Narrative:

I was working the LA2 position at the time of the event. An air carrier was cleared for takeoff with a 230 heading. Shortly after; stadium (AR2) called with a point out for a CL30; informing me that the aircraft was cleared for the VOR approach to smo; had already been switched to the advisory frequency and that he did not know what the aircraft was doing. I stated 'roger' to the AR2 controller. I did not want to approve the point out since I did not want to authorize the aircraft to enter our airspace without knowing what it was going to do. I observed the aircraft on the radar in a southbound turn; abeam smo; and notified local 2 (LC2) and the flm. DR2 (malibu sector) called and asked if I was aware of the CL30. I advised him that we had the aircraft in sight; would issue traffic; and that we would hold departures until the aircraft was out of our airspace. The LC2 controller then issued traffic to the air carrier; reissued the 230 heading; and switched him to departure. The air carrier was close to being airborne when AR2 called; so I did not recommend to the LC2 controller that he abort the takeoff. There did not appear to be any communication between sct and the pilot as to the pilot's intentions. Sct should be flashing the aircraft to us or should be verbally stopping departures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LAX Controller described a potential conflict event when a LAX departure was issued a takeoff clearance on a 230 heading and SCT was late in pointing out a SMO VOR approach aircraft that was making unexpected turns.

Narrative: I was working the LA2 position at the time of the event. An air carrier was cleared for takeoff with a 230 heading. Shortly after; Stadium (AR2) called with a point out for a CL30; informing me that the aircraft was cleared for the VOR approach to SMO; had already been switched to the advisory frequency and that he did not know what the aircraft was doing. I stated 'Roger' to the AR2 Controller. I did not want to approve the point out since I did not want to authorize the aircraft to enter our airspace without knowing what it was going to do. I observed the aircraft on the RADAR in a southbound turn; abeam SMO; and notified Local 2 (LC2) and the FLM. DR2 (Malibu Sector) called and asked if I was aware of the CL30. I advised him that we had the aircraft in sight; would issue traffic; and that we would hold departures until the aircraft was out of our airspace. The LC2 Controller then issued traffic to the air carrier; reissued the 230 heading; and switched him to departure. The air carrier was close to being airborne when AR2 called; so I did not recommend to the LC2 Controller that he abort the takeoff. There did not appear to be any communication between SCT and the pilot as to the pilot's intentions. SCT should be flashing the aircraft to us or should be verbally stopping departures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.