watching aircraft takeoff with snow clouds trailing all the way down the runway. A B737 reported braf (breaking action fair) at 20 minutes past the hour and a second B737 reported braf 21 minutes later. ATIS was reporting patchy thin ice on the runway mainly along the edges. This is an issue that I have run across more than once here. If a pilot states that he does not feel a certain condition is safe for flight; then we should all move to the next step of the problem solving process. We should not feel like we are causing the company grief. We should not be pressured to ignore our informed judgment. I wonder if anyone flew that aircraft out the next morning? This is a dangerous issue in that there is absolutely zero CRM when dealing with dispatch. Every time I call; I feel I have to prepare to fight. Instead of working with us when there is an issue; they make us feel like we caused the issue. None of us wanted to be stuck in buffalo for all those hours on a holiday. It wasn't like it was a benefit for any of us. Nothing may have happened if I had taken off. However; what if I had to abort at 130 KTS on a runway with fair braking action? The pressuring of pilots has got to stop. This is happening more than is reported.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ Captain refused an aircraft on which one channel of the anti-skid system had been deferred inoperative for an operation off of a contaminated runway. He believed a Dispatcher was attempting to force him to declare the runway 'not contaminated' and to accept the aircraft.

Narrative: We received an ANTI SKID OUTBOARD EICAS message during the boarding process. We contacted Maintenance and attempted to troubleshoot. The message remained and Maintenance then stated that we could MEL the one channel. I told him that we could not because the runway was contaminated (per MEL). He did not object and stated he would call Station Maintenance to get to the aircraft. I was told to try unpowering and repowering the aircraft and call back. It didn't work. When I called them back I was transferred to Dispatch (a coordinator; I believe) and was told that we were going to MEL the channel. I told him that the runway was contaminated. He said that it was reported as 1/8 of an inch and that it is not considered contaminated. I told him it was because there is ice and snow on the runway and I did not feel comfortable with that. He was noticeably irritated and told me that I would have to board the passengers again and make a determination at the end of the runway. I told him again I didn't feel comfortable with that. He seemed more annoyed and stated that he was going to tell them the Captain was refusing to fly the aircraft. I told him to do what he wanted; but I was not going to take off under this condition. We were being pressured by Dispatch to takeoff on a contaminated runway contrary to MEL constraints. They were trying to make us feel guilty for a maintenance issue. Here is why I felt uncomfortable. It had been snowing all day. We were watching snow plows plow the runway every 30 minutes with snow blowing in all directions. We were watching aircraft takeoff with snow clouds trailing all the way down the runway. A B737 reported BRAF (Breaking Action Fair) at 20 minutes past the hour and a second B737 reported BRAF 21 minutes later. ATIS was reporting patchy thin ice on the runway mainly along the edges. This is an issue that I have run across more than once here. If a pilot states that he does not feel a certain condition is safe for flight; then we should all move to the next step of the problem solving process. We should not feel like we are causing the company grief. We should not be pressured to ignore our informed judgment. I wonder if anyone flew that aircraft out the next morning? This is a dangerous issue in that there is absolutely zero CRM when dealing with Dispatch. Every time I call; I feel I have to prepare to fight. Instead of working with us when there is an issue; they make us feel like we caused the issue. None of us wanted to be stuck in Buffalo for all those hours on a holiday. It wasn't like it was a benefit for any of us. Nothing may have happened if I had taken off. However; what if I had to abort at 130 KTS on a runway with fair braking action? The pressuring of pilots has got to stop. This is happening more than is reported.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.