Narrative:

Vacating the active runway 25, sba ground control cleared us on the taxiway to hold short of runway 15R (an intersecting runway used for light aircraft). At this point on the taxiway the after landing checklist was completed and I advised the captain that I would be off the radio briefing the passenger and calling our company with our on/in times. The captain verified to me that he had the radios and would listen to ground control. During my debriefing I noticed the captain transmitted something to ground control (which turned out to be a reply of 'roger' to cross runway 15R and hold short of runway 15L). The captain misunderstood this as clearance to cross both 15's and taxi to the gate. Approaching the gate and back on the radios, I heard ground control scolding us because we had crossed an active runway and caused a light aircraft to abort. As it turns out, the ground controller was continually telling us to 'hold short,' but was using another airline's call sign, which flys the same type of aircraft as ours. We both should have been vigilant to crossing an active runway and looking both ways. I also believe full length readbacks in clrncs would help, because the response 'roger' proved here to be near disastrous. This incident could also have been avoided if our company did not pressure the flight crews to spend so much time talking to the passenger, when we should be operating the aircraft first and foremost.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAILED TO COMPLY WITH CLRNC TO HOLD SHORT RWY 15L.

Narrative: VACATING THE ACTIVE RWY 25, SBA GND CTL CLRED US ON THE TXWY TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 15R (AN INTERSECTING RWY USED FOR LIGHT ACFT). AT THIS POINT ON THE TXWY THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT I WOULD BE OFF THE RADIO BRIEFING THE PAX AND CALLING OUR COMPANY WITH OUR ON/IN TIMES. THE CAPT VERIFIED TO ME THAT HE HAD THE RADIOS AND WOULD LISTEN TO GND CTL. DURING MY DEBRIEFING I NOTICED THE CAPT XMITTED SOMETHING TO GND CTL (WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE A REPLY OF 'ROGER' TO CROSS RWY 15R AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 15L). THE CAPT MISUNDERSTOOD THIS AS CLRNC TO CROSS BOTH 15'S AND TAXI TO THE GATE. APCHING THE GATE AND BACK ON THE RADIOS, I HEARD GND CTL SCOLDING US BECAUSE WE HAD CROSSED AN ACTIVE RWY AND CAUSED A LIGHT ACFT TO ABORT. AS IT TURNS OUT, THE GND CTLR WAS CONTINUALLY TELLING US TO 'HOLD SHORT,' BUT WAS USING ANOTHER AIRLINE'S CALL SIGN, WHICH FLYS THE SAME TYPE OF ACFT AS OURS. WE BOTH SHOULD HAVE BEEN VIGILANT TO XING AN ACTIVE RWY AND LOOKING BOTH WAYS. I ALSO BELIEVE FULL LENGTH READBACKS IN CLRNCS WOULD HELP, BECAUSE THE RESPONSE 'ROGER' PROVED HERE TO BE NEAR DISASTROUS. THIS INCIDENT COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF OUR COMPANY DID NOT PRESSURE THE FLT CREWS TO SPEND SO MUCH TIME TALKING TO THE PAX, WHEN WE SHOULD BE OPERATING THE ACFT FIRST AND FOREMOST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.