Narrative:

The main thrust of this report concerns the continued 'pilot pushing' at our airline with another documented event that I directly experienced. Pilot sequence schedule X does not reveal the intended operation of pilot sequence schedule X. Therefore; pilot sequence schedule X must be examined in order to understand how this unfolded for the pilots of this identification. The beginning of this pilot pushing event began with the captain's refusal of the airbus 319 for flight xx/ZZZ-ZZZ2 due to a pack being deferred inoperative. While waiting on the ground in ZZZ for the call/notification that the A319 was either going to be repaired or replaced for the subject flight xx; no call to us from maintenance control; or dispatch ever occurred during that afternoon. The only call to the captain came from regional assistant chief pilot; captain Y. The issues relayed to me from captain X's message from captain Y was that captain Y wanted to 'discuss' the refusal with captain X along with captain X's 'plans for the passengers' I'm not sure what was meant by plans for the passengers in this context. In accordance with aircraft refusal; flight operations manual (fom) page 7.30.1; no other party besides the captain; dispatch; and/or maintenance control is to be involved in the refusal process unless the captain concurs with other parties participation. Captain X did not need or request any further outside intervention on his/her decision for the A319's refusal; hence only the above parties (captain; dispatch; and maintenance control) should have been involved in this decision. Again; no call from an appropriate agency (dispatch or maintenance control only) came during this period. After a period of time with no calls; I went back to the computer and checked on the A319's status and only then did I realize we had subsequently been assigned aircraft yy for this flight. This aircraft was due to arrive at the gate in ZZZ at approximately xa:38 local time with flight xx's new departure time scheduled for xb:15L. After new papers and weather were checked; the release for flight xx with aircraft yy was signed and we proceeded to the gate to meet the aircraft and flight attendants. During the latter part of the arriving flight's deplaning I proceeded outside to conduct the preflight. Upon my return all of the passengers were gone but the previous flight's pilots were still in the cockpit working on a discrepancy that was discovered upon landing at ZZZ. Both captains (arriving/departing) were discussing what happened as I returned from the walk around. The history is available for retrieval if desired but the discrepancies that were submitted were bscu #2 and brakes hot ECAM's; but only on the left main. The right main was normal. After the off going crew departed; captain X briefed me on the discussion that occurred with the off going captain. Apparently; the previous captain stated that as the aircraft exited the runway after a normal landing; the bscu #2 ECAM and the high brake temperature occurred almost instantly after exiting the runway; highly unusual for the airbus as brake temperatures will normally gradually increase at possibly an increased rate; but not instantly. Also; high brake temperatures by themselves do not fail a bscu. Additionally; the previous captain stated the left main had both a tire and brake change in ord before their flight. Armed with this information for the present malfunction along with the previous history for the left main from the crew; captain X then refused this aircraft as well due to a possible bad brake assembly on the left side or; some other malfunction that had not been defined to the crew. Soon after this decision was made; ZZZ maintenance control arrived to clear the bscu/hot brake ECAM. Along with the mechanic; a maintenance control supervisor accompanied them on the flight deck. Is this necessary in and of itself (supervisor)? The technician recycled the bscu/nose wheel steering switch as the pilots are allowed to do in the flight manual to no avail. He subsequently reset the circuit breakers for the respective maintenance control procedure to no avail either. Only after the brake temp was below 300 degrees with the 'hot brake' message cleared did the bscu reset with another circuit breaker reset. The technician stated the bscu will not reset until the brakes are below 300 degrees and that the overtemp likely caused the bscu failure. Using his logic; I then asked the technician why when the bscu #2 failed for this reason (high temperature); did the bscu #1 not fail immediately as well; when that computer (bscu #1) took over as the brake temperature at that moment was identical when bscu #2 failed? He could not offer an explanation. Another system test was run in ACARS on the bscu system after the hot brakes ECAM cleared and all tests passed. Both the maintenance control supervisor and technician proceeded downstairs to look at the left main and never returned to hopefully explain the previous brake issue and tire change to captain X. During this exchange; the captain was on the phone with maintenance control trying to further clarify the previous history and he stated that maintenance control asked them if local maintenance control had checked the brakes with a thermometer! Why is maintenance control asking the flight crew this question instead of asking their own local maintenance control personnel and then relaying the answer to the flight crew?! Shortly after the maintenance control team's departure captain Y from ZZZ first officer arrived at the aircraft with another person but I cannot remember his name. I believe by this time it was approximately xb:50L when captain Y began his discussion with us. Captain X again described in great detail his rationale for the refusal of this A319; due to no one being able to 'connect the dots' on the previous history and the bscu failure along with the rapid brake temperature rise on the previous landing at ZZZ. At this point I feel is where the discussion from captain Y should have ceased but it did not. He specifically asked us if we were willing to waive the contract for