Narrative:

Up-linked weights/cg matched the printed copy perfectly. The flight number and date were correct. However; the printed copy offered a configuration number 1; flex 47C takeoff. The up-linked one was configuration number 1; toga and the V1; vr; V2 numbers for the up-linked takeoff data were 10 to 15 knots lower. No flex takeoff option was available on the fmcg. Check airman commented that he had never seen such a discrepancy. Due to a lengthy taxi delay he was able to cell phone load control and although I only heard one side of the exchange; load control was somewhat baffled too. In the end; load control confirmed the paper; printed numbers and we used those successfully. I have no idea how such a problem comes about. Not sure of the cause; but my already shaky confidence in airbus automation just took another nose dive. I can't wait to get back to a boeing. Fortunately; check airman and I saw eye to eye and neither of us felt 'pressure' to cobble together a set of numbers to get going. He phoned load control; while the brakes were set and persisted until he got a set of numbers in which both of us had confidence

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A321 Captain reported that the up-linked weight and balance data significantly differed from the printed copy. After consulting the load planners it was determined the paper weight and balance was correct and an error occurred in the computer link somewhere.

Narrative: Up-linked weights/CG matched the printed copy perfectly. The flight number and date were correct. However; the printed copy offered a Configuration number 1; Flex 47C takeoff. The up-linked one was Configuration number 1; TOGA and the V1; VR; V2 numbers for the up-linked takeoff data were 10 to 15 knots lower. No Flex takeoff option was available on the FMCG. Check Airman commented that he had never seen such a discrepancy. Due to a lengthy taxi delay he was able to cell phone Load Control and although I only heard one side of the exchange; Load Control was somewhat baffled too. In the end; Load Control confirmed the paper; printed numbers and we used those successfully. I have no idea how such a problem comes about. Not sure of the cause; but my already shaky confidence in Airbus automation just took another nose dive. I can't wait to get back to a Boeing. Fortunately; Check Airman and I saw eye to eye and neither of us felt 'pressure' to cobble together a set of numbers to get going. He phoned Load Control; while the brakes were set and persisted until he got a set of numbers in which both of us had confidence

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.