Narrative:

Upon departure; the PA28-140 held 40 gallons of fuel; enough to fly for 3:45 plus a 45 minute night reserve at a consumption rate of 9 gph (8.75 has been the actual/historical rate in this particular aircraft). Along the path of the trip; we encountered estimated headwinds of 12-15 KTS; decreasing plane performance and increasing the rate of fuel consumption. I continued to calculate the remaining fuel multiple occasions during the flight; and each time; there was sufficient fuel to reach my destination. However; I believe this was the first mistake I made which led to the incident.I first attempted to contact approach control 25 NM from the airport. The approach channel was very busy and I finally got contact with him at 19 NM from the airport. I knew at this point that our fuel was beginning to look low; but I had an estimated 7 gallons remaining from my calculations and fuel gauges. I was instructed by approach control to turn right to a heading of 090 to avoid the final approach course for jets landing at a large airport nearby. Instead of declaring a minimum fuel emergency like I should have; I continued to fly away from the airport at 090. This was my first mistake made during the approach sequence. Soon after; I was instructed to turn 060; then a minute later direct the airport. Almost directly following our turn to direct; the fuel tank I had selected began to sputter out; and I quickly selected the other tank in an effort to make the field under engine power. As the second tank also sputtered out approximately one minute later; I brought up the pilot-controlled lighting and switched back to approach to say that we had run out of fuel and were trying to glide in and make runway 33. From that point on; I followed checklists for best glide speed and engine restart; while watching the VASI lights for a glide slope indication. As our airspeed and maintenance of the glide slope slipped away; a decision had to be made to either land in the treetops surrounding the approach end of runway 33; or abandon the approach and land on a nearby highway. Luckily; I made the right choice and landed on the roadway as well as was possible given our low airspeed. Given the same situation again; I would correct my decisions along the route to stop for fuel. This would allow me to add fuel to each tank and not run the chance of encountering a minimum fuel situation at all.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A private pilot elected to continue to his destination despite unexpected headwinds. As he approached the destination airport the engine quit due to fuel exhaustion and an emergency landing was made on a local roadway.

Narrative: Upon departure; the PA28-140 held 40 gallons of fuel; enough to fly for 3:45 plus a 45 minute night reserve at a consumption rate of 9 GPH (8.75 has been the actual/historical rate in this particular aircraft). Along the path of the trip; we encountered estimated headwinds of 12-15 KTS; decreasing plane performance and increasing the rate of fuel consumption. I continued to calculate the remaining fuel multiple occasions during the flight; and each time; there was sufficient fuel to reach my destination. However; I believe this was the first mistake I made which led to the incident.I first attempted to contact Approach Control 25 NM from the airport. The Approach channel was very busy and I finally got contact with him at 19 NM from the airport. I knew at this point that our fuel was beginning to look low; but I had an estimated 7 gallons remaining from my calculations and fuel gauges. I was instructed by Approach Control to turn right to a heading of 090 to avoid the final approach course for jets landing at a large airport nearby. Instead of declaring a minimum fuel emergency like I should have; I continued to fly away from the airport at 090. This was my first mistake made during the approach sequence. Soon after; I was instructed to turn 060; then a minute later direct the airport. Almost directly following our turn to direct; the fuel tank I had selected began to sputter out; and I quickly selected the other tank in an effort to make the field under engine power. As the second tank also sputtered out approximately one minute later; I brought up the pilot-controlled lighting and switched back to Approach to say that we had run out of fuel and were trying to glide in and make Runway 33. From that point on; I followed checklists for best glide speed and engine restart; while watching the VASI lights for a glide slope indication. As our airspeed and maintenance of the glide slope slipped away; a decision had to be made to either land in the treetops surrounding the approach end of Runway 33; or abandon the approach and land on a nearby highway. Luckily; I made the right choice and landed on the roadway as well as was possible given our low airspeed. Given the same situation again; I would correct my decisions along the route to stop for fuel. This would allow me to add fuel to each tank and not run the chance of encountering a minimum fuel situation at all.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.