duty day limits and fly to far limits if they could find another aircraft as I presume he was already made aware of our impending duty day limit by the crew desk. The contractual limit for us on 10 august; was xc:14L and we were not willing to waive. Another comment was made by captain Y that they them self would take the flight; but they guessed they would have to find another first officer; if I was not going to waive the contractual limit; and I was not. This is absolutely; totally; out of line. First; no flight operations management personnel were needed or requested on the aircraft; either operationally or via SOP in accordance with the fom. Second; all duty day discussions are to be terminated immediately when the crew states they will not waive the contractual duty day limits. There is to be no 'asking to waive' far limits ever. The discussion is over and nothing else is to be debated. Captain Y subsequently left the aircraft and we began to pack up and begin the discussion with scheduling to find a hotel for the night and what was to be done with the remainder of our flight sequence. During the initial call to the crew desk as the day was over; the desk set up rooms at an airport hotel but could not tell us what was going to happen with the remainder of the identification at that point. The room booking occurred at xc:25L according to the identification audit trail. A period of time passed and as we approached the main terminal we decided to check the computer room with the hopes of finding out what we were doing for the rest of the identification. At this point; after logging on and seeing the identification we discovered we were booked on another carrier (booking occurred at xc:43L) the next morning in order to pick up the remainder of the identification and the last leg to ZZZ3 from ZZZ2. No instructions were received from the crew desk for the flight except check in at ticket counter as per the identification audit trail. Had we followed these rather ill-advised instructions; we would not have made the flight using domestic rules (one hour show time) as we had been told. We then attempted to check in on the carrier's web site thinking we would be booked in first class and we did not want to lose the seats. During this process; we discovered we were booked in coach; not first class. At this point I called the desk back and inquired about the contractual language requiring us to be booked into first class as business class was not available on this flight and it was off line. This entire discussion itself grew bigger as the minutes wore on. Calls were made to our union contract hot line; our union reps; and the crew desk personnel as well with the hopes of researching the answer. The decision stood (no first class); and after speaking with the crew desk supervisor; I was then placed on hold and then captain Y was placed on the phone to discuss this issue. After this entire firestorm we were denied first class seats but captain Y's larger concern was that we were still at the airport and not in rest at the hotel. This discussion with captain Y occurred at approximately xd:02L; just short of 14 hours before departure and was not even close to affecting our duty day for the next day. More importantly though; why is a crew being asked why are they not in rest when they are trying to understand why a completely black and white sentence in our contract states they should be in different deadhead seats that has to do with a current identification? Contractual rest is not to be interrupted by the company issues; especially when there is a question concerning the current identification that is in progress? So why then should the assistant chief pilot be concerned that we were not in rest yet when he knew there were possible contractual issues being addressed for the reassignment? We were well within our rights to determine if the reassignment on the current identification was legal and within the bounds of the contract going into rest for the evening. I'm sorry; but the crew desk has been proven wrong on enough occasions on their decisions that requesting a simple explanation for an answer that they have provided that specifically goes against one sentence in the contract is well within reason to question. This was a reassignment made to this crew and all we were attempting to do was authenticate its legality as it was presented to us in the scheduling computer. Upon arriving at the pickup point for the transportation to the hotel; the captain was told after he called company to see where they were at that they had not even received the voucher for the trip. This occurred at xd:30L; one hour and 5 minutes after the 'rooms needed' remark was placed into the audit trail. Where was the urgency for our rest from the crew desk if this event had not even been accomplished? The keys were issued to us at xd:45L at the hotel for the evening. I've attempted to portray 'pilot pushing' events that continue at the company with this chronology as they played out for pilot sequence schedule X august 2010 at ZZZ culminating with a refusal to waive contractual duty limits with ZZZ flight operations supervision. Apparently; the FAA has chosen to look at these events with a blind eye because they seem to occur over and over again; with only the flight operations management personnel changing for the next event but the methodology remains the same. This report is being filed via company channels; but I will retain a copy as well because it's quite obvious to many crews now that this behavior (questioning crews to determine if they will be waiving duty day limits; 'helping' crews with flight operations management personnel visiting the aircraft after a refusal when they are not in the decision loop unless desired by the captain in accordance with SOP) is

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 First Officer reports efforts by his airline to inappropriately coerce the flight crew to accept two aircraft assigned to their flight when they had already deemed them unacceptable. Reporter avers this is a normal practice at his airline which he is documenting.

