Narrative:

Flight originated with scheduled part 121 service. The current and forcast weather in our destination indicated we were expecting light and variable winds; unrestricted visibility; and clear skies upon arrival. The flight operated on-time and proceeded uneventfully until reaching the airport's terminal area. I retrieved the ASOS enroute and confirmed the ideal weather conditions we were expecting upon arrival. The takeoff and landing report was prepared planning a 17/35 arrival; so we briefed the night-time visual to land straight-in on the runway. When we checked in with center approximately 15 NM northeast of the airport (local ATC services terminated earlier) we stated our intent to proceed visually to the runway. Center informed us that the runway was closed. We asked ATC to vector us in a box pattern above the field while we assessed our options. I began a series of ACARS communications with dispatch. I informed dispatch that center advised us of the runway closure and that no runway lights were visible for that runway. This prompted a back and forth discussion with dispatch about the status of the lights. (Both crew and dispatch were aware of and discussed the notams regarding the outage of the south 3;000 ft of runway lights and the outages to both runways approach lighting systems.) the approach lighting system was; in-fact; operational for both runways; but we had no success illuminating the runway lights using the pilot-controlled lighting system on the CTAF. Dispatch informed us that they were in contact with ground personnel in an attempt to clear up the discrepancy between the actual outages observed from overhead and what we had expected from the notams. I also informed dispatch of our current fuel and advised that we had little time to linger before abandoning an attempt to land at that airport. I indicated we were looking at a nearby airport for a possible diversion. Another runway was open; lighted; and available. However; that runway is charted at 75 ft in width; so the captain and I discussed its lack of suitability for landing. I also attempted to pull up landing data via acars for the runway; and the request was returned 'no valid runways requested' as expected. I typed several messages to dispatch to highlight this fact. I was getting increasingly concerned about our fuel and told the captain that I thought we'd lingered long enough and should proceed to our diversion airport. I informed center of our intent; and we began to head in that direction. As we were handed-off to approach we received an acars from dispatch indicating other rj operators had been using the other runway; that somebody on the ground claimed it was 100 ft wide and; if we were 'comfortable' with it; landing on that runway was an option. Being that we were still much closer to our original airport than the diversion airport; we turned back for our destination while continuing to discuss the idea of landing the other runway. Heading back I checked in with center and punched in messages back and forth with dispatch over ACARS. I was simultaneously receiving text about amending the release to make our diversion airport our destination while sending messages saying we had turned back to the original airport because of this indication that the other runway was an option. I was asking for confirmation of approval to land the other runway and requesting landing data that might support such an approval. No reply was received to that request. We got within 5 NM or so of the airport when I simply told the captain in no uncertain terms that while I was comfortable executing a landing to the other runway from a pilot and aircraft-capability standpoint (I landed on that runway 5 years ago in the same aircraft type); we had no specific approval saying we could land on runway less than 100 ft wide; we had no landing data to support such a decision and; given the ACARS about a destination amendment; our dispatch agreement/release authorization toland there was also now in question. Most importantly; we had no more time or fuel to debate or analyze. The captain agreed and a final determination was made to abandon any attempt at landing and proceed to our alternate. I declared us to be in a 'minimum fuel' condition and ATC was very helpful in assigning us direct with our choice of landing runways. We proceeded direct and briefed a landing runway which provided the most straight-in approach and more than adequate landing data. While enroute we received a final and clarifying ACARS from dispatch saying ignore all prior messages and proceed to land immediately at the diversion airport. I informed dispatch we were already enroute and that we'd call on the ground. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate. We reached the gate with our required fuel reserves indicating in the tanks. The captain initiated a phone call to dispatch; confirmed for dispatch that our fuel upon landing was 1;900 pounds; and was informed that we'd be flying the plane back to our original departure airport for the night. We picked up fuel and a new release; shed a few passengers that wished to drive rather than return; and we departed. We arrived and dutied off. Anytime I hear a story about an irregular event in line operations; my reaction without even hearing all the details is always one of certainty that the event could have been avoided by slowing down and more thoroughly analyzing the situation. This case is no different. Repetition and recency of experience breeds safety; but it also breeds comfort that can lead to complacency. The challenge is to maintain acuity and realize no matter how uneventful and routine our operating environment may appear; it is highly dynamic and we must remain vigilant for pitfalls. The flight crew and dispatch anticipated some lighting issues that were highlighted in the notams. We expected the south 3;000 ft of our intended runway lights to be inoperative. That should have prompted a discussion between the captain and dispatch about the suitability of the available landing distance and how that might impact the flight. Such a discussion might also have led to clarification that that runway was our only option for landing at that airport and further inquiry into its availability. Circling over the airport was not the time for determining or debating that fact.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A First Officer described the flight crew's and Dispatch's confusion during a night arrival when the runway approach lights were NOTAMed out and the pilot controlled lights would not operate. The flight diverted.

