Narrative:

Before gear retraction number 2 propeller began surging with noticeable yawing of aircraft. We reduced power on number 2 engine and went to max takeoff on number 1; retracting the gear. Identified the problem as a propeller control malfunction and feathered it; it did feather; but we had the impression the np was lower than expected so we shut down the number 2 engine and declared an emergency with a return to field. Communication with flight attendant was normal landing; no evacuation planned; no brace required. [After landing] first officer inspected propeller and engine nacelle; heard a noise (possibly hydraulic pump cavitating from fuel handle being pulled) and discussed with maintenance regarding their request to run-up engine (he asked why we pulled the fuel off handle and I said it was procedure when shutting down an engine); we checked; takeoff power setting with and without number 2 ecu numerous times; auto feather; ecu enrichment and propeller control at 900 np; watched for any unusual tq and fuel fluctuation; nothing was noted as abnormal. Then the mechanic on site looked over engine and propeller; checking for codes and chip detector. Early on in moc conversation ecu was focused as the problem not beta lockout or propeller governor issues and ferrying was suggested as possible. Training gives good emphasis on attention to detail and taking your time. Applying that in the heat of the moment would've helped us possibly avoid an engine shutdown. Had we not been distracted with the run-up possibly we could have had a better debrief and discovery time regarding what we actually experienced and saw that led to our decision to shut down the engine. This was my first shut down of an engine for an actual malfunction the only other one was an itt gauge. The possibility of having to ferry the aircraft was also confusing at the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC 8-100 flight crew experienced a surging propeller after takeoff. They secured the engine; declared an emergency; and returned to departure airport; where they were advised it was perhaps not necessary to secure the engine. They were persuaded after an inspection to ferry the aircraft.

Narrative: Before gear retraction number 2 propeller began surging with noticeable yawing of aircraft. We reduced power on number 2 engine and went to max takeoff on number 1; retracting the gear. Identified the problem as a propeller control malfunction and feathered it; it did feather; but we had the impression the Np was lower than expected so we shut down the number 2 engine and declared an emergency with a return to field. Communication with Flight Attendant was normal landing; no evacuation planned; no brace required. [After landing] First Officer inspected propeller and engine nacelle; heard a noise (possibly hydraulic pump cavitating from fuel handle being pulled) and discussed with Maintenance regarding their request to run-up engine (he asked why we pulled the fuel off handle and I said it was procedure when shutting down an engine); we checked; takeoff power setting with and without number 2 ECU numerous times; auto feather; ECU enrichment and propeller control at 900 Np; watched for any unusual TQ and fuel fluctuation; nothing was noted as abnormal. Then the Mechanic on site looked over engine and propeller; checking for codes and chip detector. Early on in MOC conversation ECU was focused as the problem not Beta Lockout or propeller governor issues and ferrying was suggested as possible. Training gives good emphasis on attention to detail and taking your time. Applying that in the heat of the moment would've helped us possibly avoid an engine shutdown. Had we not been distracted with the run-up possibly we could have had a better debrief and discovery time regarding what we actually experienced and saw that led to our decision to shut down the engine. This was my first shut down of an engine for an actual malfunction the only other one was an ITT gauge. The possibility of having to ferry the aircraft was also confusing at the time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.