Narrative: The main thrust of this report concerns the continued 'pilot pushing' at our airline with another documented event that I directly experienced. Pilot sequence schedule X does not reveal the intended operation of Pilot sequence schedule X. Therefore; Pilot sequence schedule X must be examined in order to understand how this unfolded for the pilots of this ID. The beginning of this pilot pushing event began with the Captain's refusal of the Airbus 319 for flight XX/ZZZ-ZZZ2 due to a pack being deferred inoperative. While waiting on the ground in ZZZ for the call/notification that the A319 was either going to be repaired or replaced for the subject flight XX; no call to us from Maintenance Control; or Dispatch ever occurred during that afternoon. The only call to the Captain came from Regional Assistant Chief Pilot; Captain Y. The issues relayed to me from Captain X's message from Captain Y was that Captain Y wanted to 'discuss' the refusal with Captain X along with Captain X's 'plans for the passengers' I'm not sure what was meant by plans for the passengers in this context. In accordance with Aircraft Refusal; Flight Operations Manual (FOM) page 7.30.1; no other party besides the Captain; Dispatch; and/or Maintenance Control is to be involved in the refusal process unless the Captain concurs with other parties participation. Captain X did not need or request any further outside intervention on his/her decision for the A319's refusal; hence only the above parties (Captain; Dispatch; and Maintenance Control) should have been involved in this decision. Again; no call from an appropriate agency (Dispatch or Maintenance Control only) came during this period. After a period of time with no calls; I went back to the computer and checked on the A319's status and only then did I realize we had subsequently been assigned Aircraft YY for this flight. This aircraft was due to arrive at the gate in ZZZ at approximately XA:38 local time with flight XX's new departure time scheduled for XB:15L. After new papers and weather were checked; the release for flight XX with Aircraft YY was signed and we proceeded to the gate to meet the aircraft and flight attendants. During the latter part of the arriving flight's deplaning I proceeded outside to conduct the preflight. Upon my return all of the passengers were gone but the previous flight's pilots were still in the cockpit working on a discrepancy that was discovered upon landing at ZZZ. Both Captains (arriving/departing) were discussing what happened as I returned from the walk around. The history is available for retrieval if desired but the discrepancies that were submitted were BSCU #2 and BRAKES HOT ECAM's; but only on the left main. The right main was normal. After the off going crew departed; Captain X briefed me on the discussion that occurred with the off going Captain. Apparently; the previous Captain stated that as the aircraft exited the runway after a normal landing; the BSCU #2 ECAM and the high brake temperature occurred almost instantly after exiting the runway; highly unusual for the Airbus as brake temperatures will normally gradually increase at possibly an increased rate; but not instantly. Also; high brake temperatures by themselves do not fail a BSCU. Additionally; the previous Captain stated the left main had both a tire and brake change in ORD before their flight. Armed with this information for the present malfunction along with the previous history for the left main from the crew; Captain X then refused this aircraft as well due to a possible bad brake assembly on the left side or; some other malfunction that had not been defined to the crew. Soon after this decision was made; ZZZ Maintenance Control arrived to clear the BSCU/hot brake ECAM. Along with the mechanic; a Maintenance Control supervisor accompanied them on the flight deck. Is this necessary in and of itself (supervisor)? The technician recycled the BSCU/Nose wheel steering switch as the pilots are allowed to do in the flight manual to no avail. He subsequently reset the circuit breakers for the respective Maintenance Control procedure to no avail either. Only after the brake temp was below 300 degrees with the 'Hot Brake' message cleared did the BSCU reset with another CB reset. The technician stated the BSCU will not reset until the brakes are below 300 degrees and that the overtemp likely caused the BSCU failure. Using his logic; I then asked the technician why when the BSCU #2 failed for this reason (high temperature); did the BSCU #1 NOT fail immediately as well; when that computer (BSCU #1) took over as the brake temperature at that moment was identical when BSCU #2 failed? He could not offer an explanation. Another system test was run in ACARS on the BSCU system after the Hot Brakes ECAM cleared and all tests passed. Both the Maintenance Control supervisor and technician proceeded downstairs to look at the left main and never returned to hopefully explain the previous brake issue and tire change to Captain X. During this exchange; the Captain was on the phone with Maintenance Control trying to further clarify the previous history and he stated that Maintenance Control asked them if local Maintenance Control had checked the brakes with a thermometer! Why is Maintenance Control asking the flight crew this question instead of asking their own local Maintenance Control personnel and then relaying the answer to the flight crew?! Shortly after the Maintenance Control team's departure Captain Y from ZZZ FO arrived at the aircraft with another person but I cannot remember his name. I believe by this time it was approximately XB:50L when Captain Y began his discussion with us. Captain X again described in great detail his rationale for the refusal of this A319; due to no one being able to 'connect the dots' on the previous history and the BSCU failure along with the rapid brake temperature rise on the previous landing at