Narrative:

During final approach to landing during VMC lda/DME approach (which became visual once field was in sight) in VMC; with the PIC pilot flying and myself; sic pilot not flying; after the gear was extended; the 'power brake press low' and 'antiskid inoperative' annunciatior lights illuminated. We were familiar with the procedure and checklist both because this is a regular simulator item and because we had just experienced this same malfunction 3 days prior; in the same aircraft; when landing at another airport. The aircraft was subsequently squawked and maintenance performed which was closed out and the aircraft was returned to service on the morning of this flight. The abnormal checklist was complied with and in spite of resetting the antiskid circuit breaker as directed; both annunciator lights remained on. The PIC directed that he would continue with landing and transfer controls on rollout to me; with me keeping my feet off the brakes and the PIC accomplishing all braking using the emergency brake. This pre-briefed landing and rollout were then performed uneventfully and the aircraft was taxied clear of the runway and brought to a full stop. Ground control was notified of our brake problem and ground and the FBO were both asked to bring a tug out to pull us to the ramp for normal deplaning. My own communication with the passengers were as follows: after we came to a full stop on a taxiway; I told the passengers that normal brakes had failed and that we had to land using our backup emergency brakes and would have to await a tug to take us to the ramp; and to expect about a ten minute delay to the ramp. I feel that operationally; we made the safest and most prudent; risk minimizing decisions appropriate for the circumstances (terrain; airport; etc). However; in terms of maintenance; it is my opinion that the cause was not correctly identified or fixed in three days prior; otherwise the problem would not have essentially repeated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CE560 First Officer reported the aircraft's POWER BRAKE PRESSURE LOW and ANTISKID INOP annunciator lights illuminated on short final. Emergency procedures were completed and the landing continued as briefed.

Narrative: During final approach to landing during VMC LDA/DME approach (which became visual once field was in sight) in VMC; with the PIC pilot flying and myself; SIC pilot not flying; after the gear was extended; the 'power brake press low' and 'antiskid inoperative' annunciatior lights illuminated. We were familiar with the procedure and checklist both because this is a regular simulator item and because we had just experienced this same malfunction 3 days prior; in the same aircraft; when landing at another airport. The aircraft was subsequently squawked and maintenance performed which was closed out and the aircraft was returned to service on the morning of this flight. The abnormal checklist was complied with and in spite of resetting the antiskid Circuit Breaker as directed; both annunciator lights remained on. The PIC directed that he would continue with landing and transfer controls on rollout to me; with me keeping my feet off the brakes and the PIC accomplishing all braking using the emergency brake. This pre-briefed landing and rollout were then performed uneventfully and the aircraft was taxied clear of the runway and brought to a full stop. Ground Control was notified of our brake problem and Ground and the FBO were both asked to bring a tug out to pull us to the ramp for normal deplaning. My own communication with the passengers were as follows: After we came to a full stop on a taxiway; I told the passengers that normal brakes had failed and that we had to land using our backup emergency brakes and would have to await a tug to take us to the ramp; and to expect about a ten minute delay to the ramp. I feel that operationally; we made the safest and most prudent; risk minimizing decisions appropriate for the circumstances (terrain; airport; etc). However; in terms of maintenance; it is my opinion that the cause was not correctly identified or fixed in three days prior; otherwise the problem would not have essentially repeated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.