Narrative:

We were inside 40 miles to the airport on a STAR arrival descending through the mid teens when we noted the right hydraulic light illuminated. I am not sure if it had just illuminated or it had been on. In certain jets the master caution does not illuminate with this light. We ran the right hydraulic press low light checklist. After we turned the right engine pump; auxiliary pump and transfer pump off the quantity returned to normal. [We were] less than 30 miles out. Following through the checklist: if right hydraulic quality is normal and associated light is illuminated: engine pump on; system check. If right hydraulic system pressure normal: no further crew action required. End. [We were] 15 miles out cleared to intercept localizer and cleared for the approach.the checklist ends there and implies it was an indication problem; I didn't think so. While keeping an eye on the quantity gauge; working the system in my head; and working out a contingency plan if we suddenly lose right pressure; I checked the runway in the box and hit navigation. I looked at the checklist one last time to see if we missed anything or our situation changed where to go next on the page. This is when I saw the localizer swing through. I quickly selected heading sel and turned back to the localizer. A moment or two later; final monitor gave us a heading to reestablish localizer. I was already there. We landed normally; reversers deployed; spoilers deployed; brakes were normal as was the steering; the right hydraulic quantity read 1 quart and pressure normal. [We] taxied in without problem.I had noted earlier in the flight that the APU ram door was stuck open so if we actually did lose fluid it just all went into the APU. We did not attempt to start it. At the gate maintenance confirmed we had lost the majority of the right system; and the APU was full of fluid.I then called TRACON to apologize for the overshoot and to see if there were any conflicts. They told me there were no issues with the approach.from the discovery of the low quantity light to landing was about 12 minutes. In addition to trying to work through a new and completely different QRH procedure; and other normal approach checklist and duties; time was definitely a factor in my response to this situation. I believe if this problem occurred 100 miles out I would have handled it completely different. In hind sight I think pulling myself out of the arrival; declaring an emergency; and covering all the bases would have been the correct thing to do. As I said before; by just running the QRH procedure leaves you with: if right hydraulic pressure normal: no further crew action required. End. If I had a few minutes to think about it I would have known this was an error. After a couple of days I am still mad at myself for letting the ball play me instead of me playing the ball! In declaring an emergency; it would have given me time; technical assistance and all the airspace I wanted. Lesson learned.lastly; I have; before this event; spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the new QRH. I believe this is the fourth or fifth iteration of this manual I have been issued. By far this is the worst. Difficult to work through the flow and the wording at time is ambiguous. What was wrong with the last one? It was also flawed but we have trained on it for years and it was possible to work a problem with it. I know the FAA and boeing. Figuring it out is my problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD80 lost a significant amount of hydraulic fluid during descent but the hydraulic pressure remained acceptable. An emergency was not declared and a normal landing followed after completing the QRH procedure which was recently changed and was difficult to follow.

Narrative: We were inside 40 miles to the airport on a STAR arrival descending through the mid teens when we noted the right hydraulic light illuminated. I am not sure if it had just illuminated or it had been on. In certain jets the master caution does not illuminate with this light. We ran the R HYD PRESS LOW LIGHT Checklist. After we turned the right engine pump; auxiliary pump and transfer pump off the quantity returned to normal. [We were] less than 30 miles out. Following through the checklist: If right hydraulic quality is normal and associated light is illuminated: Engine pump on; system check. If right hydraulic system pressure normal: No further crew action required. END. [We were] 15 miles out cleared to intercept localizer and cleared for the approach.The checklist ends there and implies it was an indication problem; I didn't think so. While keeping an eye on the quantity gauge; working the system in my head; and working out a contingency plan if we suddenly lose right pressure; I checked the runway in the box and hit NAV. I looked at the checklist one last time to see if we missed anything or our situation changed where to go next on the page. This is when I saw the localizer swing through. I quickly selected HDG SEL and turned back to the localizer. A moment or two later; Final Monitor gave us a heading to reestablish localizer. I was already there. We landed normally; reversers deployed; spoilers deployed; brakes were normal as was the steering; the right hydraulic quantity read 1 quart and pressure normal. [We] taxied in without problem.I had noted earlier in the flight that the APU ram door was stuck open so if we actually did lose fluid it just all went into the APU. We did not attempt to start it. At the gate Maintenance confirmed we had lost the majority of the right system; and the APU was full of fluid.I then called TRACON to apologize for the overshoot and to see if there were any conflicts. They told me there were no issues with the approach.From the discovery of the low quantity light to landing was about 12 minutes. In addition to trying to work through a new and completely different QRH procedure; and other normal approach checklist and duties; time was definitely a factor in my response to this situation. I believe if this problem occurred 100 miles out I would have handled it completely different. In hind sight I think pulling myself out of the arrival; declaring an emergency; and covering all the bases would have been the correct thing to do. As I said before; by just running the QRH procedure leaves you with: If right hydraulic pressure normal: No further crew action required. END. If I had a few minutes to think about it I would have known this was an error. After a couple of days I am still mad at myself for letting the ball play me instead of me playing the ball! In declaring an emergency; it would have given me time; technical assistance and all the airspace I wanted. Lesson learned.Lastly; I have; before this event; spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the new QRH. I believe this is the fourth or fifth iteration of this manual I have been issued. By far this is the worst. Difficult to work through the flow and the wording at time is ambiguous. What was wrong with the last one? It was also flawed but we have trained on it for years and it was possible to work a problem with it. I know the FAA and Boeing. Figuring it out is my problem.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.