Narrative: Flight originated with scheduled Part 121 service. The current and forcast weather in our destination indicated we were expecting light and variable winds; unrestricted visibility; and clear skies upon arrival. The flight operated on-time and proceeded uneventfully until reaching the airport's terminal area. I retrieved the ASOS enroute and confirmed the ideal weather conditions we were expecting upon arrival. The takeoff and landing report was prepared planning a 17/35 arrival; so we briefed the night-time visual to land straight-in on the runway. When we checked in with Center approximately 15 NM northeast of the airport (local ATC services terminated earlier) we stated our intent to proceed visually to the runway. Center informed us that the runway was closed. We asked ATC to vector us in a box pattern above the field while we assessed our options. I began a series of ACARS communications with Dispatch. I informed Dispatch that Center advised us of the runway closure and that no runway lights were visible for that runway. This prompted a back and forth discussion with Dispatch about the status of the lights. (Both crew and Dispatch were aware of and discussed the NOTAMs regarding the outage of the south 3;000 FT of runway lights and the outages to both runways approach lighting systems.) The approach lighting system was; in-fact; operational for both runways; but we had no success illuminating the runway lights using the pilot-controlled lighting system on the CTAF. Dispatch informed us that they were in contact with ground personnel in an attempt to clear up the discrepancy between the actual outages observed from overhead and what we had expected from the NOTAMs. I also informed Dispatch of our current fuel and advised that we had little time to linger before abandoning an attempt to land at that airport. I indicated we were looking at a nearby airport for a possible diversion. Another runway was open; lighted; and available. However; that runway is charted at 75 FT in width; so the Captain and I discussed its lack of suitability for landing. I also attempted to pull up landing data via ACARs for the runway; and the request was returned 'no valid runways requested' as expected. I typed several messages to Dispatch to highlight this fact. I was getting increasingly concerned about our fuel and told the Captain that I thought we'd lingered long enough and should proceed to our diversion airport. I informed Center of our intent; and we began to head in that direction. As we were handed-off to Approach we received an ACARs from Dispatch indicating other RJ operators had been using the other runway; that somebody on the ground claimed it was 100 FT wide and; if we were 'comfortable' with it; landing on that runway was an option. Being that we were still much closer to our original airport than the diversion airport; we turned back for our destination while continuing to discuss the idea of landing the other runway. Heading back I checked in with Center and punched in messages back and forth with Dispatch over ACARS. I was simultaneously receiving text about amending the release to make our diversion airport our destination while sending messages saying we had turned back to the original airport because of this indication that the other runway was an option. I was asking for confirmation of approval to land the other runway and requesting landing data that might support such an approval. No reply was received to that request. We got within 5 NM or so of the airport when I simply told the Captain in no uncertain terms that while I was comfortable executing a landing to the other runway from a pilot and aircraft-capability standpoint (I landed on that runway 5 years ago in the same aircraft type); we had no specific approval saying we could land on runway less than 100 FT wide; we had no landing data to support such a decision and; given the ACARS about a destination amendment; our Dispatch agreement/release authorization toland there was also now in question. Most importantly; we had no more time or fuel to debate or analyze. The Captain agreed and a final determination was made to abandon any attempt at landing and proceed to our alternate. I declared us to be in a 'minimum fuel' condition and ATC was very helpful in assigning us direct with our choice of landing runways. We proceeded direct and briefed a landing runway which provided the most straight-in approach and more than adequate landing data. While enroute we received a final and clarifying ACARS from Dispatch saying ignore all prior messages and proceed to land immediately at the diversion airport. I informed Dispatch we were already enroute and that we'd call on the ground. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate. We reached the gate with our required fuel reserves indicating in the tanks. The Captain initiated a phone call to Dispatch; confirmed for Dispatch that our fuel upon landing was 1;900 LBS; and was informed that we'd be flying the plane back to our original departure airport for the night. We picked up fuel and a new release; shed a few passengers that wished to drive rather than return; and we departed. We arrived and dutied off. Anytime I hear a story about an irregular event in line operations; my reaction without even hearing all the details is always one of certainty that the event could have been avoided by slowing down and more thoroughly analyzing the situation. This case is no different. Repetition and recency of experience breeds safety; but it also breeds comfort that can lead to complacency. The challenge is to maintain acuity and realize no matter how uneventful and routine our operating environment may appear; it is highly dynamic and we must remain vigilant for pitfalls. The flight crew and Dispatch anticipated some lighting issues that were highlighted in the NOTAMs. We expected the south 3;000 FT of our intended runway lights to be inoperative. That should have prompted a discussion between the Captain and Dispatch about the suitability of the available landing distance and how that might impact the flight. Such a discussion might also have led to clarification that that runway was our only option for landing at that airport and further inquiry into its availability. Circling over the airport was not the time for determining or debating that fact.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.