ZZZ. At this point I feel is where the discussion from Captain Y should have ceased but it did not. He specifically asked us if we were willing to waive the contract for duty day limits and fly to FAR limits if they could find another aircraft as I presume he was already made aware of our impending duty day limit by the crew desk. The contractual limit for us on 10 August; was XC:14L and we were not willing to waive. Another comment was made by Captain Y that they them self would take the flight; but they guessed they would have to find another First Officer; if I was not going to waive the contractual limit; and I was not. This is absolutely; totally; out of line. First; NO flight operations management personnel were needed or requested on the aircraft; either operationally or via SOP in accordance with the FOM. Second; all duty day discussions are to be terminated immediately when the crew states they will NOT waive the contractual duty day limits. There is to be no 'asking to waive' FAR limits ever. The discussion is over and nothing else is to be debated. Captain Y subsequently left the aircraft and we began to pack up and begin the discussion with scheduling to find a hotel for the night and what was to be done with the remainder of our flight sequence. During the initial call to the crew desk as the day was over; the desk set up rooms at an airport hotel but could not tell us what was going to happen with the remainder of the ID at that point. The room booking occurred at XC:25L according to the ID audit trail. A period of time passed and as we approached the main terminal we decided to check the computer room with the hopes of finding out what we were doing for the rest of the ID. At this point; after logging on and seeing the ID we discovered we were booked on another carrier (booking occurred at XC:43L) the next morning in order to pick up the remainder of the ID and the last leg to ZZZ3 from ZZZ2. No instructions were received from the crew desk for the flight except check in at ticket counter as per the ID audit trail. Had we followed these rather ill-advised instructions; we would not have made the flight using domestic rules (one hour show time) as we had been told. We then attempted to check in on the carrier's web site thinking we would be booked in first class and we did not want to lose the seats. During this process; we discovered we were booked in coach; not first class. At this point I called the desk back and inquired about the contractual language requiring us to be booked into first class as business class was not available on this flight and it was off line. This entire discussion itself grew bigger as the minutes wore on. Calls were made to our union contract hot line; our union reps; and the crew desk personnel as well with the hopes of researching the answer. The decision stood (no first class); and after speaking with the crew desk supervisor; I was then placed on hold and then Captain Y was placed on the phone to discuss this issue. After this entire firestorm we were denied first class seats but Captain Y's larger concern was that we were still at the airport and NOT in rest at the hotel. This discussion with Captain Y occurred at approximately XD:02L; just short of 14 hours before departure and was not even close to affecting our duty day for the next day. More importantly though; why is a crew being asked why are they not in rest when they are trying to understand why a completely black and white sentence in our contract states they should be in different deadhead seats that has to do with a current ID? Contractual rest is not to be interrupted by the company issues; especially when there is a question concerning the current ID that is in progress? So why then should the Assistant Chief Pilot be concerned that we were not in rest yet when he knew there were possible contractual issues being addressed for the reassignment? We were well within our rights to determine if the reassignment on the current ID was legal and within the bounds of the contract going into rest for the evening. I'm sorry; but the crew desk has been proven wrong on enough occasions on their decisions that requesting a simple explanation for an answer that they have provided that specifically goes against ONE sentence in the contract is well within reason to question. This was a reassignment made to this crew and all we were attempting to do was authenticate its legality as it was presented to us in the scheduling computer. Upon arriving at the pickup point for the transportation to the hotel; the Captain was told after he called company to see where they were at that they had not even received the voucher for the trip. This occurred at XD:30L; one hour and 5 minutes AFTER the 'rooms needed' remark was placed into the audit trail. Where was the urgency for our rest from the crew desk if this event had not even been accomplished? The keys were issued to us at XD:45L at the hotel for the evening. I've attempted to portray 'pilot pushing' events that continue at the company with this chronology as they played out for Pilot sequence schedule X August 2010 at ZZZ culminating with a refusal to waive contractual duty limits with ZZZ Flight Operations supervision. Apparently; the FAA has chosen to look at these events with a blind eye because they seem to occur over and over again; with only the Flight Operations Management personnel changing for the next event but the methodology remains the same. This report is being filed via company channels; but I will retain a copy as well because it's quite obvious to many crews now that this behavior (questioning crews to determine if they will be waiving duty day limits; 'helping' crews with flight operations management personnel visiting the aircraft after a refusal when they are not in the decision loop unless desired by the Captain in accordance with SOP) is

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.